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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates determinants of executive remuneration, both of highest paid 
directors and the rest of management members in listed Chinese firms. It focuses on 
the impacts of the board of directors, ownership structure and internal and external 
labour market comparison factors on executive remuneration. As a major transitional 
economy and with unique corporate governance characteristics, China provides an 
interesting and important context to study executive remuneration and corporate 
governance.
A panel data set of 417 firms over 2001-2003 is analyzed using multivariate 
techniques. Interviews with 10 Chinese directors are conducted to supplement the 
quantitative results. The results show a significant relationship between executive 
remuneration on the one hand and board characteristics and ownership structure on 
the other hand. However, some of the strong results reported in the Western literature 
are absent in this study, for instance the monitoring effects of institutional ownership 
and independent directors. This raises possible concerns about the relevance of 
agency theory models for studying executive pay in transitional economies like that of 
China.
This thesis finds the notion of ‘market going rate’ explain a significant part of the 
levels and dynamics of executive remuneration. The results suggest that the internal 
and external comparisons factors identified in Western economies also function in the 
transitional economy of China.
This thesis not only contributes to the literature on corporate governance, but also has 
important implications and recommendations for policy makers and corporate 
practitioners in transitional economic and political contexts.
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sections Page No.
The title of thesis I
Declaration II
Acknowledgments III
Abstract IV
Table of contents V
List of tables IX
List of figures X
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Research background and motivations 3
1.3 Research aims and objectives 10
1.4 Research methods 11
1.5 The importance of the study 12
1.6 Main findings and contributions 14
1.7 Structure of the thesis 16
1.8 Summary 21
CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 22
2.1 Introduction 22
2.2 China’s economic reform and capital market 23
2.2.1 The reform of state-owned enterprises in China 24
2.2.2 Capital market and stock exchanges 26
2.3 Corporate governance in China 32
2.3.1 A historical perspective on corporate governance 33
2.3.2 Current corporate governance in China 39
2.3.3 The characteristics and problems of current corporate governance in
China
48
2.4 Compensation and incentives in China 58
2.4.1 The traditional model 58
2.4.2 The contracting model 59
2.4.3 The modem corporation model 64
2.4.4 Characteristics of the current executive compensation system in China 66
2.5 Summary 68
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES.. 71
3.1 Introduction 71
3.2 Agency theory 72
V
Sections Page No.
3.2.1 Origin of agency theory 72
3.2.2 Agency theory 73
3.2.3 Development of agency theory 75
3.2.4 Contributions and criticisms of agency theory 81
3.3 Review of empirical literature and hypotheses development 86
3.3.1 Board characteristics and executive remuneration 88
3.3.2 Ownership structure and CEO remuneration 95
3.3.3 Market comparison factors and executive pay 105
3.4 Other determinants of executive remuneration- control variables 110
3.4.1 Firm performance 111
3.4.2 Firm size 113
3.4.3 Firm diversification 115
3.4.4 Risk 116
3.4.5 Managerial human capital attributes 117
3.5 Summary 119
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 122
4.1 Introduction 122
4.2 Panel data analysis 124
4.2.1 Panel data 124
4.2.2 Fixed effects models versus random effects model 126
4.3 Modelling specification 128
4.4 Sample, data and measures of variables 138
4.4.1 Sample 138
4.4.2 Data collection 139
4.4.3 Variables and measures 141
4.5 Some data analytical issues 153
4.5.1 Three steps of analyses 153
4.5.2 Dealing with statistical problems 155
4.6 Interviews 161
4.6.1 The sample 161
4.6.2 Semi-structured interviews 163
4.6.3 The procedures 163
4.7 Summary 165
CHAPTER 5 INITIAL ANALYSIS 167
5.1 Introduction 167
5.2 Descriptive analysis of the key variables 168
5.2.1 Executive compensation 168
5.2.2 Characteristics of board of directors 172
5.2.3 Ownership structure 176
5.2.4 Control variables 179
VI
Sections Page No.
5.3 Correlation analysis 183
5.4 Summary 187
CHAPTER 6 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS-PAY LEVEL MODELS 189
6.1 Introduction 189
6.2 HPD pay level models 190
6.2.1 Board characteristics 192
6.2.2 Ownership structure 196
6.2.3 Control variables 199
6.2.4 Interaction terms 203
6.2.5 Internal comparison effects 204
6.2.6 Regression diagnostics and robustness tests 205
6.3 The rest of management pay models 214
6.3.1 Model lc-Rest 216
6.3.2 Interaction terms 220
6.3.3 Internal comparison effects on REST pay 221
6.4 The effect of internal comparison factors on HPD pay 224
6.4.1 Model 1 e-HPD and Model 1 f-HPD 224
6.4.2 Model lg-HPD 225
6.5 Discussion and conclusion 228
CHAPTER 7 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES - PAY CHANGE MODELS 231
7.1 Introduction 231
7.2 First difference models of executive pay 232
7.2.1 HPD pay changes 233
7.2.2 REST pay changes 235
7.3 Replicating the Ezzamel and Watson models (1998; 2002) 237
7.3.1 The impact of external pay comparison factors 237
7.3.2 The impact of internal comparison factors 244
7.4 Extension of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) 251
7.4.1 External comparison factors and an extension to HPD pay changes 252
7.4.2 Internal comparison factors and an extension to HPD pay changes 256
7.4.3 Extension of Ezzamel & Watson (2002)-REST pay changes 259
7.5 Discussion and conclusion 263
CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 267
8.1 Introduction 267
8.2 Hypotheses and findings 268
8.3 Board characteristics and executive remuneration 269
8.3.1 Board size and executive remuneration 270
8.3.2 Board composition and executive remuneration 273
8.3.3 CEO-chairman duality and executive remuneration 277
VII
Sections Page No.
8.4 Ownership structure and executive remuneration 278
8.4.1 State ownership and executive remuneration 278
8.4.2 Institutional ownership and executive remuneration 280
8.4.3 Managerial ownership and CEO remuneration 283
8.5 Market comparisons and executive remuneration 285
8.5.1 External market comparisons and executive pay 285
8.5.2 internal comparisons and executive pay 288
8.6 Conclusion 290
CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 293
9.1 Introduction 293
9.2 Research background, objectives, hypotheses, and methods 294
9.3 Summary of discussion and findings 297
9.4 Contributions and implications 304
9.4.1 Contribution to the literature 304
9.4.2 Implications and recommendations 307
9.5 Limitations and future research 312
9.6 Summary and conclusion 314
REFERENCES 316
APPENDIX 1 Outline of the Interview 335
VIII
LIST OF TABLES
Table No. Table Title Page No.
Table 2.1 Types of China Shares 29
Table 2.2 Number of Listed Companies (1994-2004) 30
Table 2.3 Characteristics of Corporate Governance Models 49
Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses (Hs) and Sections to Present the 121
Related Results
Table 4.1 Definition of Variables 152
Table 4.2 Information about Interviewees 159
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Executive Pay Variables 169
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Board Characteristics 173
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure (%) 178
Table 5.4 Performance and Firm Size 180
Table 5.5 Other Control Variables 182
Table 5.6 Pearson Correlation Matrix 185
Table 6.1 HPD Pay Level Models (Dependent Variable: LnHPDpay) 194
Table 6.2 Table of VIFs for Model 1 c 207
Table 6.3 REST Pay Level Models (Dependent Variable: LnRESTpay, 215
2001-2003)
Table 6.4 HPD Pay Level Models (Dependent Variable=LnHPDpay, 227
2001-2003)
Table 7.1 Executive Pay Change Models (Dependent Variable: HPD 234
Pay Changes REST Pay Changes)
Table 7.2 External Comparison Factors and Executive Pay Changes 239
(Dependent Variable: HPD Pay Changes and REST Pay 
Changes)
Table 7.3 Internal Comparison Factors and HPD Pay Changes 247
Table 7.4 Internal Comparison Factors and REST Pay Changes 250
Table 7.5 Extension of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) 253
Models—HPD Pay Changes 
Table 7.6 Extension of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) 260
Models—REST Pay Changes 
Table 8.1 Summary of Hypotheses (H.) and Findings 269
IX
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure No. Figure Title Figure No.
Figure 5.1 CEO Dualities over Time 175
Figure 5.2 Percentage of State-Ownership over Time 177
Figure 5.3 Box Plot of Return on Total Assets 181
Figure 6.1 Residuals versus Fitted Values Plot of Model lc 205
Figure 6.2 The Distribution of Residuals of Model lc-Rest 219
x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Corporate governance has been at the heart of the business debate in most developed 
economies, as reflected both in the voluminous academic and practitioner literatures 
and in government regulations (Keasey et al. 1999). Recent financial scandals in the 
West, such as Enron and WorldCom, have led to calls for much tighter corporate 
governance reforms. The central problem in any corporate governance system is one 
of agency: how to entice managers to take decisions that maximize shareholders’ 
wealth (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). This problem is never easily 
addressed and has drawn continuing attention in the literature. Due to the data 
limitations and the sensitivity of the topic, executive remuneration remains distinctly 
under-explored in China. Very little has been written on the effects of corporate 
governance on executive remuneration.
China has been experiencing significant economic and social changes in the last 
decade. The Chinese government has enforced a series of economic reforms and one 
of the goals is to establish a sound corporate governance system to ensure the 
sustainable development of Chinese enterprises (Bai et al. 2006; Cha 2001). In 
particular, recent corporate scandals, capital flight cases and “the 59 years old 
phenomenon” 1, etc., have prompted the government bodies to place corporate
1 “The 59 years old phenomenon” describes a trend in which people with power (such as government 
officials and state owned entrepreneurs) grasp the last chance o f using their positions o f influence 
immediately before they have to retire at 60, by law, to “gain advantage by trickeries”, usually by 
corruption, bribery, or theft.
1
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governance, management incentives and restraints more specifically at the top of their 
agendas. To a certain degree, solving the management incentive problems is an 
important determinant of the success of Chinese economic reform (Wu 2002). The 
Chinese government has been adopting Western governance mechanisms to China 
(Cha 2001); however, will Western governance models work in China? It is 
interesting to investigate corporate governance in China, especially given its special 
context - a transitional economy undergoing rapid social and economic changes.
Initially motivated by these concerns, this thesis examines the level and changes in 
executive remuneration in Chinese listed companies, focusing on the effects of board 
of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure and the internal and external market 
comparison factors. A panel dataset of 417 listed firms for the period 2001-2003 is 
analyzed using multivariate techniques to test hypotheses developed from agency 
theory and the institutional background of China. Interviews with 5 executive 
directors and 5 independent directors are conducted to gain an insider’s insight, which 
helps understand corporate governance in China and interpret the empirical results.
The results show mixed support for the research hypotheses and by implication, for 
agency theory. It can be concluded that both the corporate governance mechanisms 
and the market comparison factors play an important role in setting executive pay in 
Chinese listed firms. However, some of the strong results reported in the Western 
literature are absent in this study, in particular the lack of a negative relationship 
between executive remuneration and institutional ownership and that between 
executive remuneration and the proportion of independent directors, thus raising 
concerns about the relevance of traditional governance models for studying executive
2
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pay in transitional economies like that of China. The results of this thesis not only 
contribute to the literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration, but 
also have important implications for policy makers and the practitioners of corporate 
control in China.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the remainder of the thesis. Section 2 
covers the research background and motivation of the study. Section 3 presents the 
aims and objectives of the thesis. Section 4 discusses research methods. Section 5 
discusses the significance of the research undertaken in this thesis. Section 6 
summarizes the main findings. Finally, Section 7 provides a brief account of each 
chapter.
1.2 Research background and motivations
Corporate governance is one of the core issues within most developed economies. 
According to McKinsey & Company, in recent years, corporate governance has 
become an important element in shaping how an enterprise is valued in the market 
place (Monks 2003). A vast literature has emerged covering many aspects of 
corporate governance, including the impact of the characteristics of the board of 
directors on executive remuneration, one of the most controversial and interesting 
issues in corporate governance (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998; Ezzamel 2005; 
Gomez-Mejia 1994; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997).
According to Blair (1995), corporate governance can be defined both narrowly and 
broadly. More often, it is viewed broadly as referring to the whole set of legal,
3
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cultural, and institutional arrangements which includes corporation law and board 
room practices, corporate finance, securities and bankruptcy law, laws governing the 
behaviour of financial institutions, labour relations practices, contract law and theory, 
property rights, remuneration systems, and information and control systems. An 
efficient corporate governance structure is one that leads to the most efficient use of 
resources to create wealth for society as a whole (Blair 1995). Although numerous 
individuals or institutions may contribute resources to and have a stake in the success 
of a given corporation, professional managers largely control the broad policies and 
applications of strategic plans. Therefore the central problem in any corporate 
governance system is how to make corporate executives accountable to the other 
contributors to the enterprise while still giving those executives the freedom, the 
incentives, and the control over resources they need in order to exploit investment 
opportunities and to be tough competitors. However, this can not be easily achieved 
due to the existence of the agency problem.
The agency problem is an essential element of the contractual view of the firm due to 
the separation of ownership and control (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
According to agency theory, managers are self-interest seeking rather than 
shareholder-value maximising. Theoretically, there are three ways to increase the 
likelihood that management will act in the interest of shareholders: bond them 
contractually to do so; monitor them to ensure that they do so; and/or provide them 
with incentives so that it is in their own interest to do so (Denis 2001). But in practice, 
these methods do not always work.
4
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Ideally, by signing a complete contract with the manager, the financiers can specify 
what the manager does in all states of the world and how the profits are allocated. The 
trouble is that the real world is too complicated to wholly describe and foresee future 
events. As a consequence, managers have substantial residual control rights and 
therefore discretion to allocate funds as they choose, though with certain limits on this 
discretion (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This means that managers have the scope to 
behave opportunistically, whether in the form of expropriation of investors’ funds or 
of misallocation of company funds. Meanwhile, the managers’ fiduciary duty to 
shareholders makes it difficult to contract around inefficient actions ex post (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997).
On the other hand, it is difficult to rely on dispersed shareholders to act as effective 
monitors, due to their lack of expertise and incentive to monitor. Therefore, a better 
solution lies in designing and using incentive mechanisms by granting a manager a 
highly contingent, long-term incentive contract ex ante to align managers’ interests 
with those of the owners or shareholders. If shareholders want to maximise expected 
financial return on their common stocks, they will benefit from any mechanism that 
also makes management benefit from an increase in the value of the firms’ ordinary 
shares (Denis 2001).
Consequently, the issue of executive pay has been one of the key indicators of the 
effectiveness of a corporate governance system and has motivated more research 
(Becht 2005). According to Greenbury (1995) and Conyon et al. (2000a), 
remuneration arrangements are a strategic tool used to attract, retain and motivate key 
employees in an increasingly international labour market. Board and executive
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remuneration are of concern to shareholders. Companies are expected to disclose 
sufficient information on the remuneration of board members and key executives so 
that investors can properly assess the costs and benefits of remuneration plans and the 
contribution of incentive schemes, such as stock option schemes, to corporate 
performance. Generally, studies of executive remuneration can be grouped to reflect 
three issues in the remuneration design (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997):
• the criteria used in determining pay and employment; 
the consequences to the incumbent; and
The mechanisms used to link the remuneration criteria to the remuneration 
consequences.
Research on top management remuneration spans a very large number of studies 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998). The majority of these studies are based on agency 
theory and focus on incentive alignment issues, anticipating a positive relationship 
between executive remuneration and firm performance. However, many authors 
express disappointment at the low sensitivity of firm performance to remuneration 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998). Therefore, some researchers, such as Jensen & 
Murphy (1990b) and Barkema & Gomez-Mejia (1998) suggest that researchers should 
examine factors outside an agency framework to explain CEO remuneration. Recent 
studies have begun to explore a variety of alternative models for explaining CEO pay 
(Bowen 1994; Daily et al. 1998; David et al. 1998 etc.; Ezzamel and Watson 1998, 
2002; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1994; Useem and Gager 1996; Westphal and Zajac 
1994, 1995). These studies incorporate other important factors into the remuneration 
model, explicitly integrating or comparing agency theory with other theories, or using 
varying international contexts outside the U.S.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The extant literature provides helpful insights into the factors that determine executive 
remuneration. However, little has been done to explore the extent to which models of 
corporate governance developed in Western economies can be extended to the 
transition economy of countries such as China.
One of the more important duties of any board of directors is to appoint, and set 
appropriate remuneration of, executives. According to agency theory, performance- 
related pay is a key method of aligning interests of shareholders and managers. The 
duty of setting the pay of senior executives is often performed by non-executive 
members of the board, a situation that creates an additional potential agency conflict 
between the board members, who may themselves be largely recruited by the 
executives, and shareholders (Becht 2005). In the USA and the UK, it has been 
advocated that remuneration committees, dominated by non-executive directors,
should set the pay for senior managers (Becht 2005; Greenbury 1995). China has
recently introduced similar governance reforms, raising the question as to whether 
Western board structures will work in China and providing a motivation to test the 
relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and executive 
remuneration.
Evidence from Western literature points to the key role played by shareholders in 
terms of monitoring corporate management and promoting better corporate
governance mechanisms. More specifically, some studies have examined the role of 
shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, in setting executive remuneration 
by linking executive remuneration to firm ownership (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; 
Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995; Holdemess 2003b). However, most of these
7
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
researches focus on the effect of ownership concentration and seldom explore the 
different effects of specific types of institutional ownership. Also, evidence is sparse 
on the relationship between executive remuneration and ownership structure in 
transitional economies. Chinese firms have been well-known for their very high 
concentrated ownership structures, especially the domination of state ownership. As 
the state continues its slow and gradual withdrawal from direct ownership, one of 
China’s corporate governance reforms, China now has a rich variety of ownership 
structures. For example, there are several different types of institutional shareholders, 
such as foreign institutional investors, state controlled enterprise, and private 
corporate. Therefore, China offers an interesting and distinct context for studying the 
effects of a variety of ownership structures on executive remuneration.
The vast majority of the literature on corporate governance is based on agency theory 
and focuses predominantly on incentive alignment issues, testing for a positive 
relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance (Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia 1998). However, the results of many studies have not been fully 
supportive of agency theory. This could be due to limitations of the theory itself, or it 
may be because of inappropriate identification of the most relevant variables, 
measurement of variables, or choice of statistical models and techniques. Calls have 
been repeatedly made for broadening the theoretical base of research, for example by 
combining agency theory with other theories, by using varying international contexts 
other than that of the U.S. and the UK, by modeling other important determinants 
such as the market, firm size, managerial behaviour and characteristics, by 
benchmarking against industry or market norms, or by examining finer variations in 
ownership structure and characteristics of boards of directors etc. (Barkema and
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Gomez-Mejia 1998; Ezzamel and Watson 2002; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). A 
number of recent papers have emerged in response to this call (Daily et a l 1998; 
David et a l 1998; Ezzamel and Watson 1998, 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003).
From the perspective of social comparison theory and equity theory, Ezzamel & 
Watson (2002) found that the external labour market, as well as internal pay 
comparisons within boards of directors, was significant in explaining the adjustment 
of executive pay. In this work, the authors identified an interesting but surprisingly 
under-explored research area. Similar work has not been conducted outside the UK. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to explore the extent to which the Ezzamel and Watson 
results hold in a non-Westem context. Given the socio-political and economic 
differences between the UK and China, a study of this nature is likely to shed further 
light on issues of governance that relate more specifically to transition economies. 
Equally, it is worthy attempting to extend the work of Ezzamel & Watson (1998; 2002) 
by taking into account the effects of board and ownership characteristics, to explore 
whether it changes the linkage between market comparisons and executive 
remuneration.
In addition, substantial literature already exists and provides numerous helpful 
insights linking executive remuneration with firm ownership (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein 1995; Holdemess 2003b) and board characteristics (Boyd 1994; Core et a l 
1999; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Mehran 1995; Yermack 1996). However, apart 
from a few studies such as Ezzamel & Watson (1998; 2002) and Main et a l (1996), 
insufficient attention has been paid to pay dynamics for the board/management 
members other than the CEO (or the highest paid director). Therefore, the pay
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dynamics for board/management members other than the CEO (or the highest paid 
director) remains largely unexplored and requires further research.
Finally, we know precious little about executive remuneration dynamics and their 
determinants in contexts other than those of advanced capitalist countries. As a 
developing country, China offers an interesting contrast in that it is a socialist country 
with emerging elements of a market economy, as manifested in the large number of 
listed companies in Chinese stock markets. These companies exhibit some 
characteristics similar to those of the public listed companies in advanced capitalist 
countries; but crucially, they exhibit country-specific characteristics, such as the 
presence of large stakes of state ownership. Furthermore, Chinese listed companies 
operate in fundamentally different socio-economic and political contexts compared to 
those in the USA and the UK, as evidenced in Chinese corporate regulations and 
governance mechanisms. Therefore, it is worth exploring corporate governance 
practice and the impact of such diverse contexts on executive remuneration in China.
1.3 Research aims and objectives
Motivated by these concerns, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by 
investigating how executive remuneration, both of the highest paid directors (HPD 
pay) and the rest of management members (REST pay), is determined in Chinese 
listed companies. The thesis also aims to explore the extent to which models of 
corporate governance developed in Western economies can be sensibly extended to 
the mixed economy of China
10
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First, the thesis focuses on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and executive remuneration, in particular the impact of the board of 
directors and ownership characteristics on executive remuneration. Second, this thesis 
investigates the relevance of internal and external market comparisons, as identified 
by Ezzamel & Watson (1998; 2002), in determining the levels and changes of pay for 
highest paid directors and other management members in China. In addition to 
replicating their models, this thesis also explores the possible effects of taking into 
account board and ownership characteristics on the results of Ezzamel & Watson’s 
models.
Therefore, the main factors that this thesis focuses on are characteristics of boards of 
directors, ownership structure, external labour market and internal comparison factors, 
although other factors affecting executive remuneration identified by previous studies 
will be incorporated into the model as control variables (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 
1997), such as firm performance, firm size, risk, firm diversification, industrial sector 
and location.
1.4 Research methods
This thesis offers empirical evidence on the roles played by the corporate governance 
and market comparison factors in setting executive remuneration. A number of 
research hypotheses are developed from a review of the literature on corporate 
governance and the institutional background in China. These hypotheses relate 
executive remuneration (level or changes) to board size, board composition, board 
leadership structure, state ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership,
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and internal and external market comparison factors. To test these hypotheses, a 
sample of 417 listed Chinese companies is used, covering a period of three years, 
2001-2003, giving a total of 1251 firm observations. This panel dataset permits the 
capture of possible effects of any time dynamics on the estimated equations.
Descriptive analyses of the relevant variables are conducted to understand the 
characteristics of the data and to check for possible violation of the assumptions 
underlying the statistical techniques applied to address the research questions. Bi- 
variate correlations are first run to identify the preliminary associations between 
variables. Afterwards, a series of multiple regression models are run to test the 
hypotheses. The data is analysed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, first 
difference models, fixed effect models and Two Stage Least squares (2SLS) 
regression. Equations are estimated independently for the highest paid directors and 
for the remainder of the management, followed by a series of robustness check. All 
data analyses are conducted using the STATA statistical software package, with the 
Excel spreadsheet used for data housekeeping.
1.5 The importance of the study
As mentioned earlier, executive remuneration and corporate governance has received 
wide-spread attention in the last few decades (Conyon and He 2004; Gomez-Mejia 
1994). China has recently been witnessing fundamental changes in its economy and 
corporate governance. Given the socio-political and economic differences between 
China and Western countries that have been the focus of the majority of previous 
research, a study of this nature is likely to shed further light on issues of governance
12
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that relate more specifically to transition economies. Hence, this study has the 
potential to contribute to the literature on corporate governance and to have 
implications for policy makers, the practitioners of corporate control and international 
investors in transitional economies.
More specifically, there are three reasons why studying corporate governance in 
China is important. First, China is becoming a significant player in the world 
economy. China is the largest transitional economy with a rapidly expanding 
corporate sector and stock market. Further, China’s corporate sector and stock market 
are increasingly integrated with the global economy through large amounts of foreign 
direct investment in China, China’s entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
the introduction of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) system2 and the 
increasing number of Chinese firms going listed in overseas stock exchanges (Liu 
2006; Nolan 2002). As a result, there is a growing international demand for more 
knowledge and guidance on how Chinese listed firms are governed and managed.
Second, management incentives and restraints have become critical issues in 
corporate governance, perhaps driven to prominence by emerging corporate scandals 
and “the 59 year old phenomenon”. As Jinglian Wu, the Chief Economist at the 
Chinese Council’s Research & Development Centre, has noted, addressing these 
problems properly is urgent and will have a major impact on the success of the reform 
of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Wu 2002).
2 QFII program refers to overseas investors (fund management institutions, insurance companies, 
securities companies, and other asset management institutions), approved by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), who can invest in Chinese domestic securities markets.
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Third, the scale of the 2001 corporate scandals and capital outflow prompted the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to place corporate governance at 
the top of their economic reform agenda, as reflected in the issuing of a series of rules 
and policies, e.g. The Code of Corporate Governance of Listed companies (CSRC 
2002). Given that determinants of executive pay are among the key indicators of the 
success of the corporate-govemance system (Becht 2005), the research in this thesis 
could help inform important policy implications in designing effective governance 
structures (Dalton and Dalton 2005).
Finally, China is in the early stages of transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy, providing a unique opportunity to examine corporate governance in 
transition. It is important to conduct the study now because the window of opportunity 
is only open for a short period of time before China becomes a major market economy.
1.6 Main findings and contributions
In general, the empirical results show that board characteristics, ownership structure 
and external and internal comparison factors all play an important role in shaping 
executive remuneration in Chinese listed firms, though not all as anticipated by the 
hypotheses. Specifically, the results of the pay level models suggest that executive 
pay, both the pay of the highest paid director (HPD) and the pay of the rest of the 
management team other than the three highest paid directors (REST), is positively and 
significantly related to the proportion of independent directors, foreign ownership and 
managerial ownership. State ownership seems to show no significant impact on HPD 
pay. The thesis also finds a non-linear relationship between executive pay and board
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size, which implies that executive pay peaks at a certain board size. CEO- 
Chairman/Vice Chairman dualities and other institutional ownership structure 
variables all have a positive and significant impact on HPD pay, but not in the case of 
REST pay. Both the HPD and REST pay models reveal a positive relation between 
HPD pay and REST pay, suggesting that there is an internal comparison effect on 
executive pay.
The results of the first difference models show that firm size, performance and the 
market comparison factors, both internal and external, have significant explanatory 
power over the change in HPD pay, while most corporate governance variables and 
other control variables have at best weak associations with the dynamics of HPD pay. 
The results indicate that some of the market comparison effects identified in the West 
also function in a transitional economy like China.
These findings provide mixed evidence for agency theory and the extant literature. 
Some of the strong results reported in the Western literature are absent in this study. 
For example, the literature has reported a negative relation between executive pay and 
institutional ownership. However, the results of the current study show a positive 
relation between institutional ownership and executive remuneration. Similarly, the 
result related to the relation between executive pay and the proportion of the 
independent directors is also in the opposite direction to that hypothesized. Therefore, 
the results should be interpreted with caution and should be related to the specific 
characteristics and background of Chinese listed firms. The insiders’ insights gained 
from the interviewees offer invaluable help in better understanding the empirical 
results.
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Care is taken in this thesis in undertaking the analysis reported here. The analysis 
includes checks for the endogeneity problem between firm performance and executive 
remuneration by employing 2SLS models. The models are also checked for their 
sensitivity to variations in statistical procedure by testing the stability of the results 
when using different variants of multiple regression analysis (OLS, outlier-resistant 
regression, and regression corrected for heteroscedasticity). A battery of tests is also 
conducted to check whether the assumptions underpinning regression are met in the 
data. Finally, many of the variables are measured in more than one way and / or 
transformed to meet the assumptions of regression and to check for the robustness of 
the findings. Taken together, these procedures enhance the robustness of the results to 
the method of analysis.
The findings of this study can lead to timely practical implications and
recommendations, however small, to influence the progress of Chinese corporate
governance reform. Before introducing the traditional governance models from the 
West, Chinese regulators need to consider the relevant institutional settings in China 
that are required in order to ensure that models work as expected.
1.7 Structure of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis comprises eight chapters and is structured as follows.
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the institutional background of 
China. Since the reform and open policy was launched in 1978, China has
experienced a rapid development and has now become one of the most powerful
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economies in the world. However, as a transitional economy, it has different 
institutional settings compared with the Western. Chapter 2 first reviews the process 
and main areas of China’s economic reforms, including state-owned enterprises, 
capital market and stock exchanges, which provide the general background for the 
corporate governance developments in China. It then moves on to introduce the 
historical development, current situation, characteristics and existing problems of 
corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. More specifically, the issues of 
executive remuneration and incentives are discussed. Generally speaking, both the 
economic situation and corporate governance system in China have improved 
substantially; however, there are still some bottlenecks that might hinder Chinese 
firms from achieving further improvement. One of these bottlenecks is related to 
managerial incentive and constraint, which makes the issue of executive remuneration 
an urgent and important topic for both researchers and policy makers.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration 
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Based on this review the hypotheses 
of the thesis are developed. The chapter first reviews agency theory, a theory that is 
most heavily used in the literature on executive remuneration, followed by a 
discussion of the empirical literature on executive remuneration. Research hypotheses 
are derived based agency theory, previous literature and the Chinese specific 
institutional context. These hypotheses relate executive remuneration to several 
groups of factors: board characteristics, firm ownership structure, and external and 
internal market pay comparison factors. Other important factors that determine 
executive pay are also discussed and reviewed in this chapter and are included in this
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study as control variables. In summary, this chapter presents the theoretical 
framework and argument for this study.
Chapter 4 explains the issues related to research methods including the sample, data, 
models, variables, and statistical techniques employed in the analyses. The chapter 
first offers a brief introduction to the techniques used, namely OLS regression models, 
and Panel data fixed effects and random effects models. Although panel data 
techniques are known as better at analyzing cross-sectional and time series data, they 
do require sufficient variation in the data over time (Stock and Watson 2003; 
Wooldridge 2002a). Due to the lack of variation in many variables employed in this 
study, OLS is used as the basic and main technique for data analyses. Several models 
are specified in this chapter to test research hypotheses, followed by a detailed 
explanation and discussion of sample selection, data collection and the choice and 
measurement of variables. The main variables are proxied by a variety of measures to 
supplement the main analyses. Finally, some statistically-related issues and means of 
dealing with them are discussed.
Chapter 5 reports the results of initial analyses, which include descriptive results and 
bi-variate correlations. Descriptive results are presented in four groups: executive 
remuneration, board characteristics, ownership structure and the control variables. 
From the descriptive results, the nature of the data is explored and the trend / changes 
in the variables are noted. For example, I observe an increase in the proportion of 
independent directors over time, a decreasing percentage of state ownership and an 
increased separation of CEO and board role, which all reflect the efforts of the 
Chinese government towards corporate governance reform. The bi-variate analyses
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also offer useful insights into identifying possible sources of multicollinearity in order 
to address them properly in subsequent multivariate analysis.
Chapter 6 carries out multivariate analyses for executive pay levels, to test 
Hypotheses la-6b and Hypothesis 8. The thesis estimates both HPD pay and REST 
pay. Chapter 6 first presents and discusses the results for HPD pay models. The 
results show that most of the focal variables have a significant impact on HPD pay. 
Robust tests are conducted by the different proxies of main variables, with a different 
sample, and different analytical methods. Next, the models for REST are presented 
and discussed, which show that there are some common factors that determine both 
HPD pay and REST, but the significance of the governance variables can be different 
in determining pay for these two groups of management members. Regression 
diagnostics are calculated and presented after every regression model and emerging 
problems are dealt with econometrically.
Chapter 7 reports and analyses the results for the pay change models. It first discusses 
the pay change models related to the effects of governance variables and the usual 
firm size and performance variables. It goes on to test Hypotheses 7a, 7b, 8 and 9 
which are concerned with the impact of previous-period pay anomalies compared to 
the market pay level and the internal pay comparison factors. The analysis first 
duplicates the studies of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) by defining the pay 
anomalies as the residuals of the traditional agency pay model (estimated by firm size 
and performance). Afterwards, this chapter moves on to further test these Hypotheses 
by redefining the estimate model of market pay level (including the governance and 
control variables) and re-running the models. The results vary in precise detail
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
between the two versions of the models, but show general support for Ezzamel and 
Watson’s findings (1998; 2002): both external and internal comparison factors play 
significant roles in executive pay adjustments.
Chapter 8 recaps and discusses the main findings of the empirical analyses in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 relating to the focal variables: board characteristics, ownership 
structure and market comparisons. It first tabulates the research hypotheses and the 
related results. It then discusses the results at a general and holistic level, linking the 
empirical results to the research hypotheses, previous literature and Chinese 
institutional characteristics. The findings of the interviews are also extracted and used 
to help understand and interpret the related empirical results in this chapter. Generally 
speaking, this thesis shows mixed support for the research hypotheses: Hypotheses la, 
3a, 2b, 6b, 7a and 8 are supported; Hypotheses lb, 3b, 4a, 4b are not supported; 
Hypotheses 2a, 5a and 6a receive contrary evidence; while Hypotheses 7b and 9 are 
partially supported by some models, but not by others.
Chapter 9 summarizes the main parts of the thesis and concludes the thesis. It first 
briefly recaps the objectives, research hypotheses and research methods of this thesis, 
followed by a summary of the main findings. It then discusses the contributions of the 
thesis to the literature and explores the implications and recommendations that can be 
drawn from this study to regulators, business practitioners and investors. Finally, the 
chapter explicates the limitations in this thesis, explores several avenues for future 
research, and sums up and concludes the thesis.
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1.8 Summary
This chapter draws a general picture of the thesis. After a brief introduction, it 
provided a general background and motivation for this research and introduced the 
main aims and objectives of the thesis. Then it discussed the research methods, the 
significance of this thesis and the main findings of the thesis. Finally, it provides the 
structure of the thesis and a brief introduction of each chapter.
Looking forward to the thesis itself, a thumbnail sketch of its content and objectives is 
as follows. It is an empirical study on corporate governance and executive 
remuneration. A number of hypotheses concerning the roles of the characteristics of 
board of directors, ownership structure and the internal and external market pay 
comparison factors are tested with a sample of 417 Chinese listed firms using panel 
data techniques. The results show that most of these factors have significant impacts 
on executive remuneration in Chinese listed firms, but the way these factors behave in 
China might be different from how they behave in the Western economies. The 
findings of the thesis are of interest both from a theoretical and a practical point of 
view. By considering the empirical evidence, we can better evaluate the promise that 
lies in current guidelines and prescriptions for effective governance structures (Dalton 
and Dalton 2005).
The next chapter introduces the institutional background of China.
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2.1 Introduction
While a great deal of research on executive compensation has been carried out in 
Western contexts, we know little about executive compensation dynamics and their 
determinants in other contexts. China, a developing country, offers an interesting 
contrast in that it is a socialist country with emerging elements of a market economy, 
as manifested in the large number of companies listed in Chinese stock markets since 
1990. These Chinese listed companies exhibit some characteristics similar to those of 
the public listed companies in advanced capitalist countries such as the UK and the 
USA; but crucially, they exhibit country-specific characteristics, such as the presence 
of large stakes of state ownership. Furthermore, Chinese listed companies operate in 
fundamentally different socio-economic and political contexts, as evidenced in 
Chinese corporate regulations and governance mechanisms. Therefore, to properly 
understand the Chinese corporate governance mechanisms and correctly interpret the 
findings, it is necessary to discuss its special institutional background.
China’s economic reform began in 1978, and so did its enterprise reform, as one of 
the tasks of the economic reform. The enterprise reform has gone through several 
stages (Schipani and Liu 2002) (see Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), especially the reform of 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs). These reforms provide the general background for 
Chinese corporate governance (Tam 2002). It is well known that the current corporate 
governance system in China is the outcome of the adaptation by Chinese enterprises 
to the transition from central planning to a market system (Rui et al. 2003).
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This chapter provides the necessary background information to study the corporate 
governance and executive remuneration in China. It is structured as follows. Section
2.2 describes the general economic environment of China, its economic reform and 
capital market. Section 2.3 traces the evolution of the corporate governance structures 
of Chinese enterprises, especially SOEs. Section 2.4 introduces the historical and 
current background of management incentives and executive compensation in China. 
Section 2.5 provides a summary.
2.2 China’s economic reform and capital market
The economic reform policies in China were introduced in 1978. Since then, China 
has been evolving from a planned economy towards a socialist market economy. As 
one of the tasks of the economic reform, Chinese enterprise reform also began in 1978; 
however, the importance of establishing an effective corporate governance structure 
in the Chinese SOEs was not recognized until the enterprise reform entered a new 
stage - the corporatization of the SOEs (Tam 2000).
With the initiation of corporatization, the SOEs were expected to transform into 
modem corporations and improve their efficiency. However, the reform of SOEs so 
far has not fully achieved the goal of improving the SOEs’ performances partly due to 
the lack of an effective corporate governance system, and especially of effective 
monitoring mechanisms (Cha 2001).
Despite the remaining problems, with the continuing advancement of the market- 
oriented economic system, market-determined capital transactions in China have
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experienced a fast development, especially after China’s entry into WTO in 2001. The 
final goal for China's economic reform is to establish a sound and complete socialist 
market economy system, as explicated in the Chinese Communist Party’s 14th 
National Congress (1992).
2.2.1 THE REFORM OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA
How to transform SOEs into profitable modem firms has been a challenge to the 
Chinese government for decades. SOEs have been the backbone of China’s economy, 
though their importance is declining and is being gradually replaced by other forms of 
economic entities. Indeed, many SOEs in China have been losing money and continue 
to be a significant burden on the economy as a whole. Poor economic performance of 
the SOEs has given rise to various problems that impede the progress of China’s 
economic reform, such as the government budget deficit, inflation and the delay of 
financial institutions’ reform.
The factors that contribute to SOEs’ lack of competitiveness might include heavy 
social obligations (e.g. provisions of life-long employee welfare), soft budget 
constraints3, overstaffing, inflexible wage and employment systems, spiralling debt, 
out-dated technology, and lack of quality controls (Dong and Putterman 2003; Hovey 
et al. 2003). Problems facing Chinese firms often stem from their history as “pure” 
state enterprises within a centrally planned economy, heightened by their slowness in 
adapting to the new corporatization regime (Hovey et al. 2003).
3 A term originally formulated by Komai (1979; 1980), which refers to the economic behaviour that 
SOEs exhibit an almost insatiable appetite for inputs (subsidies and bank loans) because their managers 
stand to benefit from any profitable expansion o f output, but have little to lose if the enterprise incurs 
losses (Lin and Tan 1999).
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Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Government has 
been trying to improve the performance of SOEs. However, it was not until the 
Reform and Opening Policy was introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 that economic 
development became the central task for the government, known as the basic national 
policy “One Centre, Two Bases”. Ever since then, enterprise reforms have been a 
constant item on the Chinese economic reform agenda, with three strands running 
through them: the reallocation of rights of control and management between 
government agencies and enterprises, the organizational restructuring of enterprises, 
and the transformation of ownership (Chen and Hussain 1999).
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s call for the introduction of the market economy into China 
accelerated the process of the establishment of the modem corporate system, which is 
one of the most important goals of SOEs reform. In the early 1990s, the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were established, indicating a new era for China’s SOEs 
reform. The 1993 Company Law, the most important legal framework for the 
regulation of Chinese companies to date, was promulgated to provide the legal 
support for this process. In 1997, an immense privatization program was introduced to 
restructure the estimated 308,000 SOEs (Morrison 2000). Under the slogan “protect 
the large, release the small”, this policy was directed at concentrating reform energy 
on 1,000 of the largest enterprises, many of which were “Pillar industries”, while 
escalating the de facto privatization of those small and medium-sized SOEs.
The reform of the SOEs is still in progress. Some SOEs have been fully or partly 
privatized. Others remain firmly under the control of the state. The bulk of China’s 
SOEs are now restructured as corporations and more than 1,200 went public on the
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stock exchanges. The objective is to introduce elements of modem corporate 
governance that facilitate improvements in firm performance. However, this objective 
has not been fulfilled yet (Cha 2001). The lack of an effective corporate governance 
system, especially an effective monitoring system of management, is still an obstacle 
to the development of the SOEs and also of other enterprises in China. The SOEs 
reform from the corporate governance perspective will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 2.3.
2.2.2 CAPITAL MARKET AND STOCK EXCHANGES
The capital market in China is much younger compared to that in the USA or the UK. 
Before 1990, bank loans and government subsides were the sole financing sources for 
Chinese firms. The establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in 1990 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (SZSE) in 1991 has offered an alternative way for 
Chinese firms to raise capital for further development. It also marked the emergence 
of the securities market of China. Accordingly, the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), the national regulatory body, was set up in 1992.
Ever since then the capital market of China has been developing with remarkable 
progresses in its size, legal framework and market maturity. It has become a key 
component of China’s socialist market economy and has been playing an important 
role in the development of SOEs, resources allocations, structural adjustment and 
economic growth. As the sample used in this study is drawn from listed companies in 
China, it is helpful to review the Chinese capital market. The following sub-section 
will provide such an overview.
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2.2.2.1 Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
The CSRC, empowered by the State Council, was established in 1992 and is the sole 
regulator supervising the securities and futures market in China. By 2003, it had 38 
regional and local regulatory bureaus throughout the country. The main functions of 
the CSRC are: to formulate policies, strategies and regulations regarding the securities 
and futures market; to regulate the securities and futures markets and the activities 
and transactions of these two markets; to supervise the conduct of listed companies 
and their senior executives; to regulate and supervise market intermediaries; and to 
investigate and take actions against persons violating the securities and futures 
regulations, etc. (CSRC 2004).
2.2.2.2 Stock Exchange
There are two stock exchanges in China: the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Both are supervised and controlled by the CSRC. 
According to the Securities Law (1998) and Measures for the Administration o f Stock 
Exchanges (CSRC 1997b)4, stock exchanges in China are non-profit-making and self- 
regulatory legal entities. The exchanges provide the forum for the centralized trading 
of securities and enforce applicable laws and regulations. They also perform functions 
such as accepting and arranging for listings, conducting market surveillance and 
monitoring securities trading, regulating members and listed companies; managing 
and disseminating market information (CSRC 2004).
4 Approved by the State Council on November 30, 1997 and promulgated by the Securities 
Commission under the State Council on December 10, 1997. These Measures are formulated in order 
to strengthen the administration o f stock exchanges, clearly define the powers and responsibilities of 
stock exchanges and to maintain normal order in securities markets (CSRC 1997b)
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2.2.2.3 Listed Companies
Shares in China’s stock exchanges are classified by shareholders’ identity and their 
liquidity and/or listing locations (Lin 2001). Generally speaking, there are three main 
types of shares, A-shares, B-shares and H-shares. Other types of shares include Red 
Chips, N-shares and L-shares5, for definitions see Table 2-1. Hong Kong and foreign 
exchanges have higher quality reporting standards, and therefore it has been suggested 
that firms listed outside China have greater transparency. My sample is drawn from 
those A-shares companies.
There are primarily three groups of shareholders holding A shares—the state, legal 
persons (institutions) and domestic individual investors. Legal persons denote legally 
constituted autonomous organisations, including domestic legal persons, foreign legal 
persons, and private legal persons who bought shares before IPOs. Domestic legal 
persons include listed companies controlled by SOEs or other SOEs, which are 
frequently holding companies established by government agencies to manage 
investment. In addition, employee shares have limited ownership. Managerial 
ownership, which refers to the ownership held by the directors, supervisors and top 
management, though still only accounting for a small proportion of the total, has been 
more frequently studied recently. Managerial ownership is usually locked and non­
tradable in a certain period. It should be noted that the state-owned shares and legal 
person shares are not allowed to trade in the stock exchanges. Only shares held by 
individuals and private institutions are freely tradable (Firth et al. 2006).
5 Firms listed in foreign exchanges other than Hongkong are relatively rare; therefore these other types 
are grouped into H-shares as well in some definitions.
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Table 2.1 Types of China Shares
Share
Type Definition
Listed Stock 
Exchange
Traded
Currency
A-shares
Shares that are traded only by 
mainland citizens and after 2002 a 
few select foreign institutions6.
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange & Shenzhen RMB
B-shares Shares that are available to both foreign and mainland citizens
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange & Shenzhen
USD;
HKD
H-shares
Shares issued by PRC for 
mainland companies listed on 
Hong Kong and foreign stock 
exchanges.
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange HKD
Red Chips The best rated of the H shares Hong Kong Stock Exchange HKD
N-shares
Shares issued by mainland 
companies that are listed and 
traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange
New York Stock 
Exchange USD
L-shares
Shares issued by mainland 
companies that are listed and 
traded on the London Stock 
Exchange
London Stock 
Exchange GBP
(Created by the author, inform ation source: w w w .fpasf.org and w w w .csrc.com .cn )
Table 2-2 presents the number of listed companies with different share types. This 
thesis only select samples from the pool of A-share listed companies. As shown in 
Table 2-2, A-share listed companies dominate the stock market in China. A-Shares 
are traded by domestic individual investors and a limited number of foreign 
institutional investors more recently. By December 2004, there were 1236 companies 
issuing pure A-shares. By December 2003, 1,287 companies were listed in the two 
stock exchanges, of which 1,146 companies issued A shares only, 24 companies 
issued B shares only, 87 companies issued both A shares and B shares, and 30 
companies issued both A and H shares (see Table 2-2).
6QFII were introduced in 2002 to allow a number of foreign investors to invest in Chinese stock 
market, like Bear Steams, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch.
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Table 2.2 Number of Listed Companies (1994-2004)
Firms 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Issuing A
shares
only
227 242 431 627 727 822 955 1025 1085 1146 1236
Issuing A 
and H 
shares
6 11 14 17 18 19 19 23 28 30 30
Issuing A 
and B 
shares
54 58 69 76 80 82 86 88 87 87 86
Issuing B
shares
only
4 12 16 25 26 26 28 24 24 24 24
Total 291 323 530 745 851 949 1088 1160 1224 1287 1376
(Source: http://www.csrc.gov.cn Assessed date: 16/02/2005)
Listed companies are drawn from different industry sectors such as machinery, 
metallurgy, chemicals, electronics, transportation, and energy etc. In recent years, an 
increasing number of commercial banks and securities companies have gone public as 
well. The listed companies now reflect the full spectrum of production and service 
industries in China’s economy (CSRC 2004).
2.2.2.4 The Development of the Chinese Capital Market
With a short history of about 15 years, the growth of China’s capital market has been 
impressive. According to the statistics provided by the CSRC (2004), China’s stock 
market had become the third largest market in Asia after Tokyo and Hong Kong by 
the end of 2002 and the eighth largest in the world by early 2004, with 1377 listed 
firms and market capitalization of over RMB ¥3705 billions (about £247 billion) 
(CSRC 2004). The stock exchange trading system has spread over all large and 
medium-sized cities with 2,412 retail branches all over the country. The total market
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capitalization at the end of September 2002 was RMB 4.4 trillion, accounting for 
about half of the GDP (Tong 2004). Market intermediaries have also been growing 
rapidly. By the end of 2003, there were more than 133 securities firms with about 70 
million investment accounts, 34 fund management companies, 111 investment 
advisers and 72 accounting firms licensed for securities businesses (CSRC 2004).
However, these developments are not without faults. While the USA was plagued by 
corporate scandals such as those of Enron and WorldCom in the last few years, China 
experienced its own version of “Enron” (Cha 2001; Tong 2004). Since late July 2001, 
the CSRC has reprimanded a number of listed companies for violating financial 
reporting and management provisions (Cha 2001). A few of the highest-profile cases 
are “Yin Guang Xia”, “Nan Tian”, and “Zhenzhou Bai Wen”. The emergence of such 
corporate scandals has ruined investors’ confidence and caused the market to take a 
nosedive (Tong 2004).
Realizing that the recovery of investor’s confidence relies on sound corporate 
governance, the CSRC has been making continuous efforts to improve the corporate 
governance system (Cha 2001; Tong 2004). This commitment is reflected in a series 
of regulations and rules issued later. For example, the CSRC issued the Code of 
Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China in 2002, intending to enhance 
the corporate governance and standardize the management and operation of listed 
companies.
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2.3 Corporate governance in China
China's shareholding reform apparently learns from the Westem-style organization of 
public corporations characterized by the separation of ownership and control (Lin and 
Zhu 2000). The emergence of public corporations in the West was a result of an 
endogenous, evolutionary process based on voluntary exchanges of private property 
rights in pursuit of gains from specialization (Fama and Jensen 1983). In that process, 
various corporate governance mechanisms were developed to deal with the agency 
problem arising from the separation of ownership and control. This enable the owner- 
investors- to have effective control over managers and to assure themselves of a 
return from their investment (Hart 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Basically, 
effective corporate governance under a private property rights regime relies on a well- 
functioning financial market and a sound legal system. The existence of large non­
state shareholders may also be crucial for effective governance because they have the 
abilities and incentives to exercise effective control rights and monitor management 
(Lin and Zhu 2000).
However, a distinct difference of the development of corporate governance structures 
in China from those in Western contexts is that China's firms are characterized by an 
institutional setting based on state ownership (Lin 2004). Also, China is traditionally a 
planned economy. It takes time to establish the market-oriented economic and legal 
institutions that are conducive to effective corporate governance. Social institutions 
necessary for the complete separation of the government from enterprises, such as a 
social security system, have just started to develop in China. Moreover, socialist 
legacies in China have made it unlikely or difficult for wealth-constrained private
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entrepreneurs to take on major stakes in many large SOEs (Peng and Heath 1996; 
Qian 2000). Thus, even in the absence of ideological constraints on private ownership 
of enterprises, certain degree of government ownership and government control in 
corporate governance in privatized or corporative enterprises is to be expected (Qian 
2000).
The above discussion implies that corporate governance in restructured enterprises 
may deviate from what is stipulated in the law and from what it is like in the West. As 
Tam (2002) argued, the characteristics of China’s corporate governance can only be 
understood in the context they developed. This section reviews corporate governance 
in Chinese listed companies, in terms of its historical development, current situation, 
characteristics, existing problems and scope for future improvement.
2.3.1 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
It is essential to understand the historical development of the governance model of 
SOEs. The governance structure of SOEs has evolved from a totally centrally planned 
model (1954-1984), through a contracting model (1984-1993), to today’s modem 
model (1993-present) which resembles the stylized Anglo-American corporation 
(Schipani and Liu 2002).
2.3.1.1 The Centrally Planned Model
From 1949 to 1978, there was no rigorous financial planning and control systems for 
the commercial and industrial units in China (Jen 1988). The State was assumed to be
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the only legal entity to enjoy both the property right and the managerial power of 
SOEs. The main goal of the commercial and industrial units was to carry out the 
communist party's economic development policies rather than to enhance profits for 
the State investor. The term "corporation" or "legal person" did not exist. SOEs were 
not real business enterprises but were referred to as "factories" functioning as 
government affiliates responsible for producing goods or rendering services (Schipani 
& Liu 2002).
Accordingly, the governance structure of SOEs was an integral part of the general 
governmental framework. The state maintained strong control over the activities of 
SOEs. Profits were remitted to the government and deficits were covered by the state. 
SOE executives were appointed and dismissed by, and therefore responsible to 
government agencies, and enjoyed the same political and economic treatment as 
government officials (so called "State cadres”) (Mengistae and Xu 2004). Meanwhile, 
their achievements were not evaluated by the financial performance of the enterprises, 
but by their ability to fulfil the plans made by government agencies (Yueh 2004).
The traditional model served not only as an organizer of economic resources and 
activities, but also as a tool to firmly bind the State, SOEs and employees together 
(Mengistae and Xu 2004). The State Treasury was the sole source of SOEs’ input; 
SOEs and their employees effectively lived off the SOE coffers. SOEs were thus both 
production units and social security units. Once a person entered an SOE, he or she 
gained an "iron rice bowl” which could be kept for life and which insured the 
individual's salary, housing, medical treatment and pension for making life (Yueh
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2004). Therefore, the SOE, as a State-owned Working Unit (“gongzuo danwei”), was 
unusually significant to Chinese employees.
The benefit of this central planning was that the agency problem, such as managerial 
theft or expropriation of funds at the firm level, was tightly restricted since 
management had little freedom to make discretionary decisions (Peng and Heath 
1996). However, the model led to inefficiency of resource allocation, loss of 
managerial incentives to improve production efficiency and technology innovation, 
and also a serious agency problem of bureaucrats (Peng and Heath 1996). The agency 
problem of bureaucrats refers to the phenomenon that bureaucrats, who, while holding 
control rights of the firm on behalf of the state, typically have goals different from 
social welfare and are driven by their own political and economic interests in 
selecting, disciplining and motivating management (Zhang 2005).
2.3.1.2 The Contracting Model
Most SOEs under the centrally planned model were static and uncompetitive, which 
prompted the state to reform the SOEs, especially after 1978. The main strategy was 
to encourage SOEs to expand production and earn profits, making SOEs responsible 
for their own gains and losses. Thus, a contracting model of SOE governance, also 
termed management contracting system or the transitional model, came into existence 
and became popular from 1984 to 1993 (Schipani and Liu 2002).
It was the first time that the responsibility, rights, and interests of the state authorities 
and firms had been clarified in contracts (Schipani and Liu 2002). Policy-makers at
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the time believed that "separation between the state ownership and the SOE 
management rights" was the best way to transform SOEs into legal entities, while 
retaining state property ownership. To support the reform, the State-owned Industrial 
Enterprises Law (SOEs Law) was enacted in 1988.
The main features of the corporate governance structure introduced by SOEs Law in 
1988 are as follows. First, the government agency and the SOE (as represented by its 
manager) are the two parties of the contracting system. The manager is selected 
through a competitive process and acts as the legal representative of the enterprise. 
The manager then takes the overall responsibility for production, operation and 
management of the enterprise. The basic principle of the contracting system is to set 
the minimum amount of profit that the SOEs need to submit to the State while 
entitling the SOEs to keep the remaining profit with the liability for paying the fixed 
amount to the State even if the SOEs have not made enough profit (Schipani and Liu 
2002). Second, the SOEs Law (1988) recognizes that governmental intervention in the 
operation of SOEs should be significantly diminished, while the governance bodies in 
the SOEs remain the Chinese Communist Party Committee, workers’ council (the 
meeting of employees’ representatives) and the trade union (commonly referred to 
now as the “Old Three Boards”) (Schipani and Liu 2002). The Party committee 
ensures the implementation of the Party and State’s guiding principles and policies, 
while the trade union guarantees the employees’ interests and the workers’ council 
allows employees to practice participative management and supervision (SOEs Law 
1988). /
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With the implementation of this contracting model, government’s intervention in the 
operation of SOEs was largely reduced and managers of SOEs gained more autonomy 
to make input and output decisions. As a result, the State’s fiscal revenue increased 
and the enterprises became more efficient and profitable (Li 1997).
However, this model failed to achieve the goal of SOEs reform due to the defects of 
the contracting system. First, the contracting system led to short term and myopic 
behaviours by managers. Second, the authority of selecting management was still held 
by the communist party’s personnel departments and the industrial bureaucracy, who 
have neither incentives nor information to find entrepreneurial people for managerial 
positions; therefore, bureaucrat agency problem still existed (Peng and Heath 1996). 
Third, China still maintained a centrally planned economic system under the 
contracting system. Fourth, state-owned banks have neither the incentive nor the 
ability to enforce debt contracts (Zhang 2005). Other reasons for the failure of this 
model to fulfil the SOE reform objectives included the difficulty in proper profit 
sharing between SOEs and the State, SOEs failure to submit profit in poor performing 
financial years, the SOEs’ mismanagement of reserved profit and exploitation of State 
assets (Schipani and Liu 2002).
2.3.1.3 The Modern Model
As the contracting system failed to serve the reform objectives, the state started 
searching for new solutions to the aforementioned problems. The Fourteenth Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 1992 for the first time called for the 
establishment of a modem enterprise system as a means to improving the efficiency
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of the SOEs. Soon after, the Company Law was passed in 1993, which provides the 
fundamental rules for corporate governance in modem Chinese corporations. 
Accordingly, many SOEs were converted into shareholding companies and then sold 
some of their shares to the public, thus the word ‘corporation’ entered the socialist 
vocabulary. Some of SOEs were listed in the two stock exchanges. The fifteenth CCP 
in 1997 further confirmed the state’s continuous efforts in improving the reforms and 
the establishment of a modem corporate governance system (Tam 2002).
Under Company Law (1993), modem corporations are required to form three 
statutory and indispensable corporate governing bodies: (1) the shareholders general 
meeting (SGM); (2) the board of directors (BOD); and (3) the supervisory board 
(BOS) (commonly referred to as “the New Three Boards”). In addition, the Company 
Law introduced two new statutory corporate positions - the Chair of the board of 
directors (Chair) and the chief executive officer (CEO) (Company Law 1993). BOD 
and BOS are both appointed by and expected to report to the shareholders, 
functioning as a decision-making unit and a monitoring unit respectively. This setting 
reflects a two-tier board structure, which is markedly different from the Anglo- 
American unitary board model and more similar to the German two-tier model (Tam 
2002). However, unlike German supervisors, Chinese supervisors are not empowered 
to appoint and dismiss directors and executives (Dahya et al. 2002a). Chinese 
corporate governance has its own distinctive characteristics compared to those in 
USA and other countries. The next section discusses the current corporate governance 
system in detail.
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2.3.2 CURRENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
2.3.2.1 The Legal Framework
As argued by Sun (2002), corporate governance in any country cannot be separated 
from its legal environment because the legal protection of corporate stakeholders 
might be different across countries and can lead to different governance 
characteristics. In China today, the most important legal sources of corporate 
governance rules come from the laws passed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
and its standing committee, including the Company Law (1993) and the Securities 
Law (1998). The current legal framework for corporate governance in China also 
includes the Bankruptcy Law (1986), Certified Accountant Law (1993), Audit Law 
(1994), People’s Bank of China Law (1995), Commercial Bank Law (1995), and 
Accounting Law (1999) (CSRC: www.csrc.com.cnL The key regulatory bodies 
involved in the lawmaking process are the CSRC, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the People’s Bank of China (Tam 2002). In 
addition, the Company Charter of every company plays an active role in designing the 
corporation’s governance structure. Those regulations and rules issued by the CSRC 
also provide important guidelines in practice.
The Company Law was passed by the NPC in 1993 and implemented in 1994. 
Company Law (1993) recognises two types of company: Limited Liability Companies 
and Joint Stock Companies. It requires both types of company to establish three 
statutory and indispensable corporate governance bodies—the new three boards, 
although some small limited liability companies can be exceptions (Company Law
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1993: Article 3). Listed companies have to follow this rule. The Company Law (1993) 
also introduces two new statutory corporate positions: The Chair of the board of 
directors and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The Company Law (1993) has 
provided the basic legal arrangements for all aspects of corporate governance. But it is 
not complete and some of its requirements are out of date and exhibit the 
characteristics of political administration and planned economy (Tam 2002).
A series of regulations have been issued by the CSRC and/or State Economic and 
Trade Commission, to catch up with the development of economic entities. For 
example, the Guidelines for Establishing Independent Directors of Listed Companies 
(2001) provide guidance with regards to the nomination, retaining, and 
responsibilities of independent directors in listed companies. The Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies (2002) systematically outlines the fundamental 
principles of corporate governance for listed companies, mechanisms to ensure basic 
investors’ protection, and codes of conduct and ethical standards for directors, 
supervisors, managers and other senior executives of listed companies. The Measures 
on the Merger and Acquisition of Listed Companies (2002) and Measures on the 
Administration of Information Disclosure on Shareholding Changes of Listed 
Companies (2002) constitute the most fundamental legal requirements regarding 
various disclosure requirements for listed companies in mergers and acquisitions 
situations (CSRC 2004). The following sub-sections describe the requirements 
concerning the three main governance bodies under the current system and the main 
issues related to this thesis.
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2.3.2.2 Shareholder’s General Meeting (SGM)
According to the Company Law (1993), the SGM is the supreme sovereignty in 
corporate governance and has the power to make the final decisions concerning the 
corporation’s strategic planning, shareholders’ interests and top personnel 
arrangements. The SGM should be held at least once per year and extraordinary 
meetings can be arranged if necessary. The SGM is organised by the Chair of the 
board of directors and follows the one-share-one-vote policy. Those ordinary 
proposals can be passed by majority of attendees, while for those special issues listed 
in the Company Charter to be accepted, approvals from 2/3 of the attending members 
are required. Generally speaking, the Company Law and Guidelines for Company 
Charter provide the shareholders with comprehensive decision-making powers at the 
general meeting as follows:
(1) to examine and approve the reports from the board of directors (BOD) and the 
supervisory board (BOS); (2) to examine and approve the BOD’s plans regarding 
profit distribution and coverage of company losses; (3) to elect, replace and 
compensate directors and supervisors; (4) to examine and approve the corporate fiscal 
financial budget and final account plans; (5) to examine and approve the annual 
reports; (6) to make resolutions on the increase or reduction of the corporations’ 
registered capital; (7) to decide whether to issue corporate bonds; (8) to make 
resolutions on corporate mergers, divisions, dissolution, and liquidation; (9) to make 
resolutions on the amendment of the corporate Charter (10) to decide whether to 
repurchase the company shares and (11) to make resolutions regarding other 
significant issues listed by the company Charters and requiring special approval.
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While the first five items can be done by majority vote, the last seven, concerning the 
shareholders’ basic interests, have to be passed by 2/3 vote of the attending 
shareholders (Company Law 1993). These requirements are distinct from those in the 
West. For example, in the United States, the power to approve corporate profit 
distribution plans and to determine the directors’ remuneration is reserved for the 
board of directors rather than to the shareholders (Schipani and Liu 2002:34).
2.3.2.3 The Board of Directors
2.3.2.3.1 B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  u n d e r  t h e  C o m p a n y  L a w  1993
Although the SGM is the power centre in corporations under the Company Law, it is 
not a standing institution (it is held only once or twice a year). Therefore Article 112 
requires a corporation to have a board of directors, composed of “no fewer than 5 but 
no more than 19 directors”. The board of directors is employed and authorized by the 
shareholders’ general meeting to take charge of significant management decision 
making. By statute, the board of directors is accountable to the general meeting and 
exercises the following authorities:
(i) being responsible for calling meetings of shareholders' general committee, and 
presenting reports;
(ii) implementing resolutions adopted by the shareholders' general committee;
(iii) determining the company's operating plans and investment programs;
(iv) preparing annual financial budget plans and final accounting plans of the 
company;
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(v) preparing plans for the company's profit distribution and losses coverage;
(vi) making proposals for increasing or reducing registered capital and for issuance of 
company bonds or shares;
(vii) drafting plans for company share redeeming, acquisition, merger, division or 
dissolution of the company;
(viii) determining the structure of the company's internal management;
(ix) appointing and removing the general manager (or Chief Executive Officer, 
hereafter referred to as “CEO”) and other members of the management, upon the 
recommendation of the CEO, deputy general managers of the company and the officer 
in charge of finance; listening to the reports of management and auditing their work; 
and determining the remuneration for those officers;
(x) Formulating the company's basic management rules and regulations, making 
proposals for amendments in Company Charter, and managing the information 
disclosure (Company Law 1993: Article 112).
The Company Law also states that the tenure of the directors should be prescribed by 
the Company Charter. Normally, the tenure of a director, both executive and non­
executive, should not exceed 3 years except when he/she is re-elected upon the 
expiration of his/her term (Company Law 1993: Article 115).
2.3.2.3.1 I n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s
The Company Law 1993 has no mandatory requirements for appointing outside 
directors or independent directors in corporations. It was not until 1999 that CSRC 
started to highlight the importance of outside directors. In the Measures on Further 
Promoting Standardized Operations and Deepening the Reform in Overseas-listed 
Companies (CSRC 1999), the CSRC required overseas-listed corporations to
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“establish and gradually improve the system for external directors and independent 
directors” and that “outside directors should hold more than half the board seats with 
at least two independent directors.” To make sure that outside directors are 
performing their duties, the CSRC requires outside directors to have sufficient time 
and necessary knowledge, and corporations to supply necessary information and 
materials. Also CSRC granted substantial power to outside directors. For instance, the 
views of an independent director should be specified in the board resolution; related 
transactions are not effective without independent directors’ approval and signature; 
over two independent directors may propose for a extraordinary general shareholders' 
meeting; and “independent directors may directly report to the general shareholders' 
meeting, the CSRC and other relevant agencies” (CSRC 1999). However, these 
requirements only apply to overseas-listed companies.
For those domestically-listed companies, the concept was first brought up in the 
Guidelines on Company Chapter o f Listed Companies (CSRC 1997a) as an optional 
article that a listed company may appoint independent directors if necessary. The 
Guidelines (CSRC 1997a : 117) specify who may not hold the position of independent 
directors, but keep silent on the minimum number or the duties of independent 
directors. In 2000, the State Committee of Economy and Trade permitted listed SOEs 
to have independent directors.
A formal and comprehensive guideline about independent directors was enacted in 
2001. The Guideline requires listed companies to introduce independent directors to 
the board of directors (CSRC 2001). It was the first time that the definition, duties, 
qualifications, requirements and roles of an independent director were clearly stated.
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The Guideline also stipulates the procedures of nomination, election and replacement 
of independent directors. Importantly, it requires a company to provide support to 
independent directors to facilitate their duties. More specifically, it requires that in 
every domestically listed company, “at least one of the independent directors should 
have an accounting background (e.g. academic with senior professional title in 
accounting or certified public accountants)”. Moreover, it requires that at least one 
third of the board should consist of independent directors by June 30, 2003 (CSRC 
2001). An independent director has a duty of good faith (“chengxin”) and a duty of 
diligence and care (“qinmian”) to the company and to all the shareholders.
The Guidelines (CSRC 2001) also require independent directors to have enough time 
(no less than 15 hours per year) and energy (no more than five directorships at the 
same time) in order to perform the duties effectively. The term of office of an 
independent director should not exceed 6 years. Apart from carrying the duties as 
other directors mentioned in Section 2.3.2.3.1, independent directors are required to 
express independent opinion on major events, such as nominating, appointing, 
replacing and remunerating directors and senior managers. Several special powers are 
awarded to independent directors other than those stipulated in the Company Law 
(1993) or other regulations, such as to approve major related party transactions, to 
propose to appoint/change the accounting firm, to propose to hire an 
auditing/consulting firm independently, and to propose for an interim SGM.
All these new regulations demonstrate the need of roles of independent directors 
(CSRC 2001). However, these guidelines are not very meaningful in China’s current 
legal system (Clarke 2003). The Company Law only speaks of one director duty - a
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duty of loyalty (“zhongshi”). It is unclear about whether shareholders could sue for a 
breach. Also, it is difficult for the CSRC to create a private right of action for 
shareholders against directors. The CSRC has engaged in a limited number of 
disciplinary actions against directors. But these actions rely solely on administrative 
enforcement and thus are of limited value, given the CSRC’s resource constraints 
(Clarke 2003:504).
2.3.2.4 Supervisory Board
Compared to listed firms in the U.S.A and the UK, a unique feature of corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies is the existence of the supervisory board. 
Chinese listed companies are required to institute a supervisory board consisting of 
both shareholder representatives (selected by the shareholders’ general meeting) and 
company employee representatives, with the proportion of each group determined by 
the Company Charter. The main power given to the supervisory board is to audit the 
company’s financial report, to supervise directors or managers so they will not violate 
the Company Law or Charter, and to require them to correct those behaviours that 
harm shareholders’ interests. The supervisory board also reports to shareholders’ 
general meeting and has the right to suggest extraordinary shareholders’ general 
meetings. Its members do not participate in business operation, nor do they get 
involved in the normal work of directors, but they can sit on board meetings. 
Supervisors carry on their duties by meetings and can seek external lawyers or 
certified accountants for assistance. Moreover, they can sue directors or managers 
independently for their misbehaviours.
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2.3.2.5 The Chair and the CEO
According to the Company Law 1993, both the Chair of the Board and the CEO are 
statutory and indispensable corporate positions in China. As stated in the Company 
Law, the board of directors shall have a chairman, and may have one or two vice- 
chairmen. The chairman and vice-chairmen shall be elected by the board of directors 
through affirmative votes by a majority of the directors (Company Law 1993: Article 
113). The chairman is the legal representative of the company and holds the following 
statutory powers: (i) chairing the shareholders’ general meetings and to convene and 
chair the meetings of the board of directors; (ii) supervising the implementation of 
resolutions adopted by the board of directors; (iii) signing company shares and bonds 
(Company Law 1993: Article 114). In addition, the Chair acts as the sole corporate 
legal representative and exercises some powers of the board of directors under the 
authorization of the board when it is not in session (Company Law 1993: Article 113 
& 120).
The CEO is an agent of the corporation and enjoys the rights conferred by the 
Company Law and the Company Charter (Schipani and Liu 2002). The CEO is 
appointed or removed by the board and is accountable to the board. The CEO takes 
general responsibility of daily operations, management and the implementation of the 
board resolutions (Company Law 1993: Article 119).
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2.3.3. THE CHARACTERISTICS AND PROBLEMS OF CURRENT 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
2.3.3.1 Comparing the Chinese Governance System to the Western Models
As mentioned earlier, the current corporate governance system of Chinese listed 
companies is intended to learn from the West. But due to the special economic and 
political environment of China, it tends to contain the features of both that of the 
Anglo-American model and the German model while having its own characteristics. 
Table 2.3 outlines the main differences between these models.
2.3.3.1.1 G o v e r n a n c e  B o d ie s
In terms of governance bodies, a Chinese listed company has a shareholders’ general 
meeting and two boards. The power of the unitary board in the Anglo-American 
model is split and spread among the three governance bodies in China. For example, 
in the United States, the power to approve plans of corporate profit distribution and 
the power to determine the directors and managers are both reserved for the board of 
directors rather than given to the shareholders.
48
CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Table 2.3 Characteristics of Corporate Governance Models
Governance
Mechanisms
Anglo*American Model German-Japan
Models
Chinese Model
Governance
bodies B oard o f  directors (BOD)
BOD & Supervisory 
Board (SB)
Shareholders’ general 
m eetings ,BOD & SB
Board
Structure
B oard w ith m ajority o f  
outside directors Insider dom inated
Insider dom inated board 
w ith appointm ents 
influenced by the state
Ownership
Structure D ispersed
Concentrated 
ownership with cross 
shareholding
Concentrated ownership 
w ith the state as majority 
shareholder
Managerial
Incentives
E xecutive pay linked to 
firm  perform ance
Less linked to 
perform ance
N ot linked to 
perform ance
Managerial 
Labour Market
A ctive m arket for senior 
m anagers
Less Active M arket 
for m anagers
Obstacles to developm ent 
o f  an active m arket
External
Monitoring
Roles
A ctive m onitoring roles 
o f  professional 
o rganisations and mass 
m edia
M onitoring roles 
perform ance
W eak or absence o f 
m onitoring roles by 
banks, professional 
organizations and the 
m ass m edia
Investors
A ctive institutional 
investors, with free-riding 
and short-term  individual 
investors w ith little 
interest in m onitoring
Investors, banks and 
em ployees participate 
actively in the control 
o f  com pany; usually 
long term  oriented
Short-term  and highly 
speculative individual or 
even institutional 
investors; Insider- 
controlled,
Company 
objectives and 
investor 
Protection
Prim acy o f  the protection 
o f  m inority shareholders’ 
rights
M ultiple 
stakeholders’ 
interests represented 
in com pany 
objectives
Ineffective protection o f  
m inority shareholders 
rights; com pany 
objectives intervened by 
governm ent or larger 
shareholders
Financing
Sources
R eliance on securities 
m arket
Reliance on bank 
credit
Reliance on loans from 
state owned banks
(Source: Adapted from Tam (2002))
At first glance, the Chinese governance structure may appear similar to the two-tier 
system in Germany and Japan, where corporations are also governed by a board of 
directors and a supervisory board. However, the two systems are in fact substantially 
different. For instance, in China, there is no hierarchical relation between the board of 
directors and the supervisory board. Both of them are appointed and reported to 
shareholders’ general meetings. But under the German-Japanese model, the board of 
directors is appointed, and may be dismissed, and overseen by the supervisory board
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(Schipani and Liu 2002). Also, though being part of a two-tier board structure, the 
establishment of Chinese supervisory board does not share the social and 
philosophical considerations that underlie the supervisory board in the German 
codetermination model of corporate governance7 (Tam 2002). The supervisory board 
in China has so far been ineffective in performing its duties (Dahya et al. 2002a; Tam 
1999, 2002). As a result, the corporate board structure in China seems closer to the 
Anglo-Saxon one-tier board type (Tam 1999; Tian 2001).
In the U.S.A. or the UK, outside directors play active and decisive roles in the 
governance of large publicly held corporations. As suggested by Schipani and Liu 
(2002), the 1999 survey by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) reported that the average percentage of independent directors on the board of 
directors is 62% in the U.S.A., 34% in the UK. However, there is no mandatory 
requirement for appointing outside directors according to the Corporate Law 1993 in 
China. Although the roles of independent directors have been highlighted in recent 
years, the roles are still not active in China (Orr 2004).
2.3.3.1.2 O w n e r s h ip  S t r u c t u r e
Paramount among the differences between Chinese listed firms and their Western 
counterparts is the large percentage of state ownership and the significant role of the 
state. In Anglo-American companies a large proportion of corporate shares are held
7 The German Supervisory Board is prescribed by law for German stock corporations, which is 
superior to the management board. It appoints, supervises and advises the members of the Management 
Board and is directly involved in decisions of fundamental importance to the enterprise (German 
Corporate Governance Code 2006).
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Q
by individual investors , while in Germany/Japanese companies, it is financial 
institutions that hold the largest share (Kagawa 2005). However, the majority 
shareholder in China is typically the State and the situation will probably remain 
unchanged in the near future ( Lin and Zhu 2000). For example, for most listed 
companies, the top 10 shareholders are normally the state and SOEs. This state- 
dominated ownership structure has been accused of being responsible for the 
prevalent problems in corporations, namely “bureaucratic interference”, corporate 
objectives conflicts, non-tradable shares, ambiguous property rights and the absence 
of an effective ultimate principal (Clarke 2003; Qiang 2003). These problems will be 
discussed in more detail later.
2.3.3.1.3 I n c e n t i v e  S y s t e m
Another distinction between Chinese listed companies and Western companies is the 
lack of valid incentives in most Chinese listed companies. In the USA and the UK, 
directors and executives receive full incentive schemes, ranging from short-term 
schemes, such as bonus and share grants, to long-term schemes, such as stock options 
and long-term incentive plans, to link their remuneration to firm performance. 
However, the pay system of many directors and executives in China is unitary, 
generally in the form of cash, expect for a few special cases (SRIC 2003). Also, 
unlike their counterparts in the West criticised for being overpaid, these executives 
are underpaid, at least as shown in disclosed figures (SRIC 2003; Wu 2002). China’s 
listed companies suffer a lot from adverse selection problems both from the principal
g
UK shares are less dispersed than U.S.A. shares. According to ONS (2002), the proportion of shares 
held by individuals in the UK has been on a downward trend. It fell from 54.0 per cent of quoted shares 
in 1963 to 14.3 percent in 2002.
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and the agent (Zhang 2005). Even if the right person were chosen, the low level of 
compensation, the unitary compensation system, and the lack of a long-term oriented 
incentive system still cause problems, as will be discussed later.
2 .3 .3 .1 .4  I n s t it u t io n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t
As argued by Clarke (2003), any system of corporate governance depends on a set of 
institutions for its implementation. The last five features in Table 2.3 are basically 
related to the business, social and regulatory institutions under which each system of 
governance operates.
In the Anglo-American system, well developed banking system and securities market 
have created a highly liquid capital market to help alleviate the agency problems. Also, 
their intermediate institutions such as the financial press, mass media and professional 
firms play an active and important role in monitoring (Clarke 2003; Tam 2002). In 
Germany and Japan, both the institutional investors and employees participate in the 
monitoring and control of their firms (Tam 2002).
However, the monitoring from investors is somehow absent in China. The stock 
market is less liquid due to the non-tradable but dominant state owned shares and 
legal person shares. Also, despite its majority ownership, the state does not exercise 
effective control over these companies. Moreover, because of the high rate of saving 
and the very limited investment instruments available, individual investors in the 
stock market tend to be highly speculative and less (or not) interested in exercising 
monitoring (Tam 2002). Other institutions, such as mass media and professional
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bodies are either under the state’s control or have little incentive to perform their 
monitoring roles. In a word, although China has adopted the mechanisms the Western 
corporate governance models, it does not yet have an active market for corporate 
control and monitoring (Tam 2002).
2.3.3.2 The Problems of Current Corporate Governance in China
Compared to the two previous decades, corporate reform in China has achieved great 
improvement and progress towards the Modem Enterprise System. However, China is 
still far from establishing well-developed corporations that can be the basis of its 
economic development and growth. The main problems of corporate governance are 
discussed below.
2 .3 .3 .2 .1  W e a k  in t e r n a l  g o v e r n a n c e  s y s t e m
One of the main problems in Chinese corporate governance is the weak internal 
governance in most firms. The Company Law (1993) allocates the power of ultimate 
control, the power of decision making, the power of monitoring and supervision and 
the power of management to the shareholders’ general meeting, the board of director, 
the supervisory board and the management team respectively. Although the governing 
corporate bodies in many corporations have been established, they do not function 
very well (Schipani and Liu 2002).
The attendance of minority shareholders and outside shareholders to the shareholders’ 
general meetings has been very low and is declining, though the number of inside
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attendees is increasing. The proceedings are often very mechanical. While majority 
shareholders are typically very strong and usually have some control over the 
management, individual shareholders seldom challenge management or directors and 
the voting results are usually favourable to the management or the majority 
shareholders (Clarke 2003). In a word, the shareholders’ general meeting is not 
performing its expected role in China (Schipani and Liu 2002).
The board of directors lacks independence while the supervisory board is inactive or 
ineffective (Tam 2002). Some listed corporations do not convene regular board of 
director meetings and some directors do not take the board meeting rules seriously. 
For those SOE-corporatized companies, the board of directors and the CEO are 
normally appointed by the State. These former government officials still regard the 
listed company as part of government (Cha 2001). Also, board members and 
management members are almost always overlapped; and in particular, the Chair of 
the board of directors is often also the CEO. In some cases, executives are employed 
in both the parent corporation and the subsidiary, which greatly strengthens their 
power over control mechanisms. Boards of supervisors cannot play an effective role 
because they are not independent and often are unclear whose interest they are 
representing (Cha 2001). As a result, the control system in Chinese firms is weak over 
managerial power, and insider control and managerial corruption are prevalent (Hu 
and Hu 2003; Schipani and Liu 2002).
In summary, due to the over-concentration of ownership, individual investors’ 
dispersion, the weakness of directors and supervisors and legal backup, the 
aforementioned powers are not well-balanced between the parties. Instead, Chinese
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listed companies suffer from serious problem of “large shareholder manipulation” and 
“insider control” (Lin 2004; Schipani and Liu 2002).
2.3.3.3.2 A HIGHLY CONCENTRATED SHAREHOLDER— THE STATE
Another prominent problem of the current corporate governance system in China is 
associated with the highly concentrated ownership structure (Lin 2004; Tenev and 
Zhang 2002). At present, the state is the No. 1 shareholder, holding about 65% of the 
public companies in China, accounting for over 40% stock share of each company on 
average (Hu and Hu 2003). This kind of ownership structure has brought many 
problems.
First, many Chinese listed companies were transformed from old, under-performing 
SOEs. Once the subsidiary is successfully listed, the parent SOE would use the listed 
company as a “cash machine”. This harms the assets of the listed company and 
violates the rights and interests of minority shareholders.
Second, this state-dominated ownership structure leads to “bureaucratic interference”, 
corporate objectives conflicts, non-tradable shares, ambiguous property rights and the 
absence of an effective ultimate principal, as mentioned earlier (Clarke 2003; Qiang 
2003). Although in many cases the state has left the day-to-day management in the 
hands of CEOs and executive directors, there are instances where it actively 
intervenes in director appointment, decision-making and the setting of policy 
objectives. In addition, the government agency may impose social objectives on the 
partially privatized firm, which might conflict with a firm’s profitability objectives.
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Moreover, the non-tradable state shares and legal person shares make it difficult to 
form an effective capital market for corporate control. Furthermore, the principal- 
agent relationship in state-owned/controlled firms is broken down into two other 
agency relationships: owner (the state)-to-politicians and politicians-to-managers, 
which greatly increase agency problems (Qiang 2003). To make it worse, as the 
politicians do not actually have any residual claim rights nor bear the risks over the 
control and use of state-owned assets, they might not have sufficient incentives for 
management monitoring. In this sense, state-owned shares lack representatives or 
owners.
2 .3 .3 .3 .3  L a c k  o f  t r a n s p a r e n c y
The lack of decision-making transparency and a balanced decision making 
mechanism leads to non-rational management and poor quality decisions. This 
problem is caused by the fact that decision-making power has been highly 
concentrated in the hands of insiders who tend to make decisions instinctively, with 
little input from other senior executives or outside directors (Orr 2004)
2 .3 .3 .3 .4  LACK OF EFFECTIVE INCENTIVE MACHANISMS
The distortion of the incentive mechanism has been an urgent and critical issue in 
China. The remuneration system in China is unitary and unmatched with managers’ 
actual contributions (Wu 2002) and does not tie in with the management team's 
performance. Managers’ self-value cannot be realised through a valid and transparent 
mechanism. Therefore in the absence of effective monitoring, company performance,
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to a very large extent, depends on the qualification and conscience of the manager. 
Unfortunately, not all managers are conscientious. On the contrary, many of them 
have been self-seeking at the expense of the shareholders, especially those minority 
shareholders. Due to the lack of an accounting culture in China and the widespread 
practice of reporting only good news, the organic development of a fair incentive 
mechanism may have to wait for some time (Shi and Weisert 2002).
2.3.3.3.5 LACK OF EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
The lack of necessary institutional factors is another major problem for Chinese 
corporate governance. As already discussed, a good corporate governance model 
requires certain institutional conditions, including a high level of transparency and 
accountability, protection for minority shareholders, an active market for corporate 
control, an efficient managerial labour market, professional institutions and an 
effective legal environment. Although the presence of these conditions in the system 
does not by itself eliminate unethical and fraudulent activities, their absence certainly 
raises serious concerns over the system’s efficacy to deal with such issues (Tam 2002). 
However, China has not yet had these institutional conditions, which partly explains 
the pervasiveness of insider trading, self dealing, financial errors and collusion in 
market manipulation (Clarke 2003).
In summary, China has been making efforts towards improving corporate governance 
in listed companies and major progress has been achieved. However, less progress has 
been made at the institutional level (Orr 2004). The imperfection of corporate 
governance limits the competitive advantages of SOEs and the success of their reform.
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2.4 Compensation and incentives in China
One of the most important components of China’s enterprise reform has been the 
compensation system. As mentioned earlier, the lack of proper incentive mechanisms 
has been one of the serious problems in listed companies, especially SOEs, in China. 
This section examines more closely the development of compensation and incentives 
in China.
2.4.1 THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
After the Communist takeover in 1949, there was a strong ideological opposition to 
individual material incentives and the emphasis was on collective welfare benefits and 
non-material incentives (Chow 1992). The government held both the residual claims 
and control rights of SOEs. The wages of all employees in SOEs were determined by 
government bodies, with the same applying to directors or managers. In those days 
the so-called enterprise was nothing but a production plant. It had a director but no 
“manager” in the sense of business decisions (Zhang 2005). The director (normally 
the Party secretary) was nothing more than a special worker whose main task was to 
meet the production plan made by the government. All employees, including directors, 
were compensated through a centrally set hierarchical wage-fringe benefit system, 
which had little to do with firm performance (Yueh 2004). The wage level was 
completely based on an employee’s age, seniority and job assignment; there was no 
link between pay and productivity. In addition, the level for many employees was 
kept fixed for a long time, sometimes for decades. Under those circumstances, nobody 
had incentives to improve the economy, perhaps except for the central government
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leaders and top bureaucrats because they were virtually the residual claimants (Zhang 
1993).
2.4.2 THE CONTRACTING MODEL
In the 1980s, wage reforms were carried out in China as part of the enterprise reform, 
with job characteristics playing an increasingly important role in determining 
employee salaries (Yueh 2004). Before 1985, age was the most important determinant 
of an employee’s earnings in state-owned enterprises. By 1990, job levels in the 
company had become the most significant predictor. Education and training also 
began to make a difference to people’s pay levels. However, income differences were 
still relatively small, although apparently the internal differences increased in the 
early 1990s (Yueh 2004).
Performance-based pay began to be increasingly introduced as a part of the wage 
reforms from 1980s. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, from 1986 to the early 1990s, the 
dominant policy was the management contract system (MCS). The basic content of 
the MCS was to set profit sharing rules and delimit decision rights through contracts 
negotiated by the firm and the governmental agencies. Typically these contracts 
contained indicators of profit and tax targets, utilization of retained profits, debt 
repayment, asset appreciation, product and technology innovation, product quality 
improvement, and enterprise rating (Yueh 2004). In terms of employee wage, the 
Ministry of Labour promulgated a reform in 1985 by determining that the budget to 
be allocated for wages should be linked to the economic performance of SOEs and 
collectively-owned enterprises, which was measured by enterprise profitability or a
59
CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
combined indicator of economic returns containing unemployment rate, consumer 
price index and regional growth (Yueh 2004). Enterprises were permitted to set their 
internal wage structure in 1992 within the confines of the overall wage budget of the 
government. To some extent, these policies stimulated profit-oriented behaviour in 
state-owned enterprises (Groves et al 1995; Yueh 2004).
In terms of management autonomy, although still suffering from considerable 
governmental interventions, the MCS, together with other reform polices such as 
price liberalization and output plan reduction, gave managers considerable decision 
rights. In terms of incentives, the MCS provided relatively strong incentives for 
management to make short-term profits. According to Zhang (1997), there are two 
kinds of incentives working for management under this MCS. One is formal and 
explicit, and the other is informal and implicit. The formal and explicit incentive 
comes from the fact that managers (and workers) can legally claim a considerable 
share of current profits according to the signed contract. Therefore, the residual and 
control rights can be better matched at the firm level. This better matching gives the 
manager better motivation to make profits (Groves et al 1994). However, only a tiny 
fraction of the retained profit legally accrued to the management team. Also, in reality 
many enterprises tend to pay equal (or almost equal) bonuses to all employees and 
there is still much resistance to big pay differences among employees as people still 
preferred it to group incentive schemes (Lin et al 2005; Warner 1995). Therefore 
executive remuneration entrenchment practices were relatively limited in those days; 
but meanwhile, the formal and explicit income gave very limited incentive effects to 
on management.
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One of the side effects of managers’ insufficient incentive from a formal and legal 
perspective is that many of them started to seek informal and implicit incentives, 
which generate agency problems (Zhang 2005). The informal and implicit incentive 
comes from the fact that managers can illegally claim more virtual residual and spend 
money in many ways (often referred to as “insider control”), due to inefficient 
monitoring by the government. Hiding profits (by manipulating accounts) and 
stripping assets are the usual and rather ‘safe’ way for managers to claim more profit 
than specified in the contract because it is very hard for the state to check that out. 
Typical forms of hiding profits and stripping assets include setting up independent or 
subsidiary companies with little government control, making investment in and 
transferring profit through sale or purchasing prices to these companies, putting all 
perks into cost calculations, diverting profits to private or quasi-private accounts, 
inviting relatives and friends for banquets and holidays, purchasing luxury offices, 
furniture and cars, and so on. However, managers cannot freely pocket the money; 
therefore they find ways to spend it instead such as drinking expensive wines, feasting, 
Karaoke, prostitution and gambling (Zhang 2005).
Some researchers argue that this kind of informal and implicit income can motivate 
managers to make profits because casual observation suggests that managers of better 
performing firms have a more luxurious life style than those of poor performers. For 
example, Zhang (2005) claims that it is this kind of illegal expropriation of profits that 
motivates managers to work hard, given that there is no natural owner to motivate 
managers and the residual that managers can legally claim is very small. However, 
this behaviour has negative effects as well. One of the negative effects is that most 
state enterprises under-report profits, because the majority of reported profits belong
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to the state while hidden profits are at the disposal of management. Other downsides 
might include the declining of managers’ moral standards, wasting social resources on 
unnecessary expenses and loss of many competent managers (when they were found 
out stripping state assets or committing corruption or taking bribes).
Even if the MCS has improved management motivation to make current profits, the 
incentives are short-term oriented. The long-term incentive problem has yet to be 
solved. As Zhang (2005) has observed, managers of SOEs tend to distribute retained 
profits to employees or invest in quick-retum projects rather than investing in long 
term productivity-enhancing projects and R&D. And sometimes, abnormal short-term 
profits are made at the expense of long-term productivity (Broadman and Xiao 1997).
The reason for management myopia is that the manager can only enjoy benefits from 
the firm during his firm tenure, given that there is no personal capital stake. And the 
manager sometimes cannot be sure whether he will still be in the same position next 
year because his firm tenure is mainly dependent upon bureaucratic preferences which 
are little related to firm performance9. Zhang (2005) blames management selection for 
this management myopia. SOE managers are appointed by government bureaucrats 
rather than capitalists, normally through industrial bureaus. He argued that this had 
led to problems such as Bureaucrat dominance, and “mediocre” managers.
Adverse selection, according to Zhang (2005), is most serious in China. The reason is 
two-fold. On the one hand, with no personal stake to signal ability, many people 
pretend that they are qualified for management. On the other hand, the bureaucrats
9 Normally the contract lasts 3 or 4 years normally, the government is not bound by the contract in 
replacing the manager.
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have neither incentive nor ability to find and appoint high quality candidates because 
they do not need to bear the consequences of their selections. Also, the bureaucrats 
themselves too often base their selections on personal connections (Guanxi) rather 
than merit.
Officialism10 is another Chinese characteristic problem. In contrast to the West where 
most managers focus their career in business, SOE managers too often try to be 
promoted to become bureaucrats. Because managers are appointed and dismissed by 
bureaucrats, the latter are always considered superior to the former. As a result, most 
SOE managers believe that promotion to a bureaucrat is the best reward for managers. 
Consequently, they often behave more like professional bureaucrats than professional 
managers and regard the firm as nothing but a platform for promotion to the rank of a 
bureaucrat (Tenev and Zhang 2002). That explains why they only care for short-term 
performance.
Because of this selection system, good performers are as likely to be removed from 
the profitable firms as bad performers, sometimes more likely, because when a firm is 
highly profitable bureaucrats have every incentive to replace the incumbent with their 
favourite. As a result, the best way for the incumbent to secure his/her position is 
making the firm perform satisfactorily but not spectacularly (Zhang 2005). Zhang 
(2005) found that these arguments are strongly supported by empirical investigations. 
The phenomenon of “Good managers are short-lived” has attracted much attention 
among academics and managers (Zhang 2005:25).
10 Officialism refers to one o f the Chinese cultural phenomena that government officials have higher 
social position and authority and most Chinese people look up to government officials and would try 
hard to become one of them.
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Actually, these phenomena did not only occur under MCS. They still exist nowadays. 
A most recent example is that the Chair of China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
was appointed as the Top Official of Hainan Province, transforming from a business 
leader into one of the top government bureaucrats. As long as the bureaucratic 
selection system remains, these problems will continue.
2.4.3 THE MODERN CORPORATION MODEL
Having realized that MCS-dominated reform could not solve the incentive problems, 
especially in the long-term, the government and economists have turned to the 
modem corporation system in the West in order to learn from it. Thus, SOEs are 
allowed to be restructured into State-holding listed companies. Accordingly, the 
compensation system has been reformed to fit the needs of the modem corporation 
system.
Since 1978, different forms of compensation reform have been experimented with, 
but as mentioned before, changes in the entrenched compensation practices were 
relatively limited up to the mid-1990s. But with the establishment of the stock 
exchanges and the introduction of many foreign investment and joint-ventures in the 
1990s, the compensation system is becoming more developed. From 1994-1995, the 
compensation reform policy finally gave publicly listed companies’ virtually 
complete discretion in setting compensation levels for their employees (Yueh 2004). 
Two standards were set to guide the wage setting in listed companies: first, the growth 
rate of total wages must not exceed that of after-tax profitability; second, wage growth 
per capita should be lower than labour productivity growth rate (Yueh 2004).
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Since 1997, a handful of state companies have begun to experiment with salary and 
bonus schemes that link a manager’s earnings to firm performance. The previous six- 
component wage system (including basic wage, bonuses, benefits and subsidies, 
overtime wages, supplementary wages and others) was replaced by a two-component 
wage system, fixed and variable (Yueh 2004). The fixed part includes basic wage, 
seniority wage, and insurance and housing fund. The variable part includes bonuses 
depending on individual productivity and firm performance. Most recently, some 
companies have even initiated trial reforms, by rewarding senior executives with 
stock options, though these options bear little relationship to traditional Western 
incentives in which executives are given options to buy company shares at below 
market price. While this may not necessarily eliminate corrupt managers, it should go 
a long way towards motivating managers to excel and improve their company's 
performance, in order to derive their personal benefit.
However, because of the fundamental problems under the MCS system have not been 
solved, the state share-holding system cannot satisfactorily address the problems of 
SOEs. As Zhang (2005) has argued, the state share-holding system cannot solve the 
management selection problem. Managers are still selected by bureaucrats. Although, 
according to Company Law or later regulations, the managers of listed companies 
should now be appointed formally by the board of directors, the government still 
intervenes in this process in corporatized SOEs, and board members are selected from 
the government or other SOEs themselves. Therefore, managers’ Officialism and their 
short-term behaviours continue to persist.
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2.4.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN CHINA
Shanghai Rongzheng Investment Consultancy Co., Ltd (SRIC), the only consultancy 
firm focusing on executive compensation and management buyout (MBO) issues, has 
been conducting an annual survey and research on management shareholdings and 
compensation since 2001. According to their report White Paper on Chinese 
Entrepreneur (SRIC 2003) and also Wu (2002) and Melvin (2001), the current 
situation of executive compensation in China’s listed companies is as follows:
> The level and structure of executive compensation are quite problematic. The 
majority of listed companies only use cash compensation and the level is 
relatively very low compared to that in Western countries. For example, the 
average annual remuneration of managers in Beijing, the highest paid city in 
2002, was RMB¥254,000 (i.e. about £15,000), while that in the Qinghai 
province was only RMB¥75,000 (i.e. £5,000). Long term incentive schemes, 
e.g. shares or share options, are seldom used. The statistics show that at the 
end of 2002, 63.66% of the Chairmen of Boards of Directors do not have any 
share stakes in the company they serve, 65.68% of the CEOs do not hold any 
shares of their companies, and over 60% of management of listed companies 
do not hold their company shares (SRIC 2003). Both the amount of their 
shares and the market value of their shares declined in 2002 compared to that 
o f2001.
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> The linkage of the compensation to firm size and firm performance is 
becoming stronger. As SRIC (2003) reported, there was no correlation 
between the salary of the highest paid executive and firm performance or firm 
size in 2001; while the salary in 2002 was significantly related to earning per 
share, profit after tax and also company size. So were the fees of independent 
directors.
> The compensation level and structure differ across industries and regions. As 
far as industries are concerned, managers in the Construction, Finance and 
Banking, and Information and Technology are normally paid higher than other 
industries, while those in the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Farming 
industries get the lowest pay (SRIC 2003). In terms of regions, Beijing, the 
Guangdong province and Shanghai are the regions with the highest executive 
compensation, while those provinces in the West, e.g. Lingxia and Qinghai, 
receive much lower pay. The market value of executive shareholdings varies 
across industries and regions as well. For example, CEOs in IT on average 
hold more company shares than those in other industries. IT is a promising and 
highly growing industry, and managerial ownership provides better incentive 
for the managers. The highest average market value of managerial shares is 
found in the Zhejiang province, an east-coast province, and the lowest in 
Yunnan, a province in South-west China.
From the above discussion we can see that the incentive system in China requires 
further reforms. More and more economists, researchers and practitioners are 
advocating the incorporation of managerial shareholdings, including common shares
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or share options, into managerial compensation package. For example, Schipani and 
Liu (2002) suggest that stock option programs should be implemented nationwide and 
the legislature should offer guidelines for the content and validity of stock option 
contracts. However, due to the lack of necessary institutional factors, such as legal 
sources of managerial shares, supporting accounting methods, an efficient capital 
market and stock market, an objective and impartial performance appraisal system 
and the related legal regulations, whether or not this type of incentive can work in 
China is still questionable. But at least both the government and the enterprises 
themselves have realized the importance of managerial incentives and are seeking to 
improve the situation.
2.5 SUMMARY
China has been implemented its economic reforms for decades, which provides the 
general background for its corporate governance development. Chinese corporate 
governance has evolved through several stages and has been significantly improved 
compared to its previous centrally-planned model. However, the nature of China’s 
reform, the immaturity of its capital markets and the special ownership structures of 
Chinese enterprises have unavoidably led to a corporate governance system with 
some as-yet unresolved problems.
The salient features of the current business conditions and governance systems in 
China are: serious government intervention; absence of effective managerial 
incentives; highly concentrated and state-dominant ownership; ineffectual internal and
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external monitoring mechanisms; a thin managerial labour market; lack of relevant 
laws to enforce property rights; and lack of legal redress.
These inadequate and undeveloped corporate governance practices have impeded 
business growth and economic development in China. In particular, the lack of 
effective managerial incentive has become a key and urgent issue both for 
government policy makers and enterprise practitioners to address. To some degree, 
resolving the managerial incentive problem is an important determinant of the success 
of economic reform. This might explain why executive compensation has become an 
important topic for both researchers and practitioners in China in recent years.
With its entry to the World Trade Organization, China has become an increasingly 
important player in the world economy. Improving corporate governance has become 
a key element in order to enhance the competitive advantage of Chinese enterprises 
and is one of the long term challenges facing China. Prior research in China and 
elsewhere indicates that corporate governance has a significant impact on firm 
performance. Evidence suggests that improving performance and creating value can 
be achieved by paying greater attention to ownership structure and executive 
compensation (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Good corporate governance in China 
however will also depend heavily upon the successful reform of government agencies 
and the legal system.
It might be worth stressing that because China’s listed companies face a different 
institutional environment from Anglo-American companies the common 
understanding of executive compensation dynamics and management incentives
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might not apply in China or at least require some adjustments. Therefore, to help 
understand the complicated corporate governance of China, interviews were 
conducted with 10 directors of Chinese listed firms, as a compliment to the 
quantitative analysis based on secondary data. How the interviews were conducted is 
introduced in chapter 4 and the results are used to help explain the empirical results of 
this thesis in the later chapters.
The next chapter reviews agency theory and the literature on corporate governance 
and executive remuneration and develops research hypotheses of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY 
AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 introduced China’s economic reforms, its capital market and stock exchanges, 
and the evolution of its corporate governance and executive incentive system. That 
provides a general institutional framework for this study and also indicates that China is a 
special context to study corporate governance and executive remuneration compared to 
those in the West. Chapter 3 offers a review of the literature on corporate governance and 
executive remuneration, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, and develops 
research hypotheses for this study.
There are numerous papers that debate about executive remuneration from different 
theoretical perspectives. Within that debate, agency theory has received most attention in 
the literature. Although some of the assumptions of the agency model are open to 
criticism, this theory is undoubtedly the most influential theory in the area of corporate 
governance and management remuneration. This thesis therefore gives agency theory a 
central position in reviewing previous research on the determinants of executive 
remuneration.
This chapter provides an overview of the general agency model of remuneration and the 
empirical studies on the determinants of executive remuneration. Based on this review 
and also an understanding of the institutional background of China, the research
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hypotheses for this study are developed. These hypotheses relate executive remuneration 
to board characteristics, ownership structure and market comparison factors. Other 
factors that have been identified by the literature to have impacts on executive 
remuneration are also reviewed and this thesis will control for their effects.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes and evaluates the literature on 
agency theory. Section 3 reviews the literature on corporate governance, more 
specifically executive remuneration, and develops the hypotheses for the thesis. Section 4 
reviews the literature on other determinants of executive remuneration which provides the 
theoretical underpinning for the selection of control variables. Finally, a summary is 
provided in Section 5.
3.2 Agency theory
3.2.1 ORIGIN OF AGENCY THEORY
The fundamental breakthrough in Information Economics, which has been dominant 
since the 1960s, is the rejection of the assumptions of perfection information and altruism, 
thus casting doubt on the classical theory and paving the way for the Principal-Agency 
theory (Xi and Wu 2000). Berle & Means (1932) first argued in their influential book, 
“The Modem Corporation and Private Property”, that the development of modem 
corporations had changed from ‘owner control’ to ‘manager control’, as cited in Xi and 
Wu (2000). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, economists started to explore risk sharing 
among individuals or groups and argued that the risk-sharing problem arises when
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cooperating parties have different attitudes toward risk (Arrow 1971; Wilson 1968). 
Based on these earlier works, researcher ( Fama 1980; Holmstrom 1979; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Shavell 1979) identified the so-called agency problem and developed 
formal models for the principal-agent theory.
3.2.2 AGENCY THEORY
In Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s definition, an agency relationship exists in any situation 
that one or more persons (principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf, which involves the delegation of some decision making 
authority to the agent. The principal and agency relationship develops with the separation 
of ownership and control. Under agency theory, a firm is the nexus of contracts, known 
as Nexus of Contracts theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
In its simplest form, agency theorists assume social life as an endless series of contracts 
and analyse organizations as such (Perrow 1986). In their view, every person in a firm 
has a contract with at least one other party. For example, the CEO has contracts with both 
his /her subordinates and the board of directors. The firm is little more than a nexus of 
contracts or bilateral agreements. Any party can freely enter a contract relationship and 
break it if he/she likes. The violation of contracts when possible is not an occasional 
dilemma but the root problem of organization (Perrow 1986). Contracts and their 
violation are the basic foundation of agency theory.
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According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a principal-agency relationship is formed 
when the firm owner delegates managerial authority to the manager. Such relationship is 
governed by a contract specifying what the agent should do and what the principal should 
do in return such as compensating the agent. However, the principal-agent relationship is 
fraught with built-in problems such as cheating, limited information, and bounded 
rationality in general (Perrow 1986), and conflicts in interests between the parties (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). With authority delegation, the principal expects the agent to act in 
the best interests of the principal, that is, to maximize the principals’ utility; while the 
agent takes it as an opportunity to maximize his/her own utility. This raises the trouble 
that if both parties are utility maximizers, the agent might not always act in the best 
interests of the principal. Therefore, agency theory assumes that managers will act 
opportunistically to further their own interests before shareholders, which generates the 
so-called agency problem, especially when it is difficult or too expensive for the principal 
to verify what the agent is actually doing (Jensen and Meckling 1976). There is another 
problem — risk sharing, which arises when the principal and agent have different risk 
preferences. Agency theory is concerned with resolving these two problems associated 
with agency relationships (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated that a manager has potential conflicts of 
interest with the outside shareholders unless the manager, owns 100% of the firm. This 
means that an agency problem generally exists in modem corporations with ownership 
dispersion. Then how can the financiers be sure that their funds are not expropriated or 
wasted on unattractive projects? Generally, the principal can sign a contract with the 
agent that specifies what the manager does with the funds, and how the returns are
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divided between them (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). As mentioned by Jensen & Murphy 
(1990b), if shareholders had complete information regarding CEO’s activities and 
investment opportunities, they could design a complete contract specifying and enforcing 
the managerial action to be taken in each state of the world. However, due to the 
complicated and ever-changing environment, it is unrealistic and impossible to wholly 
describe and foresee all the events in the future. This in turn makes it unrealistic or even 
impossible to write a complete and very specific contract. Thus, managers tend to have 
most of the residual control rights and discretion (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
To protect shareholders’ interests, various devices have been proposed, namely incentive 
alignment and governance mechanisms (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). As 
mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the principal can design appropriate 
incentives for the agent to act to increase shareholder wealth, employ monitoring systems 
to reduce the unwelcome activities of the agent, or, bond the agent to the principal to , 
which guarantees that he will not take actions adverse to the principal’s interests. All 
these actions involve costs, known as ‘Agency Cost’, defined as the sum of the cost of 
monitoring management, bonding the agent to the principal and residual losses (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976).
3.2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF AGENCY THEORY
Over the last few decades, agency theory has been extensively used in widespread 
research fields (Eisenhardt 1989). These researches are developed along two streams: the 
“principal-agent” stream and the “positivist” stream (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997;
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Jensen 1983). The two streams share common assumptions such as self-interest, bounded 
rationality and risk adverse preference, information as a purchasable commodity, partial 
goal conflicts and information asymmetry between organisational participants 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Both streams analyse the contract between the principal and the agent 
(Eisenhardt 1989).
However, the research focus of the two streams has been different. The principal-agent 
stream almost exclusively focuses on the contract for controlling agency costs, trying to 
identify the optimal contract under differing conditions of information asymmetry. On the 
other hand, the positivist stream focuses on identifying goal-conflicting situations and 
introducing governance mechanisms to limit the agent’s self-serving behaviours 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). Most positivist researchers have 
only focused on the special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners and 
managers of large public corporations (Eisenhardt 1989).
3.2.3.1 The Principal-agent Stream
Principal-agent stream emanated from a managerial finance and managerial economics 
perspective and largely focuses on modelling the optimal contract, behaviour versus 
outcome, between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). Under the assumptions 
mentioned in the last paragraph, the essence of this model can be described by two 
scenarios (Eisenhardt 1989; Harris and Raviv 1979; Shavell 1979). The first scenario is 
under the assumption of complete information. When the principal has complete
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information about agent’s efforts, the most efficient contract is based on behaviour since 
an outcome contract needlessly transfers risk to a risk-averse agent.
In the second scenario, the principal does not have complete information about the 
agent’s effort. The self-interest seeking agent might not act in the principal’s interest, and 
hence might give rise to an agency problem. Formally, the literature emphasises two 
aspects of the agency problem—moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Adverse selection arises when the agent misrepresents his/her ability or qualification 
because the principal cannot verify the skills or abilities of the agent either at the time of 
hiring or after. Moral hazard, also called Shirking, occurs when the agent does not make 
agreed efforts.
Concerning these unobservable behaviours of the agent, the principal has two options: to 
hire some mechanisms to discover the agent’s behaviour or to transfer the risk to the 
agent by designing an outcome-based contract, such as incentive alignment (Gomez- 
Mejia and Wiseman 1997). Thus, the central issue in the optimal contracting problem lies 
in the trade-off between the cost of measuring the agent’s behaviour and that of 
measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent (Beatty and Zajac 1994; Gomez- 
Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Zajac and Westphal 1997).
Some researchers have extended this simple model in a number of ways. For example, 
Harris & Raviv (1979) relaxed the assumption of a risk-averse agent. Others extensions 
include: relaxing the assumption of interest conflicts (Demski 1980), relating the issue to 
the task programmability by the agent or the time of the principal-agent relationship
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(Eisenhardt 1985, 1988; Lambert 1983). These studies have examined the various 
assumptions underlying traditional agency theory and have theoretically extended agency 
theory.
However, as commented by Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), despite the promise of 
the line of theory, research on contracting as a control mechanism has been less than 
supportive of agency theory. Also, due to the normative and deterministic nature of this 
stream, it is less accessible to organisational researchers and therefore its impact on 
organization studies in general is limited (Beatty and Zajac 1994; Eisenhardt 1989).
3.3.2.2 Positivist Stream
As mentioned above, the positivist stream is based on the same assumptions as the 
principal-agent stream. However, positivist stream researchers are interested in 
identifying goal-conflicting circumstances and then introducing governance mechanisms 
to limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour (Eisenhardt 1989). As pointed out by 
Eisenhardt (1989), some classic work has been very important in this stream, namely 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explored the importance of the ownership structure of 
modem corporations and explained how managers’ equity ownership aligns their interests 
with those of other owners. By integrating elements from the theory of agency, the theory 
of property rights and the theory of finance, they developed a theory of the ownership 
structure of the firm, provided a new definition of the firm and defined the concept of 
agency costs.
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Fama (1980) discussed the role of efficient capital and labour markets as information 
mechanisms to control the self-serving behaviour of top executives, so that executive 
remuneration cannot deviate too much from what the market regards as appropriate. 
Fama and Jensen (1983), instead, introduced the board of directors as a decision 
controlling system that could be used within large corporations to monitor the 
opportunism of top executives. Jensen (1984) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) extended 
these ideas to controversial practices, such as golden parachutes and corporate raiding.
Theoretically, the positivist stream has been most concerned with identifying governance 
mechanisms that solve agency problems ( Eisenhardt 1989). Governance mechanisms 
identified in this stream can be captured by two propositions. The first proposition, called 
incentive alignment, is that an outcome-based contract encourages the agent to behave in 
the interest of the principal. The argument is that an outcome-based contract mitigates the 
conflicts of self-interests between the agent and the principal by making the rewards for 
both parties depend on the same outcome. The other proposition is that information 
systems curb the agent’s opportunistic behaviours (Eisenhardt 1989). When the principal 
knows exactly what the agent is doing, they can control agent opportunism. This is 
because the agent will be aware that it is not easy to fool the principal. One example here 
is the establishment of the board of directors (Fama and Jensen 1983).
Positivist agency theory has enriched economics by offering a more complex view of 
organizations (Jensen 1983). However, it has been criticised by organisational theorists as 
minimalist (Eisenhardt 1989). For example, Perrow (1986) claims that it addresses no 
clear problems and Hirsch and Friedman (1986) criticized it as excessively narrow.
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Meanwhile, micro-economists (Jensen 1983) condemned it as tautological and lacking 
rigor. These issues will be discussed in detail later in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.2.3 The Two Streams and Their Empirical Results
As discussed above, the two streams of agency theory research share common 
assumptions and the same unit of analysis—the contract between the agent and the 
principal, but they are different in some respect. The principal-agent stream, as a formal 
theory, involves careful specification of assumptions and logical deduction and 
mathematical verification. It can be applied to broader general agency relationships. In 
contrast, the positivist paradigm has focused on a special case of the agency relationship, 
namely the owner-and-CEO relationship in large corporations. However, these 
differences are not crucial. Rather, the two streams are complementary: Positivists 
identify various contracting alternatives, and the principal-agent theory indicates which 
contract is the most efficient under certain situations (Eisenhardt 1989).
After its introduction, principal-agent theory has been widely used in management and 
related fields and researchers in different disciplines have undertaken empirical studies of 
agency theory. Eisenhardt (1989) reviewed and examined mainly those studies 
undertaken in the 1980s under the two research streams of agency theory. She found that 
the common approach in studies within the principal-agent stream is to use a subset of 
agency variables to predict whether the contract is based on behaviour or outcome. 
Generally speaking, these studies support the principal-agent hypotheses linking contract 
form to information systems (Conlon and Parks 1988; Eisenhardt 1985, 1988), task
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programmability (Eisenhardt 1985), time (Conlon and Parks 1988) and outcome 
uncertainty and measurement (Conlon and Parks 1988; Eisenhardt 1985). The support 
rests on research by a variety of research methods including questionnaires, secondary 
sources, laboratory experiments, and interviews.
In the positivist stream, the common approach is to demonstrate in a specific agent 
relationship that information systems or outcome-based incentives co-align the agent 
behaviour with owner preferences. Most studies within this stream have used secondary 
data from large corporations. The positivist propositions described earlier have been 
supported by these studies. Therefore, she concluded that agency theory is testable and 
empirically supported (Eisenhardt 1989).
3.2.4 CONTRIBUTIONS AND CRITICISMS OF AGENCY THEORY
This section discusses the contributions of agency theory and also evaluates its strengths 
and weaknesses.
3.2.4.1 Contributions
Controversial as it is, agency theory has proved to be an important theory for many 
decades. Even its critics recognise its contributions to academic thinking. For example, 
Perrow (1986) admitted that agency theory has re-established the importance of 
incentives and self-interest in organisational thinking. Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997)
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proclaimed that the most significant contribution of agency theory is the articulation of 
specific mechanisms to help control opportunistic management actions.
Agency theory also makes some other specific contributions to organizational research. 
One contribution is its treatment of information as a purchasable commodity (Eisenhardt 
1989). This gives an important role to formal information systems, such as budgeting and 
corporate governance systems, namely boards of directors and external auditors. Under 
agency theory, organizations can invest in information systems to limit agent 
opportunism. The implication of this in my thesis is that the effectiveness of these 
governance mechanisms (the board of directors and firm ownership structure), can help 
explain executive pay. From an agency theory perspective, remuneration should be 
contingent upon a variety of factors including information systems. Better information 
systems lead to tighter control on managerial opportunism, which in turn reduces 
management entrenchment of higher level pay (Jensen and Murphy 1990b).
Another contribution of agency theory is its risk implication. Any organization faces an 
uncertain future that is not totally under the control of organization members. Agency 
theory suggests that this outcome uncertainty, viewed as risk/reward trade-offs and 
coupled with different risk preference, should have an impact on the contracts between 
principal and agent.
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3.2.4.2 Criticisms of Agency Theory
Useful theory as it is, agency theory has also several limitations. Most of the critiques 
have focused on the validity of the assumptions behind the theory.
The first criticism is about the difficulties in measuring firm performance for the optimal 
contract. Agency theory assumes that there is a well-defined causal relationship between 
the manager’s actions and firm performance and that the effect of an individual 
manager’s effort can be separated from other factors, both internal and external to the 
firm. However, it is impossible in reality to fully isolate the outcomes attributed to 
managerial effort. Specifically, the debate also concerns the relative merits of using 
accounting-based versus market-based performance measurement (Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin 1992; Lambert et al. 1985; Sloan 1993).
This captures the essence of the optimal contracting problem: how to balance the cost of 
information with the risk of the unmonitored agent. Market-based measures may increase 
the risk borne by executives as they are noisy (subjected to uncontrollable external factors) 
and thus require paying a risk premium to the agent (Lambert 1993), while the opposite 
argument is that such linkage increases the possibility that executives behave consistently 
with the interests of the principal (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; Jensen and Murphy 
1990b). Accounting earnings are less risky but can be manipulated by'the managers. 
Sloan (1993) suggested to assign relative weights to the two performance measurements 
so as to minimize the amount of noise. This probably is a better measure; however, it is 
very difficult to practise.
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Secondly, an important assumption of the agency model is that principals implement 
contracts including incentive remuneration to control the problem of moral hazard. 
However, the implementation of incentive contracts quite often are under the hands of 
management themselves and may not serve the interests of shareholders (Forbes and 
Watson 1993). Indeed, Forbes and Watson argue that incentive contracts, rather than 
being a monitoring mechanism, may bring new accountability problems. The lack of 
adequate information disclosure regarding remuneration contracts and information 
asymmetry adds to this problem.
A third criticism of the agency model challenges its economic ‘model of man’. Agency 
theory assumes managers have different personal goals from the owners and they are 
potentially opportunistic and shirking motivated by economic self-interest maximization 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). This assumption over-simplifies the motives of a human. 
There are other “models of man” (Donaldson and Davis 1991) that are motivated by 
wider human motives, such as needs to achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction through 
successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility and 
authority, or to gain recognition from peers and bosses (McClelland 1961). For example, 
stewardship theorists argue many managers are loyal stewards whose motives are largely 
aligned with those of their principals (Donaldson and Davis 1991).
A fourth challenge to the notion of the contract as a control mechanism comes from 
organizational researchers. These researchers stress the power/political issues related to 
conflict of interest in corporate governance, especially in the design of executive 
remuneration (Westphal and Zajac 1995). Organizational researchers criticize the
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principal-agent literature for ignoring the political and interpersonal aspects of agent- 
principal relations (Perrow 1986). They also criticise its narrow focus on contract 
specification. Agency theory limits discussion to issues of information incompleteness 
and incentive alignment which only partially reflects the agent monitoring problem 
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). For example, Holmstrom (1979) argued that 
mathematical principal-agent models carefully specify contract conditions and lead to 
deterministic solutions; however, these solutions deviate from the complex organizational 
realities due to the impossibility of foreseeing all future events, the existence of 
uncertainty, lack of information, the dynamic nature of principal-agent relationships and 
the difficulty of regulating monitoring through ways such as behavioural criteria and 
direct supervision.
Fifthly, agency theory is also criticised for not considering managerial competence (Shen 
2003). Standard agency theory just focuses on “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” 
(Hendry 2002; Ross 1973). It does not recognize deal with the managers’ ability problem. 
However, even if managers are honest or made honest by effective control, they might be 
limited in their competence to fulfil shareholders’ objectives (Hendry 2002). Hendry 
suggested that there may be situations in which principals should pay more attention to 
training or mentoring managers in order to improve their performance rather than to 
supervise them.
Finally, the principal-agent model is criticised for its narrow economics perspective. As 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) argued, while this theory has offered some important 
theoretical insights, the heroic assumptions and deterministic nature of many of the
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mathematical representations make them too far removed from the realities of 
organizational life. Therefore, they suggest that management scholars should fill the gaps 
by extending studies beyond the simple economic terms portrayed in traditional agency 
views.
Hence, it is clear from the above discussion that the practical application of the agency 
model confronts many difficulties. In particular, appropriate measures of performance are 
extremely difficult to formulate; the model may be inappropriate if shareholders lose the 
power to specify the remuneration contract; many commentators argue that the agency 
model oversimplifies organizational life and incentives faced by individuals and ignores 
some important managerial problems other than moral hazard.
However, most criticisms seem to aim at the principal-agent stream for its untenably 
strict assumptions. It might be justified that the researchers in the positivist stream have 
looked beyond the contract to issues of direct supervisions (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman
1997). Also, in terms of the current corporate governance debate, it is clear that 
shareholders and the general public expect directors’ remuneration to be linked in some 
way to firm performance, and in this respect, the agency model, despite its drawbacks, is 
a useful framework for examining the setting of executive remuneration.
3.3 Review of empirical literature and hypotheses development
As discussed above, Eisenhardt reviewed the related literature in the 1980s and assessed 
agency theory as “unique, realistic, and empirically testable (1989:72).” In the past two
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decades, more empirical studies have been conducted in different disciplines, especially 
on executive remuneration. Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) reviewed and classified 
the previous literature along three dimensions that reflect three basic issues in 
remuneration design: the criteria for awarding pay, consequences of pay and the 
mechanisms for linking pay criteria to pay consequences. According to them, there are 
two remuneration mechanisms: incentive alignment and monitoring (Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman 1997).
Under agency theory, managers may engage in self-interest serving rather than 
shareholder-wealth maximising behaviour. In terms of top management pay, CEOs and 
executive directors have incentives to award themselves high levels of remuneration. So 
either or both of these mechanisms are developed in order to curb the opportunistic 
actions of professional managers.
Monitoring systems should be complementary to incentive alignment and may result in a 
negative relation between governance systems and incentive remuneration. Finkelstein 
and Hambrick argued that “alternative monitoring mechanisms (e.g., direct board 
monitoring, CEO remuneration, the market for corporate control, market remuneration) 
act as substitutes for one another” (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996:259). This is an 
equally plausible argument (Ezzamel 2005). But this also leads to some confusion in 
explaining the empirical findings. However, this issue has not been empirically addressed 
until recently (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997).
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This section will review these recent studies of the impact of governance systems on 
executive remuneration. The internal governance mechanisms this project will focus on 
are the board of directors and the ownership structure. Based on the theory discussed 
above and the literature surveyed, research hypotheses to be tested in this thesis will be 
developed.
3.3.1. BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
From the principal-agent perspective, the board of directors has a pivotal role to play in 
the governance of the corporation. It is well recognised that, the ‘expert board’ will 
enforce its ‘ratification and monitoring’ of top management through its power to ‘hire, 
fire, and compensate’ top managers (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). The board of 
directors also has the capacity to approve or veto major actions proposed by the CEO. 
Having a board is one of the legal requirements for incorporation. Although the debate on 
the efficacy of the board of directors is still going on, the critical and central importance 
of boards of directors as internal governance mechanisms is beyond doubt (Ezzamel 2005; 
Jensen 1993). As a consequence, the board of directors has been the subject of academic 
research and the interest in it has been rising in recent years (Ezzamel 2005; Johnson et al. 
1996; Zahra and Pearce 1989).
Ezzamel (2005) classified research on the board of directors along four dimensions: the 
composition and dynamics of the board (Shen and Cannella Jr 2002; Zajac and Westphal 
1996); board characteristics and decision making (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998); board 
characteristics and organisation performance (Dalton et al. 1999; Yermack 1996); and
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board characteristics and CEO remuneration (Boyd 1994; Hadlock and Lumer 1997). The 
literature on issues of board characteristics and executive remuneration is reviewed in 
more detail to support the hypotheses developed in this thesis.
3.3.1.1 Board Size and Executive Remuneration
According to agency theory, an effective board of directors can monitor executives’ 
entrenchment behaviour and design more appropriate remuneration packages. Boyd
(1994) found that board control explains a significant part of CEO remuneration and 
suggested that the board of directors is a key internal governance mechanism. According 
to resources dependency theory, larger boards can be used to form environmental links to 
obtain greater amounts of critical resources for the organisation (Dalton et al. 1999). In 
this sense, a board with larger size should control and monitor executives more 
effectively and lead to a more sensitive link between executive pay and firm performance. 
This argument is supported by Rui et al. (2003), the only study that has tested the 
relationship between executive remuneration and board size in China. Rui et al. (2003) 
reported a negative and significant relation between CEO pay and board size, opposite to 
what they hypothesized.
However, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that large boards are less 
effective compared to small boards. Based on some anecdotal evidence from the practices 
of a few large organisations and also more systematic evidence, Jensen (1993) argued 
that smaller boards of directors have successfully performed their jobs: hiring, firing and 
compensating the CEO and providing high-level council. He attributes board failure to
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board culture, information problems, boards’ lack of expertise compared to CEOs, lack of 
legal incentives, lack of management and board member equity holdings, and board 
oversize. Both Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argued that boards with more 
than seven or eight membership are less likely to function effectively and are easier for 
the CEO to control. This is because the oversize of board is normally due to the inclusion 
of too many insider members. These insider directors cannot criticize openly and monitor 
CEOs effectively because they want to avoid “animosity and retribution” from the CEO 
(Jensen 1993:865). Therefore, to enhance effective board monitoring, Jensen (1993) 
suggested that the CEO should be the only insider board member while remaining the 
communication channel between directors and other senior executives.
High levels of remuneration and low sensitivity of pay-performance have been offered as 
evidence of ineffective board control. Yermack (1996) found that the pay-performance 
relationship for CEOs decreased with board size, suggesting that small boards give CEOs 
larger incentives and force them to bear more risk than do large boards. Cole et al. (1999) 
found that CEO remuneration is higher when the board is larger as a board with a larger 
size makes it more difficult for directors to organize in opposition to the CEO. These 
studies seem to suggest that board effectiveness is negatively related to board size.
Thus, the above literature suggests a relationship between board size and the extent of 
sensitivity between executive remuneration and firm performance, but the direction of the 
relationship is not clear. This gives rise to the following non-directional hypotheses:
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Hypothesis la: Exeucutive remuneration is related to the size of the board of directors. 
Hypothesis lb: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is related to the size of the board 
of directors.
3.3.1.2 Board Structure and Executive Remuneration
Given that each CEO and other senior executives usually have seats on the board, and 
also that internal directors are likely to be more responsive to the CEO’s desires than to 
protecting shareholders (Jensen 1993), the effectiveness of the board depends on the 
independent non-executive directors (Core et al 1999; Fama and Jensen 1983; John and 
Senbet 1998; Weisbach 1988). A series of UK governance reports view the employment 
of non-executives on the board as a governance mechanism that could help in reducing 
agency cost (Cadbury 1992; Greenbury 1995). The results of Dahya et al. (2002b) 
support the argument that the Cadbury recommendations of appointing non-executive 
directors have improved the quality of board oversight in the United Kingdom. Mehran
(1995) found that the use of equity-based remuneration was positively related to the 
number of outsiders on the board; see also Core et al. (1999) and Rupp and Smith (2002), 
who support a link between outside director’s effectiveness and pay-performance 
sensitivity.
Whether non-executive directors promote shareholders’ interests is open to debate 
(Jensen 1993). There have been some claims that the proportion of non-executive 
directors will be negatively associated with top management pay, which is supported by 
the prediction of agency theory.
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Although Core et al. (1999) and Boyd (1994) argued that insider directors are not pawns 
of CEOs, reporting a negative relation between CEO remuneration and the percentage of 
inside directors on the board, this argument is only confirmed in the sense that the 
insiders do not side with CEOs or become intimidated by them to make decisions that 
favour CEOs. In reality, however it is rare that the insider directors can really keep at 
arm’s length from the CEOs. Therefore, the dominant view in the literature is that the 
presence of non-executives on the board is an important governance mechanism.
In China, some non-executive directors are appointed by government and other 
institutions, the controlling shareholders. Consequently, it is difficult to tell whether a 
‘non-executive’ director is independent. Rui et al. (2003), proxying non-executive 
directors as non-paid directors, found no relationship between CEO pay and the 
proportion of non-paid directors over the board; while Lin et al. (2005) found a 
significantly negative relationship in the individual fixed effect model but not in the firm 
fixed effect model. I consider independent directors as a category different from non­
executive or non-paid directors. Independent directors are introduced as outside directors 
representing minority shareholders. Given that almost every study of governance tests for 
non-executives, it is necessary to retest whether independent directors have a monitoring 
effects on executive remuneration. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Executive remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of 
independent directors.
Hypothesis 2b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of independent directors.
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3.3.1.3 CEO-chairman duality and executive remuneration
Jensen (1993) argues that Chairman-CEO duality gives the CEO too much power over 
the decision-making process, and scope to pursue personal interests at the expense of 
shareholders. According to Jensen (1993), when the CEO also holds the position of 
chairman of the board, internal control systems fail, as the board cannot effectively 
perform its core control functions.
The separation of the two roles of the chairman of the board and CEO has been 
commended as good corporate governance (Cadbury 1992). However, some empirical 
studies show no support for the recommendation, such as Dahya et al. (2002b) who have 
suggested that splitting the responsibilities of the CEO and the chairman of the board did 
not improve the quality of board oversight in the United Kingdom.
Prior research examining the impact of duality on firm performance or CEO 
remuneration has offered some empirical evidence of a positive relationship between 
CEO-chairman duality and CEO remuneration, see Brickley et al. (1997), Cole et al. 
(1999), Cyert et al. (2002) and Sridharan (1996), although Ryan and Wiggins (2001), 
Conyon (1997b) and Main and Johnson (1993) found no significant effects of CEO- 
chairman duality on CEO pay.
Rui et al. (2003), the only existent study on the relation between CEO pay and CEO- 
chairman duality in China, found a negative relation between the two, but their result was
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not robust across their models. Their finding is interesting as it conflicts with most of the 
literature and motivates further investigation of this relation in China.
Given that China’s corporate governance is still weak and that many companies suffer 
from insider control (Cha 2001), giving a person both the roles of the CEO and the 
chairman enhances the possibility of power concentration, weak supervision and insider 
control, which in turn leads to more likelihood of incurring executive entrenchment by 
overpaying themselves and not linking pay to performance. The above discussion 
motivates the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Executive remuneration is positively related to CEO-Chairman duality. 
Hypothesis 3b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is negatively related to CEO- 
Chairman duality.
3.3.1.4. Interlocking Directorship
In addition to board size and board structure, both Core et al. (1999) and Hallock (1997) 
found that CEO pay at a given company increases when boards are "interlocking"11. One 
possible interpretation is that there is a quid pro quo between such directors and the CEO, 
which leads to greater remuneration. Another interpretation could be that the CEO of the 
given company is very successful and thus has sufficient bargaining power to get both 
higher remuneration and a very friendly board of directors (Hermalin and Weisbach
1998). This is an interesting issue. However, it is not common for a CEO or other
11 A director is interlocked if an inside officer of the firm serves on the board of that outsider director’s 
company (Hallock 1997).
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executives to take a director position in another listed company in China; therefore this 
thesis will not model the ‘interlocking’ effect.
3.3.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
In addition to the board of directors, firm ownership structure may affect monitoring and 
impact remuneration. For example, the dispersal of ownership may dilute monitoring and 
affect remuneration (Westphal and Zajac 1994; Zajac and Westphal 1995). Under the 
assumption of self-interest seeking individuals, more atomistic shareholders will exercise 
less monitoring, especially when they have to bear the cost of monitoring while sharing 
its benefits with others. This is because small shareholders have less stake in the firm and 
because it is more difficult to coordinate their actions in curtailing self-serving 
behaviours of top management (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
Empirical research has used ownership concentration as a proxy for the intensity of 
monitoring (Boyd 1994; Goldberg and Idson 1995; Wright et al. 1996) and the results are 
supportive of a negative relation between ownership concentration and managerial 
opportunistic behaviour. As reviewed by Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), greater 
ownership concentration is related to (1) a tighter linkage between executive pay and firm 
performance (Boyd 1994; Mehran 1995); (2) less reliance on firm size to set executive 
pay (Gomez-Mejia et al. 1987); (3) lower agency costs in executive remuneration 
(Goldberg and Idson 1995); (4) fewer mergers and acquisitions for justifying higher pay 
or diversifying the employment risk for managers (Kroll et al. 1990); (5) more risk taking 
(Wright et al. 1996); (6) weaker CEO power and influence over the board of directors
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(Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989); and also other variables that are not very closely related 
to this study, such as greater possibility of managerial turnover for poor performance and 
less financial manipulation.
More specifically, in terms of the relationships between ownership concentration and 
executive remuneration, the literature usually addresses two questions: (1) the level of 
executive remuneration and (2) pay-performance sensitivity in the presence of a 
blockholder (Holdemess 2003a). While the findings are consistent in terms of the role 
played by external blockholders in monitoring the remuneration of top executives, they 
are mixed on the impact of managerial ownership on executive remuneration.
3.3.2.1 External Blockholding and Executive Remuneration
The literature suggests that external blockholders, specially institutional investors, are 
likely to constrain executive discretion and tend to be associated with firms with long­
term orientation (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997), e.g., high R&D investments 
(Baysinger et al. 1991; Kosnik and Shapiro 1997). There are some theoretical reasons 
why institutional investors are more active in monitoring than individual shareholders. 
First, investing “other people’s money”, they have a legal fiduciary obligation to be 
proactive. Second, their high aggregate ownership makes it difficult for them to “vote 
with their feet” in response to poor firm performance, as doing so may result in lowering 
the share price. Third, institutional investors, with the economy of scale and more 
interaction with other firms, have the opportunity and ability to govern and judge 
remuneration policy (Black 1992). Furthermore, already owning significant stakes in
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most firms, institutional investors might face difficulty in finding appropriate substitute 
investments, and this provides an incentive for them to monitor executives (David et al. 
1998; Kochhar and David 1996).
The empirical studies on the relationship between external blockholding and executive 
remuneration have offered supportive evidence for the above arguments. David et al 
(1998) have reported that institutional investors have a direct impact on CEO pay policy, 
by decreasing excessive pay or fostering long-term incentives, but they also argue that the 
effect depends on the nature of their relationships with firms, such as “pressure-resistant” 
or “pressure-sensitive”. Hartzell and Starks (2003) support the findings of David et al. 
(1998) with a sample of almost 2000 firms during the period 1991-1997.
Mehran (1995) found that firms with larger percentages of their shares held by outside 
blockholders used less equity-based remuneration, suggesting that monitoring by outside 
blockholders may be a substitute for incentive pay for executives. Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1995) reported that companies with a large external shareholder paid their 
CEOs less than those with no significant external owners.
Mayers and Smith (1992) used data for the remuneration of CEOs of privately-held 
insurance companies to consider differences in remuneration for stock versus mutual life 
insurance companies 12. Based on differences in corporate control across the two 
organizational forms, they argued that remuneration of mutual insurance companies
12 Whereas a privately-held company, in most cases, is owned by its founders, management or a group of 
private investors; the base of the ownership a mutual life insurance company is made of its customers. 
Therefore, the ownership of the former is normally highly concentrated, while that of the latter disperses.
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should be less sensitive to firm performance than remuneration for stock insurers. They 
did not separately analyse the pay-to-performance link for the public and private stock 
companies. However, Ke et al. (1999) argued that significant differences in ownership 
concentration should be associated with different pay-to-performance sensitivities. 
Therefore, they used similar data to examine CEO remuneration in the property-liability 
insurance industry across different ownership concentration levels, which were proxied 
by the private versus public distinction. Their results showed that there is a significant 
positive association between return on assets and the levels of remuneration for publicly- 
held insurers but not for privately-held insurers.
Mayers and Smith (1992) and Ke et al (1999) used a very small sample covering only 
one specific industry. Their conclusions might not be generalisable to other industries. 
Also, they failed to consider other differences between the two types of insurers. Despite 
these limitations, their studies contribute to the literature on the pay-to-performance 
sensitivity by demonstrating the importance of share ownership concentration as a 
determinant of the optimal structure of executive remuneration.
Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) and Firth et al. (1999) also support the view that 
blockholders play a monitoring role of CEO pay. Using a sample of HongKong 
companies, Firth et al. (1999) found that high institutional ownership restricts the 
magnitude of top management remuneration though it has no effect on changes in pay 
which might be because directors and the CEO increase their cash remuneration when 
their large shares have suffered negative returns.
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From the above review of the literature, also as indicated by Holdemess (2003b), the 
findings are consistent in terms of the role for external blockholders in monitoring 
executive remuneration. However, despite the consistency of the above findings, they 
offer little insight into how the monitoring effects of external block-ownership work in 
China, given its vastly different socio-economic and political contexts.
3.3.2.1.1 STATE OWNERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the distinct features of Chinese listed companies is the 
dominance of state ownership and the diversity of owners, such as the state, domestic 
legal persons, foreigners, private legal persons and individuals (Xu and Wang 1999). The 
thesis will explore the possible effect of these different types of share blockholders on 
executive remuneration.
Previous research on China suggests that state ownership contributes to higher executive 
pay (Lin et al. 2005), poor operating efficiency, inefficient monitoring and more acute 
agency problems (Chen 2001; Xu and Wang 1999; Zou and Xiao 2005). Berkman et al. 
(2002) attributed this finding to the owner-manager incentive conflicts caused by the 
separation of the voting and cash flow rights in state shareholdings and the insufficient 
incentives of bureaucrats to monitor due to the absence of a direct link between their 
rewards and the financial performance of the companies they oversee. The ineffective 
monitoring in turn encourages management entrenchment and higher executive pay 
irrespective of firm performance, thus promoting the argument that higher state 
ownership leads to higher HPD pay and less pay-performance sensitivity.
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However, state controlled companies might also pay executives less. First, government 
bureaucrats overseeing Chinese listed companies are paid low civil service salaries and 
thus may exert downward pressure on executive remuneration to keep rewards in line 
with equivalent pay in the government hierarchy (Zou and Xiao 2005). Moreover, Firth et 
al. (2006) argued that fear of social unrest may exert pressure on the government to 
ensure that executive pay is not significantly detached from the pay of other employees, 
encouraging the use of performance-related pay as a way of justifying executive pay. 
They found no significant relationship between CEO pay level and government control 
status, but reported that firms controlled by SOEs have incentive pay schemes for 
executives based on operating income but not on share returns. Rui et al. (2003) found 
that firms controlled by government paid less to CEOs. Hence, state ownership seems to 
have an influence on executive pay, though the direction is not clear. This gives rise to 
the following non-directional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a: Executive remuneration is related to the proportion of state ownership. 
Hypothesis 4b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is related to the proportion of 
state ownership.
3.3.2.1.2 LEGAL PERSON OWNERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
Previous evidence also suggests that agency problems tend to be less severe for firms 
with a high level of legal person shares (even when they are held by SOEs) compared to 
firms with high levels of state ownership (Zou and Xiao 2005). This may be because
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legal persons have voting and cash flow rights and thus have a stronger incentive to 
monitor more closely managerial inertia compared to government bureaucrats.
As indicated in Chapter 2, legal person (institutional) shares in China include domestic 
legal person shares, foreign legal person shares and private legal person shares and the 
roles played by each category might vary. For example, given that the ultimate controllers 
of domestic legal person shares are normally the government and that legal person shares 
are also non-tradable, it could be argued that the impact of legal person and state 
ownership will be similar. Also, it could be argued that foreign owners, staking their 
money on a company in China have an incentive to more closely monitor the 
management of the firms they invest in (Chhibber and Majumdar 1999; Hovey 2002), 
encouraging them td hire highly qualified executives and link pay to performance (Firth 
et al. 2006). Therefore, firms with more foreign ownership or more private legal 
ownership might pay more to their executives and have a stronger pay-performance link.
Only Firth et al. (2006) and Rui et al. (2003) have examined this possible link between 
different types of legal person ownership and executive remuneration in China. To test 
the impact of different ownership types on the pay-performance sensitivity, Firth et al. 
(2006) found that the type of dominant shareholders is critical in linking CEO pay to 
performance: firms with a dominant SOE shareholder base their CEO pay on operating 
income, while those with a private or foreign shareholder favour the use of shareholder’s 
wealth. They also found large private shareholders and foreign shareholders and their 
interaction to be positively related to CEO pay level, but the results are not robust across 
different firm performance measures.
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Both studies proxied ownership variables as dummies. It would be interesting to test the 
relation between different legal ownership and executive remuneration using continuous 
variables. Given the highly consistent findings in the Western literature, higher 
institutional (legal person) ownership tends to be associated with lower executive 
remuneration and stronger pay- performance-sensitivity, this thesis develops the 
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5a: Executive remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of legal 
person ownership.
Hypothesis 5b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of legal person ownership.
The thesis tests for the possible different roles played by different identities of the legal 
persons by using various proxies of legal person ownership.
3.3.2.2 Managerial Ownership and Executive Remuneration
Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggest that the cost of deviating from value-maximization to 
stockholders declines as management’s ownership of stock rises. As managers’ stakes 
rise, they bear a larger proportion of these costs and are, therefore, less likely to squander 
corporate wealth. Thus, an executive’s stock ownership can act as a governance 
mechanism over management entrenchment. However, the empirical findings in the 
literature are mixed.
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Holdemess and Sheehan (1988) investigated the relationship of managerial shares and 
managerial remuneration and found that top executives with high ownership received 
higher salaries and bonuses compared to those in firms similar sized but diffusely held 
firms. Mehran (1995:173) reported that executive cash remuneration in large firms may 
become less important when managers hold significant equity stakes in the firms since 
the majority of their income would come from their equity stakes. Using a sample of 153 
randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980, his results provided evidence 
supporting advocates of incentive remuneration, and also suggested that it is the form 
rather than the level of remuneration that motivates managers to increase firm value. His 
findings show a negative relation between the percentage of executives’ equity-based 
remuneration and their shareholdings.
However, Jensen & Murphy (1990b) analysed performance pay and top-management 
incentives for over 2000 CEOs in three samples over five decades, and found that the 
relation between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth is small and has fallen over the 50 
years: “Median CEO inside stockholdings for the 120 largest US firms fell by an order of 
magnitude from 0.3% in 1938 to 0.03% in 1984... The pay-performance of sensitivity for 
top-quartile CEOs fell by an order of magnitude from 17.5 cents per $1000 in 1934-1938 
to 1.9 cents per $1000 in 1974-1986 (Jensen and Murphy 1990b: 262)”.
Hadlock & Lumer (1997) and Holdemess et al. (1999) both used time-series ownership 
data and found an increase in pay-performance sensitivity in a sample of large industrial 
firms from the 1930s to the 1990s with an increase in managerial ownership, and 
concluded that managerial ownership was not a substitute for pay-performance
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remuneration. These studies, therefore, show a positive relationship between pay- 
performance sensitivity and managerial ownership.
Hambrick & Finkelstein (1995) argued that CEO remuneration in management-controlled 
firms and in owner-managed and externally controlled firms is influenced by different 
determinants. The conflicting results indicated by the previous research suggest that the 
agency relationship between owners and executives is very complex (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein 1995) and has led Holdemess (2003b) to suggest it as an area ripe for future 
investigations.
No study has attempted to examine this issue in China. Lin et al. (2005) ignored this issue 
in China on the basis that stock options or stock ownership are still rare among Chinese 
executive, less than 0.01%. However, given its importance in the Western literature, and 
given the heated debate about introducing managerial ownership in Chinese listed 
companies (SRIC 2003), this thesis empirically investigates the possible impact of this 
variable on the setting of executive remuneration. The following hypotheses are drawn 
from the agency perspective to be tested empirically:
Hypothesis 6a: Executive cash remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of 
managerial ownership.
Hypothesis 6b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of managerial ownership.
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3.3.3 MARKET COMPARISON FACTORS AND EXECUTIVE PAY
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) reported that market pay comparisons factors, both 
internal and external, are important in explaining both CEO and other directors’ pay 
awards in the UK. Their studies shed light on an important but under-explored research 
area on executive remuneration, which provides a motivation to extend their work to 
China’s context. The section reviews the studies on the market comparison factors and 
develops related hypotheses.
3.3.3.1 External market comparison factors and executive pay
Marginal productivity theory (Roberts 1959) argues that market forces, demand and 
supply relationship, determine executive remuneration. Agency theory also suggests that 
market forces offer an upper boundary for executive compensation (Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman 1997). Market competition restrains the entrenchment of managers who are 
concerned about their reputation and long-term career and helps keep levels of 
compensation in line with the market rate (Agrawal and Walkling 1994; Fama 1980). 
Despite the importance of the market in setting executive remuneration, knowledge about 
the use of “competitive market going rates” is surprisingly sparse (Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman 1997).
Some researchers have empirically tested the relationship between market pay 
comparison factors and executive pay in the UK and their results provide support for the 
significant effects of external comparison pay level on executive pay. "The market going
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rate" can be regarded as the effect of the participation constraint in a principal agent 
model (Smith and Szymanski 1995), which must be paid by a firm in order to retain their 
executives from being bid away by another firm. Moreover, Ezzamel and Watson (1998) 
argued that the substantial costs related to executive recruitment provide the financial 
incentive for firms to keep their executives by offering competitive remuneration. 
Furthermore, from a social comparison perspective, board members refer to their own 
pay when judging the appropriate pay for their executives (Ezzamel and Watson 1998; 
O'Reilly et al. 1988), which also brings executive pay towards the market pay level, 
especially when directors are executives of other companies.
Smith and Szymanski (1995) used the average level of executive cash pay as the external 
benchmark pay level, Cosh and Hughes (1997) measured the benchmark pay level as the 
pay expected given the estimated size pay relationship and Ezzamel and Watson (1998) 
created three proxies for the comparison level of executive pay and found similar results. 
The results of all these studies lead to a robust conclusion: the deviation of executive pay 
from the market pay level has a significant explanatory power over the subsequent 
adjustments of executive pay. However, these three studies were conducted in the UK, 
covering 52 large quoted companies, the UK electrical engineering industry, and 223 
non-financial companies respectively. No study has tested the relation between the 
market pay level and executive pay in contexts other than the UK.
As discussed in Chapter 2, China, a transitionally planned economy, is in a process of 
transformation with emerging elements of a market economy. It offers an interesting 
context to investigate the extent to which ‘competitive market going rate’ works on the
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dynamics of executive pay in a non-developed economy. Chinese listed companies are 
operating in a very different institutional environment, but they also exhibit some 
characteristics similar to their counterparts in the UK. The Chinese managerial labour 
market has started to grow. For example, in Chinese listed companies executive contracts 
are renewed and renegotiated based on a typically three years’ duration (CSRC 2002), 
rather than “Die Fan Wan” (life-long employment) before, and the reappointments are up 
to both parties: the executives/directors and the company. Therefore, it is also necessary 
for a Chinese listed company to pay their executives at least the market rate in order to 
keep them.
However, it has been claimed that the appointment of directors is highly influenced or 
manipulated by the government or the largest shareholders (Bai et al. 2006), and 
therefore such necessity for Chinese companies to pay their executives the ‘going market 
rate’ might not exist or might be not as strong as in the West. Given that the market 
elements are enhancing while the planned and controlled elements are weakening in 
China (Cha 2001), and also the empirical results in the Western literature, this thesis 
retests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7a: Executive pay will be adjusted towards external market pay level, i.e. 
subsequent-period executive pay changes are negatively related to pay anomalies
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) further investigated the issue by examining whether 
there was an asymmetric adjustment to prior period pay anomalies between relatively 
overpaid executives and relatively underpaid executives. Their results supported the
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prediction of asymmetric adjustment, which leads to the “bidding up” of CEO pay. Their 
findings agreed with Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman’s (1997) argument that the notion of 
“going rate” in the market is firmly abused among remuneration practitioners. The 
explanation for this “bidding-up” is that executives tend to compare themselves to those 
who are slightly better or more expert and thus better paid (O'Reilly et al. 1988); and also 
that from the perspective of agency theory, an agent, especially when he has the power 
over the board, will try to negotiate his pay up when underpaid but will try to keep the 
status when he/she is overpaid. The above discussion leads to Hypothesis 7b:
Hypothesis 7b: The strength of the relationship between the time t+1 executive pay 
changes and their time t pay anomalies will be significantly greater for executives who 
were underpaid relative to the market pay level than for executives who were relatively 
overpaid.
3.3.3.2 Internal Comparison Factors and Executive Pay
Another criterion that involves ‘comparison’ in explaining executive remuneration is 
provided by social comparison theory (O'Reilly et al. 1988). Unlike market forces, this 
theory is concerned with conscious decision processes for setting executive remuneration. 
O'Reilly et al. (1988) observed that board members refer to their own pay when setting 
the executives’. Their empirical results supported the observation: CEO pay rose as the 
average salary of outside directors increased. This motivated Ezzamel & Watson (2002) 
to investigate the effects of internal pay comparison factors on executive pay, in addition 
to external ones.
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Based on equity theory, signalling theory and these previous studies guided by social 
comparison theory (Gomez-Mejia 1994; O'Reilly et al 1988), Ezzamel & Watson (2002) 
analysed the determinants of, and the relations between, the cash pay awards of CEOs 
and other board members with a sample of large UK companies over the period of 1992- 
1995. They found that both external labour market and internal (i.e. within board) pay 
comparisons were important in explaining both CEO and other directors’ pay awards13. 
The arguments are that comparability in pay awards to all members of the board is 
essential for the firm to observe justice and fairness in pay and to maintain team cohesion 
and equality (Ezzamel and Watson 2002).
Given that the Chinese government give priority to social stability (Zou and Xiao 2005) 
and the ideology of the society is collective development and the equity among people, 
comparability and equality among management members in pay adjustment should be 
essential for Chinese listed companies. Therefore, the above discussion suggests the 
desirability of re-testing the following hypothesis in China:
Hypothesis 8: Internal pay level has a significant effect on executive pay: executive pay 
adjustment is positively related to the pay adjustment of their peers within the firm.
Ezzamel & Watson (2002) also investigated the relationship between CEO pay changes 
and the extent to which the other board members appear to be under or overpaid relative 
to their market pay level. Their results suggest that the “bidding-up” of CEO pay due to 
asymmetric adjustment to prior pay anomalies is most likely to occur when the other
13 Their results also further supported the findings o f ‘bidding up’ of CEO pay discussed above.
109
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
board members were themselves relatively overpaid. Given the weak governance system 
in Chinese listed companies and the close and complex relationship between top 
management team members, this phenomenon may also occur in China. Therefore, this 
thesis tests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9: ‘Bidding-up’ of Highest Paid Directors’ pay will be most apparent in those 
firms where the rest of management are relatively overpaid compared to the external 
comparison pay level.
3.4 Other determinants of executive remuneration- control variables
As described in the empirical literature reviewed above, research on executive 
remuneration is generally divided between two categories: incentive alignment, where 
contracts use some outcome performance criteria, and monitoring, where direct 
supervision links with behavioural or process criteria. However, the mixed and 
ambiguous results of these studies have led to a variety of alternative explanations for 
executive remuneration (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). For example, Gomez-Mejia 
and Wiseman (1997) and Jensen & Murphy (1990a) suggest that researchers should 
examine factors outside the agency framework to explain CEO’s remuneration and 
consider what and how different criteria should be controlled for and considered in 
explaining executive remuneration. Accordingly, it is important to integrate agency 
theory with other paradigms or theories to empirically test the explanatory value of 
alternative paradigms compared to agency-based models.
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Later studies following this suggestion have started to offer a variety of alternative 
paradigms for explaining CEO pay, such as marginal productivity theory, information- 
processing theory, resource dependence theory, managerial discretion theory, and social 
comparison theory (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998). Some of these studies explicitly 
integrate agency notions with other formulations. This section discusses the executive 
pay determinants other than those already discussed above. These determinants include 
firm performance, firm size, individual characteristics, capital structure, firm risks, 
diversification etc. (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Firth et al., 1999). Even though 
they are not the focus of this study, these factors will be included as control variables.
3.4.1 FIRM PERFORMANCE
The most explored topic in the literature on executive remuneration is the relationship 
between executive remuneration and firm performance, a central hypothesis motivated by 
principal-agent theory (Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Gregg et al. 1993; Jensen and 
Murphy 1990a; Murphy 1985; Veliyath 1999). As discussed in Section 3.2, agency 
theory emphasises that managers are self-serving and stresses the design of optimal 
remuneration contracts to elicit appropriate effort by senior management when the 
objective functions of the two parties potentially diverge (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). The aim is to motivate the agent to act in the owners’ best interest, 
given asymmetry of information (usually moral hazard), by linking executive 
remuneration closely to firm performance. Thus, executives are compensated for their 
contribution to the firm (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997). As Murphy (1990) argued, 
performance-related-pay schemes not only can reduce the costs associated with
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managerial non-performance, they can also reduce the need for direct monitoring of 
executives.
Based on the discussion above, there should be a positive relationship between executive 
remuneration and firm performance. There is ample evidence supporting this principal- 
agent perspective prediction (Antle and Smith 1986; Boschen and Smith 1995; Boyd 
1994; Bushman and Smith 2001; Jensen and Murphy 1990b; Miller 1995; Murphy 1985; 
Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik 1993; Sloan 1993).
However, some studies show that there are important determinants of pay than 
performance, such as size (Boyd 1994; Garen 1994). Some studies even found that results 
change with different measurements of performance (Boschen et al. 2003; Miller 1995), 
different statistical techniques (Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik 1993) or different time periods 
(Gregg et al 1993). For example, Gregg et al. (1993) examined the relationship between 
salary and bonus of the highest paid director in a sample of 288 UK listed companies and 
found that there was a statistically significant relationship between remuneration and 
performance for the period 1983 to 1988, but this relationship disappeared over the 
recessionary period 1989 to 1991.
Despite the divergent results of previous research, the overwhelming evidence indicates 
that firm performance plays an important role in the executive remuneration setting 
(Kaplan 1994). As the pay-performance relation has been thoroughly explored by 
previous studies, this thesis will not focus on it, but nonetheless, will include it as an 
important control variable. A positive relationship is expected.
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3.4.2 FIRM SIZE
Firm size has been another important factor in explaining executive remuneration. Given 
that CEOs of larger firms have increased responsibility and must expend more effort and 
require more expertise, it is not surprising that the relationship between firm size and 
CEO remuneration is one of the most solidly documented findings in the literature (Boyd 
1994; Ciscel and Carroll 1980; Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003; Finkelstein and Hambrick 
1989; Jensen and Murphy 1990b; Lambert et ah 1991; Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik 1993; 
Roberts 1959).
A meta analysis by Tosi et al. (2000) showed that firm size accounts for more than 40% 
of the variance in total CEO pay. Kostiuk (1990) analysed the effects of firm size with 
several data sets and argued that the positive effect of firm size on executive 
remuneration is relatively stable over time and across countries. Some UK-based studies 
also report similar findings, e.g. Gregg et ah (1993).
Although the empirical results are quite consistent, debates continue concerning the 
explanation of this result, especially between managerialists and those who believe in 
human capital theory. On the one hand, managerialists argue that, given the apparent 
propensity for ‘management-controlled firms’, executive pay is based on firm size rather 
than profit. Greater size offers managers more power and prestige and less pay and 
employment risk, and also justifies higher pay (Lambert et ah 1991; Roberts 1959). On 
the other hand, human capital proponents argue that bigger firms require more managerial 
knowledge and skills and therefore tend to pay more (Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui
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1993). Other explanations include that bigger firms have higher ability to pay more and 
that bigger firm have more hierarchical pay levels (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1988; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989).
Some authors even argued that these findings might be an artefact of measurement due to 
the restricted samples they represented. Therefore, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) 
have suggested that researchers should look at the dynamics in firm size, firm 
performance and CEO remuneration over time. If compensation changes with the 
changes in size and not performance during the reign of a CEO, the managerial viewpoint 
will be supported (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997).
It is not the purpose for this thesis to resolve the debates. However, this thesis does 
include firm size as a control variable. A positive relation between firm size and 
executive remuneration is expected. In addition to the aforementioned significant results 
between firm size and executive pay, controlling for firm size is also important for my 
study on market comparison factors.
Ezzamel and Watson (2002) observed that remuneration committees prefer to choose 
objective external market pay comparisons based on firm size because it is easier for 
them to legitimize to shareholders and other outside stakeholders both their own and 
other board members’ pay awards. The argument is that it is difficult, or too costly, to 
obtain information on the supply and demand factors (such as relative workloads, 
responsibilities, and managerial quality) and therefore firm size is an easily observable 
proxy (Ezzamel and Watson 2002). Thus, the analyses of outside professional pay
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consultants typically brought in to advise remuneration committees largely consists of the 
production of comparison levels of pay across firms in different size bands (Baker et al 
1988; Ezzamel and Watson 2002).
3.4.3 FIRM DIVERSIFICATION
Various aspects of the firm’s strategic posture have been posited to impact executive or 
managerial remuneration (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1990; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 
1998; Gomez-Mejia 1992; Veliyath et al 1994). Most of these studies expect a positive 
relation between total diversification and CEO remuneration subject to the common 
understanding that firm’s overall diversification increases the complexity of the CEO’s 
job (Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). First, operating in 
different industries requires an understanding of several product markets and determining 
resources allocation priorities (Rose and Shepard 1997). Second, multiple product lines 
entail more knowledgeable and experienced managers, because of more diversity in 
customers, competitors, product life cycles and competitive strategies (Rumelt 1974). As 
a result, executives need to exercise greater effort and in turn deserve more remuneration 
as a reward for managing this added complexity.
Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik (1993) have distinguished between two types of 
diversification, related and unrelated diversification, and they used a path analysis on a 
sample including 216 companies from 28 industries. They found that diversification of 
both types is positively related to CEO remuneration. Given the above discussion of the
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effect of diversification on executive remuneration, this study will incorporate it as a 
control variable.
3.4.4 RISK
Risk is a key concept under agency theory. One assumption of the theory is that managers 
are risk-averse (Jensen and Meckling 1976), therefore, it is reasonable to postulate that 
managers who work for firms facing higher risks require additional remuneration for the 
risk and insecurity they bear and they might not like their pay to be tied to firm 
performance which brings them more risk.
Garen (1994) tested a model that explained the variance in pay-performance sensitivity 
across risk settings and argued that CEO pay-performance sensitivity varies inversely 
with firm risk. He also used his findings to challenge the results of Jensen and Murphy 
(1990b) who found low pay-performance sensitivity, by arguing that this was partly due 
to variance across agency settings.
Miller et al. (2002) further supported this argument. They compared the effects of firm 
risk on pay design across different levels (high, moderate and low) and types of risk 
(market-driven risk and firm-specific risk) and concluded that CEO pay changed 
according to the degree of risk facing a firm, and that the effects of firm-specific risk are 
stronger than those of market-driven risk. They found a positive association between 
market risk and total remuneration and a curvilinear relationship between firm-specific 
risk and total pay with a ceiling effect.
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Therefore, the literature provides a generally consistent prediction that executive pay is 
positively related to firm risk (Bloom and Milkovich 1998; Gray and Cannella 1997; 
Murphy 2000). This thesis will control for the risk effect.
3.4.5 MANAGERIAL HUMAN CAPITAL ATTRIBUTES
In contrast to performance and external comparisons made above, human capital theory 
(Agarwal 1981) postulates that individual human capital (managerial abilities) explains 
the remuneration level. As Agarwal (1981:39) put it, the amount of human capital 
possessed by executives influences their productivity and thus should influence their 
remuneration. The explanatory power of human capital has been supported by some 
empirical studies (McKnight and Tomkins 2004; Milboum 2003; Murphy 1986; Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia 1989). Murphy (1985) argued that the omission of human capital variables 
constitutes a severe omitted variable problem and this might be one of the causes for the 
lack of a positive linkage between pay and firm performance in cross-sectional 
regressions.
Given that individual performance may be unobservable, due to the difficulty in 
separating out the effects of individual effort, remuneration tends to be based on input 
factors as indicators of an individual’s performance, such as age, tenure, and executive 
education background. Although this study cannot control for the effects of human capital, 
a brief literature review is provided as follows.
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Age
The significant effects of age on executive pay is supported by some empirical studies 
(Ingham and Thompson 1995; Kostiuk 1990; McKnight and Tomkins 2004). Ingham and 
Thompson found that CEO age and CEO age squared both had a positive influence on 
remuneration (1995). McKnight and Tomkins (2004) examined both the direct and # 
indirect effects of chief executive officer tenure and age on CEO pay in UK organizations 
and found that CEO age weakened the relationship between the level of CEO salary and 
size of the organization.
Tenure
Individuals receive lower remuneration in their early years on the job as they acquire firm 
specific human capital, in the expectation that they will receive higher remuneration in 
the future. Some studies have reported a greater pay- performance decoupling the longer 
the tenure of the executive (Murphy 1986; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989). However, the 
explanations for the findings are quite divergent. The “learning” model (Murphy 1986) 
suggests that a manager’s human capital is revealed over time and the principal can 
evaluate and trust the manager more correctly and adjust remuneration to reflect these 
more precise estimates of human capital, and thus there is less need to tie executive pay 
to firm performance. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) offered an opposite explanation, 
arguing that managers become more entrenched over time, thus leading to less pay- 
performance sensitivity.
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Other studies (McKnight and Tomkins 2004; Milboum 2003) suggest that CEO tenure 
has a positive and meaningful impact on estimated CEO pay sensitivities. For example, 
McKnight and Tomkins (2004) found that the elasticity between salary and sales 
increased with CEO tenure. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995), instead, suggested a 
curvilinear relationship in externally controlled firms. Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) 
proposed an inverted-U shaped relationship with CEO pay, which supports the premise 
that increasing CEO tenure is good to a certain point, but beyond that it begins to 
diminish the CEO efficacy (2003:62).
It is still hard to figure out a clear effect of tenure on executive pay or to tease out the 
different forces driving a certain result. It would be ideal to be able to control for the 
effects of executive human capital characteristics, but this thesis cannot do so due to data 
unavailability. However, the first difference model allows me to control for these effects.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has critically reviewed agency theory, the theoretical and empirical studies 
on executive remuneration under that theory and some other explanations of executive 
remuneration.
Agency theory assumes that managers are self-interest seeking and that there are goal 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, and therefore argues that executive 
remuneration should be related to firm performance in order to align directors’ and
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shareholders’ interests. However, the majority of empirical studies only find a weak 
statistical relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm performance. Moreover, 
agency theory has been criticised for several limitations, such as over-simplifying the 
‘model of man’, ignoring the complicated political and interpersonal aspects of the 
principal-agent relations, and failing to provide sensible practical implications. Despite 
this, agency theory has received and continues to receive the focus of attention in the 
literature. This thesis uses agency theory to guide the hypothesis development; however, 
it is aware that other theories of directors’ remuneration may contribute to a better 
understanding of the observed levels and changes in directors’ remuneration.
Theory and empirical research have come a long way in explaining executive 
remuneration, providing us with rich and useful insights. However, the field is still beset 
with debates between the various traditions seeking to provide explanations and 
prescriptions for executive remuneration practices. For example, studies based on the 
same theoretical framework might lead to different empirical results, and similar 
empirical results can be explained from different theoretical perspectives. Therefore, 
there is a lot more to explore in this area.
This thesis examines the impact of corporate governance and market comparison factors 
on executive remuneration in China. Based on the review of literature and the 
institutional background of China, several hypotheses have been developed. As outlined 
in Table 3.114, these hypotheses relate executive pay, pay changes and executive pay-
14 In Chapter 8, there is another table, outlining the hypotheses and related results.
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performance sensitivity to board size, board composition, board leadership structure, state 
ownership, legal person ownership, managerial ownership and the market comparison 
factors, both internal and external.
Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses (Hs) and Sections to Present the Related Results
Hs Variables Predictedsign
Section(s) of Empirical Analysis
Dependent Independent HPD REST
la Executive pay
Board size
9 6.2.1 6.3.1.1
lb Executive pay- performance sensitivity
? 6.2.4 6.3.2
2a Executive pay Proportion of
independent
directors
- 6.2.1 6.3.1.1
2b Executive pay- performance sensitivity
+ 6.2.4 6.3.2
3a Executive pay CEO-chairman
duality
+ 6.2.1 6.3.1.1
3b Executive pay- performance sensitivity - 6.2.4 6.3.2
4a Executive pay State
ownership
? 6.2.2 6.3.1.2
4b Executive pay- performance sensitivity
9 6.2.4 6.3.2
5a Executive pay Institutional
ownership
- 6.2.2 6.3.1.2
5b Executive pay- performance sensitivity + 6.2.4 6.3.2
6a Executive pay Managerial
ownership
- 6.2.2 6.3.1.2
6b Executive pay- performance sensitivity
+ 6.2.4 6.3.2
7a Executive pay changes External pay anomalies -
Replicated: 
7.3.1.1
Extended:
7.4.1.
Replicated: 
7.3.1.2
Extended:
7.4.3
7b
The adjustment of executive pay over 
previous pay anomalies are stronger for 
underpaid executives than for overpaid 
executives
cu<co<0
Replicated: 
7.3.1.1
Extended:
7.4.1.
Replicated: 
7.3.1.2
Extended:
7.4.3
8 Executive pay changes
Internal pay 
comparison +
Replicated: 
7.3.2.1
Extended: 
6.2.5; 6.4; 
& 7.4.2
Replicated:
73.2.2
Extended: 
6.3.3; & 
7.4.3
9
‘Bidding-up’ HPD pay adjustment will be 
most apparent in firms where the rest of 
management is relatively overpaid
Cu.i<0
Co.i>0
Replicated: 
7.3.2.1
Extended:
7.4.2
Replicated:
13.2.2
Extended:
7.4.3
Note: For the predicted signs, ‘+’ stands for that ‘there is a positive relation between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable; means ‘negative’, while ‘?’ means that there is a relation, but the sign is not decisive
The next chapter introduces the research methods, key analytical techniques, sample, data 
and other method related issues.
121
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 provided a review of agency theory and literature on corporate governance 
and developed several research hypotheses. These hypotheses examine the relationship 
between executive remuneration, corporate governance mechanisms and market 
comparison factors. This chapter discusses research methods used to fulfil the research 
objective and test these hypotheses.
To address research questions on how executive remuneration is determined, two basic 
approaches can be used—quantitative and/or qualitative methodology. With few 
exceptions, e.g. McNulty & Pettigrew (1999) and Perkins and Hendry (2005), research 
on executive remuneration uses quantitative methods. There is no one best strategy for 
all research but the research method(s) should fit specific research objectives. As can be 
seen from McNulty & Pettigrew (1999), qualitative research methods can generate 
excellent insights into process and informal dynamics of governance and executive pay. 
However, it is difficult to obtain the necessary access to CEOs and directors. And also, 
the topic of executive remuneration is very sensitive, and frequently it is quite difficult 
to get information different from that publicly available. Therefore, this thesis adopts a 
quantitative approach as the main research method and this serves my research 
objectives identified in Chapter 1. In addition, to help with the understanding of the 
complicated governance background in China and to gain insiders’ insights into 
corporate governance and executive remuneration, I conduct several interviews with 
directors of Chinese listed firms.
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To test the research hypotheses, a panel data set of 417 Chinese listed companies is 
used. The main data covers a three year period, from 2001 to 2003. Data are analysed 
with multivariate techniques. The data analysis begins by following most of the 
literature on executive remuneration in treating the data as pooled cross-sectional data 
with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Given that OLS fails to control for 
those unobservable firm specific factors that might affect executive remuneration, this 
thesis also tests for the importance of unobserved firm effects by employing panel data 
techniques, such as first difference, fixed effects and random effects models, to 
examine their impact on the OLS results. These panel data techniques are known to be 
good at controlling for unobserved firm effects and suffer less from the missing 
variable problem (Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2002a). As OLS is widely used in 
accounting research, this thesis does not provide a detailed introduction of it. However, 
panel data techniques are relatively new, and hence I first introduce these techniques 
briefly.
This chapter is divided into 6  sections. Section 2 briefly introduces panel data and the 
main methods to analyse it. Section 3 develops the models that will be used to test the 
hypotheses. Section 4 explains sample selection, data collection, and the measurement 
of variables. Section 5 discusses the related statistical problems and methods to deal 
with them. Section 6  describes the research method of interviews. The final section 
summarises the chapter.
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4.2 Panel data analysis
4.2.1 PANEL DATA
In a panel data set, variables of interest are observed both across cases (e.g. countries, 
individuals, and in this thesis, firms) and over several time periods. For example, the 
data set analysed in this thesis cover 417 firms over 3 years. It is not suitable to employ 
time series techniques to analyze these data sets since the time period is not sufficiently 
long. Equally, these data sets might not qualify for analysis using cross-section 
techniques because a simple pooling of the data would require the untenably strong 
assumption that all observations were homogenous (Wooldridge 2002b). Therefore, this 
kind of data is better treated as panel data.
Panel data techniques have a number of advantages. Particularly in the study of 
executive remuneration, OLS with cross sectional data cannot capture the time-course 
of changes in remuneration (Murphy 1985). In contrast, although time series studies 
can capture the time effects, they are unable to recognise the contribution of individual 
effects (Greene 2003). By combining the two dimensions, a panel data approach offers 
greater insights into the dynamics of behaviour between firms and over time (Baltagi 
2001; Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2002b). Also, the power of the estimators to detect 
effects can be enhanced for the same limited companies or years by increasing the 
number of cases since there are n x t observations. Moreover, panel data sets may also 
alleviate the problem of multicollinearity as the explanatory variables vary in two 
dimensions -  across the firms and over time. Furthermore, panel data techniques allow 
for the use of more sophisticated models with less restrictive assumptions. The
124
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
advantage of panel data techniques lies in their ability to distinguish between residual 
heterogeneity associated with changes over time (time effects) and across firms (firm 
effects) (Stock and Watson 2003; Wooldridge 2002a). This ensures a better 
identification of the factors leading to changes in corporate governance and 
remuneration.
Last but not least, panel data techniques can also alleviate the missing variable problem 
(Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2002b). Most previous research on executive remuneration 
is based on cross-sectional analysis of remuneration and performance and other factors, 
such as entrepreneurial ability, managerial responsibility, firm size, and past 
performance (Murphy 1985). These cross-sectional models are inherently subject to a 
serious omitted variables problem (Ciscel and Carroll 1980; Murphy 1985). With Panel 
data, we can control for factors that cannot be controlled for with cross-sectional data. 
These include factors that vary between firms but are constant within-firms over time or 
vary within-firms over time but are constant between-firms; could cause omitted 
variable bias if not modelled; are unobserved or unmeasured and therefore cannot be 
included in the regression using multiple regression techniques. Murphy (1985) 
estimated models of executive remuneration with both cross-sectional techniques and 
panel data techniques. He found that the results were dramatically different in sign and 
magnitude. He therefore argued that previous cross-sectional estimates were biased and 
misleading and that it was important to allow the regression intercepts to vary across 
cases (Murphy 1985).
As discussed above, panel data analysis has advantages over cross sectional OLS 
analysis, however, panel data techniques require data to have sufficient changes over a
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number of years (Stock and Watson 2003; Wooldridge 2002a). Therefore, they are not 
efficient in examining the individual effect of time-constant variables.
4.2.2 FIXED EFFECTS MODELS VERSUS RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL
With panel data, the models can be estimated based on fixed and random effects 
methods. Different methods may give different estimates, given the models’ different 
treatment of the error structure, e* (Baltagi 2001; Hausman 1978; Wooldridge 2002b). 
The fixed effects model is the same as the dummy variable model. It is easily estimated 
using OLS with a set of additive dummies. This is possible if the number of 
observations is only a few thousand (Greene 2003). In our case the observations are less 
than a thousand. Compared with the first difference method with pooled OLS, the fixed 
effects estimator is efficient when the idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated and 
homoskedastic (Wooldridge 2002b). The fixed effects model allows the unobserved 
individual effects to be correlated with the included variables.
If individual effects are strictly uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, then it 
might be appropriate to model the individual specific constant terms as randomly 
distributed across cross-section units, called random effects model. Random effects 
model could be appropriate if sampled cross-sectional units were drawn from a large 
population. The payoff of this form is the reduction of the number of parameters to be 
estimated, while the cost is that the estimates might be inconsistent, should the 
assumptions turn out to be inappropriate (Greene 2003:294). In the case of the random 
effects model, generalised least squares (GLS) are used to account for the possible 
correlation between the unobserved differences and the error term.
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The choice between the fixed effects and the random effects models can be based on 
some specification tests. However, there are a priori reasons for choosing between the 
random effects and the fixed effects models. As discussed above, the random effects 
model assumes that the unobservable differences are uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables; while the fixed effects model is less restrictive as it does not require such an 
assumption (Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2002b). The individual intercept terms 
automatically control for all unobserved differences regardless of whether or not these 
differences are associated with the likelihood of corporate governance changes. 
Generality of the inferences that can be drawn from the estimated coefficients is also 
cited in the literature as a possible consideration in the choice between the fixed effect 
and the random effect models (Kennedy 1995). If inferences drawn are to apply only to 
the sampled observations, the fixed effects model will serve the purpose; while the use 
of the random effects model is recommended if it is to draw inferences about the entire 
population (Kennedy 1995).
A Hausman test is the generally accepted specification test to serve this purpose. It 
checks a more efficient model against a less efficient but consistent model to make sure 
that the more efficient model also gives consistent results (Hausman 1978). Statistically, 
it is always reasonable to estimate fixed effects with panel data as the fixed effects 
models always give consistent results; but they may not be the most efficient models to 
run (Stock and Watson 2003). Random effects models can provide better p-values as 
they are more efficient estimators; but they are consistent only under the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test. Therefore, this thesis will follow Stock and Watson’s 
suggestion by first running random effects and using the Hausman test to see whether it 
is statistically justifiable to do so. If this null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effects
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estimates should be preferred. In that case, the thesis’s econometric strategy would 
stress the importance of idiosyncratic firm effects, to control for any unobserved time 
invariant firm factors (Benito and Conyon 1999).
4.3 Modelling specification
The choice of the econometric specification depends on the way the problem is 
conceived and the characteristics of the data set (Wooldridge 2002b). The aim of this 
thesis is to model how the executive pay level and dynamics are driven, especially 
focusing on the impacts of corporate governance changes and the external and internal 
comparison factors of executive pay. In this section, the econometric models are 
developed to test the hypotheses specified in Chapter 3. To make the model 
specification compact, the detailed definitions and measurements of the related 
variables are provided separately in Section 4.4.3.
A central issue in the principal-agent empirical literature is to test whether there is a 
positive link between executive pay and corporate performance (Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman 1997; Gregg et al. 1993; Jensen and Murphy 1990b; Murphy 1998; Murphy 
1985). The rationale for this was discussed in chapter 3. To briefly recap, agency 
models typically assume risk-neutral shareholders (principals) who delegate decision 
making authority to risk-adverse managers (agents) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Given 
information asymmetry (usually in the form of moral hazard) and goal conflicts, 
between shareholders and managers, shareholders attempt to design optimal 
remuneration contracts to bring forth appropriate effort by senior management. One
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such solution is to reward agents according to their performance (Conyon 1997a; 
Conyon et al. 1995; Jensen and Murphy 1990b).
In addition, other factors may be important in shaping executive pay such as firm size, 
firm diversification, capital structure, industrial differences, location and firm age (see 
Chapter 3). Although these factors are not the focus of this thesis, they are included in 
the models of this study as control variables.
The literature also suggests that corporate governance variables are important in 
shaping executive pay (Conyon 1997a; Conyon and Peck 1998; Cordeiro and Veliyath 
2003; Core et al 1999; Jensen 1993). In practice, the institutional design of the board, 
its associated committees and the ownership structure all play an important role in 
potentially resolving the agency problems, because the appropriate design can perform 
a cost-efficient monitoring function. This thesis models executive pay levels and 
dynamics, focusing on the impact of board structure and ownership types, but also 
controlling for other variables (e.g., firm size). Hypotheses la, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a and 6 a are 
tested using the following model:
LnPayit = Po + Pi Performanceu + P2 LnSaleSjt + [P3 Boardsizeu + p4 Proindjt + ps 
Duality it + p6 StateOwnjt + p7 LegalOwnjt + Ps PrivateOwnjt + P9 ForeignOwnu P10 
ManageOwnit] + £  pcControlCit + ZStDt +£it (1)
where: i = 1, 2, ..., N (1 to 417 companies); t =1, 2, ..., T
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LnPayitis the log of reported pay of highest paid director (HPDpay) and that of 
the rest of management team (RESTpay) respectively. These are the dependent 
variables.
Independent variables are:
Performancejt is firm performance of company i in year t. LnSalesit is the total 
sales of company i in year t. These two variables are not the focal variables of 
this thesis, but given their importance in the literature, they are presented 
separately from the other control variables.
Boardsizeu, Proind jt and Duality^ are board characteristics of firm i: board size, 
board composition, and leadership structure respectively in year t. StateOwnjt is 
state ownership. LegalOwnu, is the proportion of shares held by state-controlled 
domestic companies. PrivateOwnjt is the proportion of shares owned by 
domestic private companies. ForeignOwnjt is the proportion of shares owned 
by foreign investors. ManageOwnjt is managerial ownership, held either by the 
whole management team or by the board at time t. These eight governance 
variables are the focus of this thesis, which will also be collectively referred to 
by the title GOVERN, shown as GOVERNgjt in the equations hereafter, to 
make the equations succinct and more legible. Therefore, Model (1) can be 
rewritten as:
LnPayit = Po + Pi Performancejt + P2 LnSalesjt + £Pg GOVERNgjt +
£Bc CONTROLcit + I 8 tDt + eit,
Where £  Pg GOVERNgjt = [p3 Boardsizejt + P4 Proindjt + P5 Dualityjt + p6 
StateOwnjt + P7 LegalOwnjt + Ps PrivateOwnjt + P9 ForeignOwnjt +P10 
ManageOwnjJ; therefore, g = 3 to 10 for coefficients of the eight governance 
variables.
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CONTROLcit is a vector of other control variables (e.g., supervisory board size, 
industry, risk, diversification, capital structure, firm listing years and firm 
location), c indexes the control variables.
Dt is the set of dummy variables for time.
The definitions and measures of these variables are discussed in detail in Section 4.4.3 
of this chapter. Since there are a variety of proxies for the variables, the model can be 
extended into several sub-models.
The Ps are the parameters to be estimated (see Table 4.1 Definition o f Variables for the 
expected signs). Also, most UK research on top pay determination assumes that there is 
no time series heterogeneity in the determination of top pay (Benito and Conyon 1999). 
However, this might not be the case. For example, Gregg et al. (1993) found that top 
pay and performance relationship varied during their sample period 1983-1991. In light 
of this, the thesis include T-l year dummies Dt for all years but the latest year 2003, to 
filter macro-economic shocks from the estimating equation and to allow for separate 
per-period effects in the modelling, while 5t is the coefficient for the year dummies.
Equation (1) considers the direct effects of corporate governance mechanisms on 
executive pay levels. The thesis is also interested in their indirect impact, that is, 
whether a certain governance mechanism makes the link between executive pay and 
firm performance stronger (Hypotheses lb, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b and 6b). To test these 
hypotheses, I incorporate into Equation (1) the interaction terms between the 
governance variables and performance:
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LnPayit = Po + Pi Performanceit + P2 LnSalesu + Z Pg GOVERNgit + Performanceit x 
ZPg+8 GOVERNgit + X BcCONTROLcit + XW t + eit (2)
The indexes are the same as in Model 1, expect for the eight additional interaction 
variables. Whereas main effects of governance variables have coefficients Psto pio, the 
corresponding interaction terms (performance x governance variables) have coefficients 
Pi 1 to Pig- For example, whereas g=3 is the index for the simple effect of Boardsize, the 
index for (Performance x Boardsize) is g=ll (=3+8); Proind is g=4, (Performance x 
Proind) is g=12, and so on.
The signs of X Pg(p3, P4J 5, p6, P7, Ps, P9, Pio), together with those of XPg+8 (P11, P12, P13 
P14, P15, Pi6, P17, Pis), will indicate the extent to which a governance mechanism has an 
impact on the pay-performance link.
To shed further light on the pay performance sensitivity, a first difference model is 
developed to estimates the change in executive pay:
ALnPayit= Lnpayjt-Lnpayit-i = a + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSalesjt+ XgGOVERNgjt + 
X BcCONTROLCit + X5tDt + slt (3)
ALnPayit = (Lnpayit-Lnpayit-i) denotes the reported log change in HPD pay or REST 
pay in firm i from time t-1 to t. APerformanceit is the changes in firm performance of 
company i from year t-1 to year t. ALnSalesjt is the logarithmic change in sales from 
year t-1 to year t; other variables are as in Equations (2) and (3).
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Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) found that the external market pay level and within- 
board pay partially explain the dynamics of executive pay settings. This thesis extends 
Model (3) to examine the extent to which the findings of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 
2002) hold in the Chinese context. The traditional agency model is first run as a 
benchmark model, which only includes firm size, performance and year dummies as 
explanatory variables. I first followed Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) by proxying 
the external market and internal market pay level as the estimated pay by firm size and 
performance. Therefore, to test Hypothesis 7a, the following model is specified.
ALnPayit = a + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSalesit + p3 (LnPayu-i -  LnPay*jt-i)+ X§tDt + 
Sit (4)
where LnPayVi is the predicted market level pay for firm i at time t-1 , estimated from 
the regression: LnPayjt-i = bo + bi Performanceit-1 + b2 LnSalesjt-i.
(LnPayit-i -  LnPay*jt.i) is therefore the pay anomaly experienced by executives in firm 
i in time t-1 , which is hypothesised to have consequences for pay changes in time t; 
others are the same as before. To support Hypothesis 7a, p3? the coefficient of pay 
anomaly variable should be negative and significant.
To test Hypothesis 7b, I split the pay anomalies variable into two and rewrite Equation 
(4) into Equation (5):
ALnPayit = a + Pi APerformanceit + p2 ALnSalesjt + p30 (LnPayjt-i -  LnPayVi) + P3U 
(LnPayit-i -  LnPay*it-n + Z5tDt + 8jt (5 )
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While others remain the same as those in Model (4), 03 ,, (LnPaytt-i -  LnPay*jt-i) is the 
adjustment process for the ‘underpaid’ executives; i.e., where LnPayjt-i -  LnPay* jt-i) <0; 
P30 (Ln Payit-i -  Ln Pay*jt.i) is the adjustment process for the ‘overpaid’ executives, 
i.e., where (LnPayit-i — LnPay*it-i) >015. Hypothesis 7b is supported if P3U< P3o< 0 , i.e. 
there is a bigger adjustment for underpaid executives.
Hypothesis 8 captures Ezzamel and Watson’s (2002) idea about the internal pay 
comparison effect that executives: when compare their pay to the market pay level, they 
are more likely to compare their pay to the pay level of their colleagues within the 
management team. This hypothesis is tested with Equation (6 ):
ALnHPDpayit = Po + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSalesit + P3 (LnHPDPayit-i -  
LnHPDPayVi) + P4 A LnRESTpayit + £ 5tDt + £it (6)
where ALnHPDpayit = (LnHPDpayit-LnHPDpayjt-i) is the reported log change in HPD 
pay in firm i between time t-1 and t; (LnHPDPayin -  LnHPDPayVi) is the pay 
anomaly experienced by HPDs at time t-1; (LnRESTpayu -  LnRESTpayjt-i) is the 
change in log REST pay between time t-1 and t; and other variables remain the same as 
before.
This thesis also follows Ezzamel and Watson (2002) by adding another variable for the 
internal comparison factor, the REST pay anomaly (the residuals of REST pay 
estimate model), and thus create Equation (7):
15 Equation (5) is equal to the following equation: ALnPayit = p0 + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSaleSjt+ 
p3o D0 (LnPayjt.j -  LnPayVi) + p3u Duv (LnPay lt-, -  LnPayV ) + £ 5 tDt + eit,
where Du is a dummy variable = 1 if the executive was underpaid at time t-1 (i.e. LnPayit_i -  LnPay' it-l <
0) and 0 otherwise. Similarly D0 is a dummy variable = 1 if the executive was overpaid at time t-1 (i.e. 
LnPayi,.! -  LnPay Vi > 0) and 0 otherwise.
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ALnHPDpayit = Po + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSalesit+ P3 (LnHPDPayit-i -  
LnHPDPayVi) + p4 ALnRESTpayu + Ps (LnRESTpayit-i -  LnRESTpayVi) 
+£5tDt + sn (7)
where others are the same as those in Equation (6), (LnRESTpayu -  LnRESTpay*jt) 
is the pay anomalies experienced by the rest of the management team at time t. A 
negative sign is predicted for P5.
Hypothesis 9 predicts that the ‘bidding-up’ pay adjustment for HPD pay is greater 
where the rest of management team is relatively overpaid. To test this hypothesis, a 
dummy variable is created, which has a value of one if the rest of management were 
overpaid in the previous period and zero otherwise (OVERREST). This is then 
multiplied by the HPD prior period under and overpayment anomaly variables, which 
results in creating two new interaction terms whose estimated coefficients represent the 
differential impact that relatively overpaid management teams have on the HPD pay 
adjustment to prior pay anomalies. To support Hypothesis 9, it is required that the 
coefficient on the underpaid interaction term is significantly less than zero and that of 
the overpaid greater than zero.
ALnHPDpayit = Po + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSalesjt+ P30 (LnHPDPayin -  
LnHPDPayVi) + P3u (LnHPDPayjt-i -  LnHPDPayVi) + p4 ALnRESTpayu + 
P5(LnRESTpayit-i -  LnRESTpayVi) + p6o (LnHDPPayjt-i -  LnHDPPayVi) x 
OVERREST iM + p6u (LnHDPPayjt-i -  LnHDPPayVi) x OVERREST iM +I5 tDt +
£it (8 )
OVERRESTjt-i = 1 if (RESTpayu-i -  RESTpayVi) >0, otherwise 0.
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This thesis also retests Hypothesis 9 by re-estimating Equation (7) separately for the 
two sub-samples: firms with overpaid managements and those with underpaid 
managements.
The above discussion explains the process of retesting Ezzamel and Watson (1998;
2002) models. As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis also seeks to extend their work by 
exploring the effects on their results of including more governance variables into the 
models. What makes the following models different from theirs are: first, the pay level 
models used to estimate internal and external pay comparison levels take account of the 
effects of governance variables and other control variables, i.e. LnPay*it is redefined; 
second, governance variables and other variables are included in the models, unless the 
empirical evidence later suggests that these variables have no significant effects. 
Therefore, Equations (4) - (8) can be re-estimated by the following counterparts, 
Equations (4*) to (8*):
ALnPayit = Po + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSaleSjt+ P3 (LnPayit- i-  LnPay* jt-i) + 
ZPgGOVERNgjt + X BcCONTROLCit + Z5tDt + eit (4*)
where now LnPay**jt.i is the predicted market-level pay for firm i at time t-1, estimated 
from Equation (1) at time t-1:
LnPay*Vi = bo + bi Performanceit. 1 + b2 LnSaleSit-i + £  PgGOVERNg jt-i + 
IPcCONTROLcit-i + su
(LnPayit. 1 -  LnPay* jt-i) is therefore the estimated pay anomaly experienced by 
executives in firm i in time t-1. Apart from the adding of the governance variables, 
others in Equation (4*) are the same as those in Equation (4).
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Equation 5*:
ALnPayit = Po + Pi APerformanceit + p2 ALnSaleSjt+ P30 (LnPayit-i -  LnPay**it-i) + P3u 
(LnPay^ 1 -  LnPay**it-i) + I  PgGOVERNgit + 1  BcCONTROLcit + X6 tDt + eit 
With LnPay**it-i computed as in Equation 4*.
The same principle applies to create Equations 6 *, 7* and 8 *.
Equation (6*):
ALnHPDpayu = Po + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSales;t+ X PgGOVERNgjt + pn
(LnHPDPayit-i -  LnHPDPay*Vi) + P12 ALnRESTpayu + X BcCONTROLCit +
Z^tDt + 8 it
Equation (7*):
ALnHPDpayit = Po + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSaleSjt+ P3 (LnHPDPayjt-i -  
LnHPDPay**it-i) + P4 ALnRESTpayit + p5 (LnRESTpayit-i -  LnRESTpay*Vi) + X 
BcCONTROLCit + Z^tDt + sjt
Equation (8*):
ALnHPDpayit = Po + Pi APerformanceit + P2 ALnSalesjt+ p30 (LnHPDPayjt-i -  
LnHPDPay*Vi)+ P3u (LnHPDPayjt-i -  LnHPDPay'Vi) + P4 ALnRESTpayit + Ps 
(LnRESTpayit-i -  LnRESTpay**it-i) + P60 (LnHDPPayit -  LnHDPPay**it) x
OVERRESTiM +1 PgGOVERNgjt + p6u (LnHDPPayit -  LnHDPPay"it) x
OVERREST u-i + 1  BcCONTROLcit + I 6 tDt + slt 
OVERRESTit-i — 1 if (RESTpayu-i -  RESTpay*Vi) >0, otherwise 0 .
137
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
It should be noted that for Equations (6) to (8), and also (6*) to (8*) are written for 
HPD pay. Models will also be run for REST pay, where these equations will be 
adjusted, such as using ALnRESTpayjt as dependent variables and changing the 
relevant bits on the right hand side of the equations. Also, Hypothesis 8 can also be 
initially tested in the pay level models by including the internal comparison factor into 
the Equation (1):
LnPayit = po + Pi Performanceu + p2 LnSalesit + £  PgGOVERNgit+ Pn LnRESTpayit + 
I  BcCONTROLcit + XStDt + sit (9)
where other variables are the same as those in Equation (1), LnRESTpayit is the log of 
REST pay at time 1.1 hypothesise Pn >0.
4.4 Sample, data and measures of variables
4.4.1 SAMPLE
One of the advantages of quantitative research methods is the generalisability of results. 
However, to achieve generalisable results, the sample should be large enough (Pallant
2003). Different authors tend to provide different guidelines in terms of the number of 
cases or subjects needed for multiple regression models. For example, Stevens (1996:72) 
recommends that about 15 subjects per predictor are needed for a reliable equation. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996:132) give a formula for calculating sample size 
requirements, taking into account the number of independent variables to be used: 
N>50 + 8m ( where m equals the number of independent variables). More cases are 
needed if the dependent variable is skewed (Pallant 2003:136).
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In 2003, there were around 1300 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. The final sample of this study consists of 417 Chinese listed companies. 
These companies are selected from these two stock exchanges on the basis of two 
conditions: first, the company must have 3 continuous years of data for the period 2001 
to 2003 (in 2001 companies were required to disclose the total pay for the three HPDs); 
second, the company must not be a financial company as financial firms in China have 
different corporate governance rules. These criteria resulted in the selection of 420 
companies, of which three were excluded because they reported negative sales figures 
as a result of re-structuring. Hence, the sample on which I conduct my analysis consists 
of 417 listed Chinese companies over 3 years, 1251 firm-year observations. I also 
include the data for 1999 and 2000 in order to allow for lagging some variables without 
loss in sample size16. This sample should be adequately large according to the above 
rules. Also, although it would be better to obtain sufficient time series observations to 
employ the method of ‘mean group estimator’, it is impossible to do so due to the 
information disclosure situation.
4.4.2 DATA COLLECTION
The information disclosure of executive pay in China is relatively poor compared to 
that in the UK and USA. Chinese companies began to disclose directors and executive 
pay in 1998. But the degree of the disclosure is inconsistent in the following years. 
Only in 1998 did most Chinese listed companies disclose executive pay individually. In 
1999 and 2000, most companies disclosed only the pay intervals and the number of
16To test for the impact of survivorship bias on the results, Chen and Ezzamel (2006) reran the models 
with a second sample with the first restriction removed, which result in a sample of 2821 form 
observations over 2001-2003. The details of the results are presented in a working paper, Chen and 
Ezzamel (2006), and are briefly reflected in the data analysis chapter.
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management members whose pay level fell in the interval. Since 2001, most companies 
have reported the remuneration of the three highest paid directors in aggregate and 
payment for the whole management team. Only cash payments are reported. This is 
why I select 2001-2003 as my sample period. Also, the listed companies only reported 
the sum of salary and bonus, excluding any other forms of remuneration like benefits. 
Hence it is not possible to conduct analysis on the non cash pay components, nor is it 
possible to do the analysis for individual directors, except in 1998.
The data are derived from two sources. The financial data and some of the corporate 
governance data were extracted from Sinofin database developed by Sinofin 
Information Services, while most information about firm characteristics were coded 
manually from annual reports, downloaded from the website: www.iri.com, in order to 
ensure the consistency of data coding. The Sinofin database provides some information 
on executive remuneration and corporate governance annually for all publicly traded 
firms in the two stock exchanges in China since 1998. To check the reliability of 
Sinofin data, 20 companies of the sample were randomly selected and checked against 
the original annual reports. Also, in the descriptive analysis, for every variable, the 
largest 5 values and the smallest 5 values were identified and checked with the original 
report for accuracy, and any data errors found were corrected (2 data entry errors were 
corrected). Three data points were excluded, having negative values in Sales, due to re­
structuring rather than data errors, as mentioned in the sample selection.
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4.4.3 VARIABLES AND MEASURES 
4.4.3.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the regression model is executive remuneration. As 
mentioned earlier, a breakdown of the Chinese data on components of executive pay is 
not possible. Fortunately, the published data still allows consideration of two different 
measures of executive remuneration: (1) highest paid director (HPD)’s pay (HPDpay), 
measured by the average pay of the three HPDs (i.e., total cash pay for the three HPDs 
divided by three), and (2) the pay for the rest of management team members other than 
the three HPDs (REST pay), measured by the total cash payments for the top 
management team as whole (including all directors, supervisors and very senior
1 7managers) minus the aggregate cash payments for the three HPDs .
4.4.3.2 Independent Variables
The key independent variables selected for this thesis are the external and internal 
comparison factors, board characteristics and ownership structure. The main sets of 
parameters forming the focus of the study are proxied by a variety of variables (see 
Table 4.1 for details).
17 This definition of REST pay does not take account of differences in board size or the numbers of 
management team. However, there are problems of using the average o f REST pay due to the fact that 
some directors in China are not paid. The thesis duplicated some of the analyses in Chapter 6 using 
average REST pay. The results are not materially different from the reported results. Taking Model 
lc Rest as an example, the results are similar, except that in the average REST pay model, the 
lnboardsize and Super size swap significance, and the ownership variables become more significant. The
R s 2 are similar.
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4 .4 .3 .2 .1  B o a r d  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s
In the literature, board characteristics are normally described by four dimensions: board 
size, leadership structure, composition of the board and interlocking directorship 
(Ezzamel 2005). Interlocking directors are very rare in the current sample and therefore 
are not included in this study.
Following the literature, board size is measured as the number of the directors on the 
board of each firm, both executive and non-executive directors. On the one hand, more 
directors mean more resources, thus better firm performance will be expected (Dalton 
and Daily 1999); on the other hand, bigger board size will also lead to higher cost and 
less efficiency due to communication problems (Jensen 1993; Lipton and Lorsch 1992), 
a result which also has some empirical support (Core et al. 1999; Yermack 1996). This 
thesis leaves the predicted sign of this variable undecided.
Board composition is proxied as the proportion of the number of independent directors 
over board size.
Board leadership structure, also known as CEO-Chairman duality, is proxied by a 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the Chairman also serves as the CEO, and 0 
otherwise (Duality 1). Duality2 is another dummy with 1 when the CEO is not the 
Chairman, but the Vice Chairman or a director, and 0 otherwise.
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4.4.3.2.2 O w n e r s h ip  s t r u c t u r e
Ownership structure is described as the proportion of shares held by members of the 
board, institutional investors, and the state over total shares of the company, and also as 
the degree of ownership concentration among ordinary shareholders.
State ownership, as in Hovey et al. (2003), is measured as the percentage of state 
shares to total shares (State_share). State ownership is not divided further by national, 
regional or local levels as these are all parts of government.
Institutional ownership, also called Legal person ownership in China, is measured as 
the percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional/corporate investors other than 
directors. Legal person shares are normally subscribed when a firm goes IPO. 
Institutional ownership in China includes stated-controlled legal person ownership 
(Legal_share), foreign ownership (Foreign_share), and private legal person ownership 
(Private_share), measured as the percentage of shares held by state controlled or owned 
companies, foreign companies, and private domestic companies to total company 
shares, respectively. In addition to treating these three variables individually, the thesis 
also tests for the different combinations of them to see their effects on executive pay.
Managerial ownership, as in Wei (2000), is proxied as total director shares 
(Director_share) and top management shares (tot_man_share), measured by the 
percentage of shares held by the board of directors and that by top management 
respectively over total shares. Top management comprises directors, supervisory board 
members and the senior management team including the CEO, Vice GMs, Chief
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Financial Officer, Chief Engineering Officer, and the secretary of the board, whose 
shareholdings are disclosed in the Annual Reports.
4 .4 .3 .2 .3  E x t e r n a l  a n d  in t e r n a l  m a r k e t  p a y  l e v e l
Ezzamel and Watson (1998) constructed three proxies for CEO pay market comparison 
levels: the within-sample firm size and performance estimate, the Times 1000 sector- 
size-adjusted estimate, and the Times 1000 sector-average level of pay. They found that 
the three measures were highly correlated and the first two produced similar results, 
while the third had less explanatory power. Ezzamel and Watson (2002) estimated the 
comparison level of pay as the predicted pay level in time t derived from an OLS 
regression of the pay variables on the t-1 firm size (log of sales). Building on these two 
studies, this thesis first follows Ezzamel & Watson (1998) by proxying the external 
pay comparison factor as the predicted pay level of an OLS regression model of HPD 
pay and REST pay on performance and firm size. The pay anomaly experienced by 
each HPD and REST management in time t is calculated as the residual of the estimated 
model. Then, the thesis proxies the external pay comparison factor as the predicted pay 
level of an OLS regression model of HPD pay and REST pay on performance, firm size, 
governance variables, and some control variables (equation (1)), to investigate the 
possible effects of the inclusion of governance variables on their models.
Similar to Ezzamel and Watson (2002), the internal pay comparison level is measured 
by the total pay of the rest of management members excluding the three HPDs.
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4.4.3.3 Controlled Variables
4.4.3.3.1 F ir m  P e r f o r m a n c e
Performance-related-pay schemes can reduce not only the costs associated with 
managerial non-performance, but also the need for direct monitoring of executives 
(Boyd 1994; Bushman and Smith 2001; Miller 1995). Executive incentives are 
typically measured as the change in executive rewards brought about by a change in 
company performance (Conyon and Sadler 2001). Although most prior, cross-sectional, 
research produced mixed results (Zhou 1999), research overwhelmingly suggests a 
positive relationship between the two (Kaplan 1994). Results may be sensitive to 
different measures of performance (Boschen et al 2003) and different time periods 
(Gregg et al 1993).
In the literature, the predominant measures of firm performance fit into two key 
categories: accounting-based measures and market-based measures. Accounting 
measures (e.g. return on assets or net assets, earnings per share and return on equity) 
represent the impact of many factors, including the past successes of advice given by 
the board to the management team, and these are the traditional mainstay of corporate 
performance measures (Conyon et al 1995). Accounting measures are free from 
general economy-wide shocks and can shield the executive from noise induced by 
market-wide factors that are out of their control (Conyon et al. 2000b). This thesis 
follows Xi and Wu (2000) in using return on assets (ROTA) as the main measure of 
firm performance, which is widely used in the literature and the data is available in 
China.
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However, accounting measures are backward and inward looking, and subject to 
managerial manipulation. In contrast, market-based measures (e.g., Tobin’s Q, market 
to book ratio and shareholder’s return) emphasize the expected future earnings of the 
firm and so are forward-looking indicators (Conyon et al 2000b). However, using 
Tobin’s Q involves calculating the replacement cost of assets and the market value of 
debt, but a large part of the debt of listed Chinese companies has no market value, 
raising concern over the reliability of Tobin’s Q. Also, the majority of shares of 
Chinese companies held by the state and legal persons are non-tradable and can only be 
transferred between parties through negotiation subject to approval from the CSRC, 
normally at a price based on the value of net assets per share plus a margin for traders’ 
profit and expenses. Simply using the product of share price and total number of shares 
will overstate the market value of a company (Zou et al 2003). Therefore, this paper 
follows Zou et al (2003) by using adjusted market value (Adjusted_mv), calculated as 
the sum of the product of market value of tradable shares and the product of non­
tradable shares and net assets per share. Therefore, Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio 
of adjusted market value of the firm over total assets. However, given the weak market 
efficiency in Chinese stock markets (Dahya et al 2002a), the imperfection of China’s 
Stock Market and the fact that many firms only list part of their assets (Xi and Wu 
2000), it may not be efficient to link pay to stock market factors alone as market-related 
performance measures might be very noisy. Thus, accounting performance may be 
more reliable.
The timing of firm performance is potentially important (Conyon and Leech 1994; 
Gregg et al 1993). Some literature has used lagged return variables (Ezzamel and 
Watson 1998, 2002; Gregg et al 1993; Jensen and Murphy 1990b). The use of lagged
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performance variables helps reduce the potential ambiguity of mutual causality that 
may be caused by the endogeneity of executive remuneration and firm performance 
(Gregg et al. 1993; Jensen and Murphy 1990b), and might also better reflect the actual 
timing of the impact of company performance on executive remuneration as directors’ 
pay is typically determined the year before. Ezzamel and Watson (1998) argued that 
this is clearly an empirical issue. Hence, this thesis estimates the models using both 
non-lagged and lagged performance variables, the strategy used by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990b), Conyon (1997a) and Ezzamel and Watson (1998).
The relation between executive pay and firm performance has been well explored in the 
literature. Thus, this study does not focus on this issue but includes firm performance as 
a control variable. A positive relationship is expected.
4 .4 .3 .3 .2  F ir m  s iz e
Most empirical studies report a highly significant positive relationship between firm 
size and the level of executive remuneration (Kostiuk 1990; Tosi et al. 2000). Firm size 
is usually measured in three ways: 1) total sales; 2) market capitalization (= number of 
shares x share price), and 3) number of employees (O'Reilly et al. 1988). Sales is used 
here as the main proxy for firm size. Total asset and market capitalisation are used as 
alternative proxies for robustness checks. A positive sign is expected for the 
relationship between executive pay level and firm size.
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4 .4 .3 .3 .3  O w n e r s h ip  c o n c e n t r a t io n
The literature proxies ownership concentration by a variety of measures: an arbitrary 
cut-off of 5% or more held by a single shareholder; the proportion of shares owned by 
the five largest shareholders, or the Herfindahl index (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 
1997), see below. A distinctive feature of Chinese listed companies is that the majority 
of company shares are owned by the state, on average over 50%. For example, Xu and 
Wang (1999) found that the five largest shareholders accounted for 58 percent of the 
outstanding shares in 1995; hence using a 5% cut-off may not be meaningful in the 
Chinese context. Instead, this thesis uses the Herfindahl index of the biggest 10 
shareholders of the firm (Herfindahl lO), calculated as the sum of the square of the 
proportion of shareholdings of the 10 largest shareholders (Hio= X Si2, where Si refers
thto the percentage of the shareholding of the i biggest shareholder, i=l, 2, ..., 10). The 
Herfindahl index of the biggest 5 shareholders of the firm (Herfindahl_5) is used as an 
alternative proxy for robustness checks.
4 .4 .3 .3 .4  S u p e r v is o r y  b o a r d  s iz e
As discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese listed companies have a two-tier board structure. 
The supervisory board is expected to supervise the board and top management, and 
therefore should have a monitoring effect on executive remuneration. However, 
previous literature on other topics seems to suggest that the supervisory board in China 
does not function as expected (Cha 2001; Dahya et al. 2002a). No previous study has 
tested the relation between the size of supervisory board and executive remuneration.
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This thesis includes the size of supervisory board (Super size) as a control variable, 
measured by the number of supervisors. A negative sign is expected.
4.4.3.3.5 C a p it a l  s t r u c t u r e
Different capital structures imply different levels of financial risk and prompt different 
extent of supervision from the creditors (usually banks), which consequently affect 
management remuneration decisions consequently. The higher risk arising from 
increases in the debt ratio could lead risk adverse executive to expect more pay (Garen 
1994). However, as debt increases, creditors may begin to exercise more supervision 
over the firm, making it difficult for management to entrench by overpaying themselves. 
Therefore, the sign of the relation between debt ratio and executive pay could be either 
positive or negative. This thesis controls for the effect of capital structure, proxied by 
the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets (Debt).
4.4.3.3.6 D iv e r s if ic a t io n
Various aspects of firm strategic posture have been posited to impact executive 
remuneration (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1990; Veliyath et al. 1994). Firm 
diversification increases the complexity of the CEO’s job, and therefore increases the 
pay expectation of CEO (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). Thus, this thesis 
incorporates diversification as a control variable.
There are various measures of diversification, among which the most popular two are 
product count measures and Herfindahl-type measures. Riahi-Belkaoui & Pavlik (1993)
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preferred the product count method. They argued that the SIC-based measures and the 
categorical measures are less subjective and continuous measures of diversification that 
reflect diversification differences more accurately between firms. They also called for 
future studies to use other measures of diversification such as Herfindahl-type measures 
(Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik 1993). The data only allows the measure of diversification 
by the number of industries a firm’s principle income comes from (No_indus). 
Operating in different industries requires greater managerial expertise in managing 
multiple product lines and understanding complex product markets and entails more 
tricky resource allocation priorities (Rose and Shepard 1997). A positive sign is 
expected.
4.4.3.3.7 I n d u s t r ia l  E f f e c t
Given that the pay levels vary across industries in China (SRIC 2003), as discussed in 
Section 2.4.4 in Chapter 2, it is necessary to control for industrial effects. This thesis 
follows the Shan ghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in categorising listed companies into 
thirteen industries: agriculture /forestry /fishing /farming, manufacturing, finance and 
insurance, information and technology, power and utility, mining, transportation and 
warehousing, media and culture, wholesaling and retailing, real estate, social service, 
construction, and mixed industry. Twelve dummies are constructed: whenever the 
company belongs to a certain industry, it is represented by 1, otherwise 0. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, executives in construction, finance and banking, and IT are paid higher; 
therefore a positive sign is expected for dummies for construction, finance and banking, 
and IT. Executives in agriculture /forestry /fishing /farming are paid less and therefore 
the dummy variable for them should have a negative sign.
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4.4.3.3.8 L o c a t io n
Location might affect executive pay. Compared to other parts of China, Shanghai, 
Beijing and Shenzhen have more industrial concentration, information availability, 
technological advantages, and a more active managerial labour market as well as higher 
cost of living (Melvin 2001; SRIC 2003). I use a dummy variable, 1 for companies 
located in Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen and 0 otherwise, to control for location. A 
positive sign is expected.
4.4.3.3.9 F ir m  a g e
The number of years a firm has been listed on the stock market after IPOs 
(yearafterlPO) is used to control for the effects of firm age, as in Shi (2005). When a 
firm is first listed, it attracts a lot attention from the investors and the media, which play 
an important role in monitoring the firm’s top management. The longer the firm has 
been listed in the stock exchange, people pay less attention to the firm; hence the 
executives might feel less constrained in entrenching higher remuneration. In this sense, 
a positive effect of firm age is expected.
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Table 4.1 Definition of Variables
V ariab les: Definition/ M easurement Predict-
sign
Executive Highest paid director (HPD) rem uneration= the average cash remuneration o f the pay for the top 3 highest-paid director ( HPDpay)
remuneration Pay for the rest of management= The disclosed total pay for the top management team- pay for the 3 Highest paid directors (RESTpay)
External comparison 
factors
Market rate of executive remuneration pay—estimates o f OLS regression model with sample positive
Internal comparison 
factors
-REST pay 
-REST pay anomalies
State ownership (State share)=State shares/total shares ?
Domestic legal person ownership (legal share)= shares owned by state-owned enterprise/total shares negative
Private legal person ownership (Private share)= shares owned by domestic private companies/total shares negative
Ownership structure Legal person ownership(legalshare)=Private share+legal share negative
Foreign ownership =foreign held shares/total shares negative
Ownership concentration: Herfedalh 10= £S i2, where Si refers to the shareholdings of the ilargest shareholders in the company, i=l,2,...,10) negative
Managerial ownership- Total directors’ shares/total shares (Director share) or Total management share/total shares (tot man share) negative
Board Structure Proportion of non-executive directors over board size (Proind) Negative
Board Size No. of members of the board o f Directors (Boardsize) Positive
Duality Duality 1 =1 if the Chairman also serves as the CEO, 0 if otherwise Duality2 =1 if the CEO also serves as the Vice Chairman or a board member
Positive
supervisory board 
Size
The number of supervisors (Size_super) negative
C orporate
Performance
l)Retum on total assets (ROTA) =Profit before interest and tax /total assets; 2) Profit before interest, tax and dividend (B itd p ro fit)
3) Adjusted Market value (Adjusted_mv)= share price* tradable shares+ net asset per share* non-tradable shares
4) Tobin’s Q=Adjusted mv/total assets
Positive
Firm Size l)Sales 2) Adjusted Market value positive
Location Dummy: 1 if located in Shanghai, Beijing, or Shenzhen, otherwise 0 positive
Industry differential Industry dummies: coded 1 if a firm belongs to a certain industry, 0 otherwise ?
Debt ratio Book value of total debt/total assets (Debt) ?
Diversification The No. of industries from which the principal income of the firm is generated (No indus) positive
Firm age The number of years the firm has been listed after IPO ( Y earafterlPO ) ?
Note: Some of the variables might require data transformation. In the later analysis, the prefix ‘RY’ of a variable means that the variable is rank-transformed, ‘Ln’ means 
Napierian Log-transformed., ‘Sq’ means square transformed, while ‘Ch’ means the change in the variables.
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4 .4 .3 .3 .10  Y e a r  d u m m ie s
Year dummies are constructed to allow for macroeconomic shocks. With the time 
dummies, some effects that are constant across firms but change over time can be 
ruled out, such as inflation and the economic situation.
It should be noted that some of the variables, such as those that are constant over time, 
are excluded in fixed effects models, because their effects should have already been 
ruled out.
4.5 Some data analytical issues
4.5.1 THREE STEPS OF ANALYSES
Data are analysed in three steps: descriptive statistics, bi-variate correlation analysis 
and multivariate analysis.
Analysing descriptive statistics enables an understanding of the nature of the variables 
and their underlying statistical distribution (Pallant 2003) and can also help to identify 
and compare differences between Chinese data with those of the West. Bi-variate 
correlations help identify the potential problem of multi-colinearity and the initial 
relations between variables. Familiar multivariate techniques, namely ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS), first difference models and fixed/random effects models, 
are employed to further analyse the data and test the research hypotheses. Regression
153
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
models are estimated independently for the highest paid directors and the rest of the 
management team.
Previous research on executive remuneration is mostly conducted with cross-sectional 
data using OLS. However, OLS has been criticised for missing variables problems 
and more recently, researchers have started to use panel data to control for 
unobservable individual effects. This thesis follows the procedures used by 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) by first using OLS to study the observable determinants of 
executive pay with the pooled data and then to examine the unobserved heterogeneity 
in the contracting environment across firms with panel data by using fixed/random 
effects models. The Hausman test is run to decide whether a fixed or random effects 
model is the appropriate way to treat the error structure, 8jt (Baltagi 2001; Hausman 
1978; Wooldridge 2002b). The random effects model estimates are more efficient 
under the null of the Hausman test. However, if the null hypothesis is rejected, the 
random effects estimates are inconsistent and the consistent fixed effects estimates are 
preferable.
It should be noted that because fixed effects model controls for firm effects, the 
variables of firm characteristics, which are constant over time, can be eliminated from 
the model. Also, Himmelberg et al. (1999) found that some significant results in their 
OLS models disappeared in their fixed effects models, which they explained might be 
due to the lack of variation in their ownership variables. Due to the nature of my data, 
similar discrepancies in the results might be found across different estimate models in 
this thesis.
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Also, as is well known, OLS regression is built on series of assumptions, such as 
linearity, normality, homogeneity, independence, errors in variables, model 
specification, influence and collinearity (Stock and Watson 2003; Wooldridge 2002b). 
Therefore, statistical tests and visual displays are used to check for regression 
diagnostics after OLS models are run and deal with them if such problems are 
identified.
Finally, some further analyses are run to test how robust the models are, by using 
different proxies or different analytical methods.
4.5.2 DEALING WITH STATISTICAL PROBLEMS
Given that executive remuneration determining is a complicated matter and there are 
normally many variables involved, research on this issue is very likely to suffer from 
statistical problems such as non-normality, omitted variables, multi-colinearity and 
outliers. In addition, Ciscel & Carroll (1980) identified three frequent problems in 
examining executive remuneration: heteroscedasticity, simultaneous equations bias 
and measurement error in the data. This thesis considers these problems seriously and 
dealing with them using available techniques.
To reduce the omitted variables problem, my OLS models try to control for the 
determinants identified in the literature. Also, as discussed in Section 4.2.1, the use of 
panel data analysis, e.g. fixed effects model, is likely to significantly reduce the 
omitted variables problem.
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Moreover, regressions assume that the errors should be normally distributed and 
constant. Normality of residuals assures valid hypothesis testing. After I run a 
regression, tests are be undertaken to check for the normality of residuals, such as 
Shapiro-Wilk W test, Jarque-Bera, and Shapiro-Francia. Given that it is difficult for a 
large data set to be judged as normally distributed by these tests (Ezzamel and Mar- 
Molinero 1990), I check graphically residuals using kemal density plot, QQ plot or 
histogram with normal curve etc. With a large N, a minor and trivial deviation from 
normality is practically acceptable (Chen et al. 2006), though often reported as 
statistical significant.
The existence of heteroskedasticity does not bias the estimates of the coefficients 
themselves; however, tests for the significance of variables might be unreliable as the 
ordinary least squares estimate is inefficient in the existence of such a problem 
(Wooldridge 2002b). The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test or a plot of residuals 
versus fitted values (rvfplot) can be used to detect heteroskedasticity. If there is a 
problem of heteroscedasticity, it may be corrected by using robust standard error 
schemes discussed in MacKinnon and White (1985). Long and Ervin (2000) 
recommend the “hc3” correction.
Multicollinearity occurs because two (or more) variables are correlated. When this 
happens, the individual p-values can be misleading (a p-value can be high, even 
though the variable is important) and the confidence intervals on the regression 
coefficients will be very wide (Belsley et al. 1980). To avoid this problem, I not only 
run the bi-variate correlation analysis to initially identify the possible sources of 
multicollinearity, but also calculate the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) after each
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regression. This is to further identify any multicollinearity problem caused by the 
dependence of one variable on several variables together18. A bi-variate correlation 
coefficient greater than 0.8 (Studenmund 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell 1989) or a VIF 
greater than 10 (Mason and Perreault 1991) are thought to signal harmful collinearity. 
If this happens, I drop one or more highly correlated variables, if one of the variables 
is not logically essential to my models or if one variable has substitute explanatory 
power for the other one, to reduce or eliminate multicollinearity. Also factor analyses 
might be used to prefix the models by reducing the number of variables, if necessary, 
into a few more compact but fairly independent factors. Alternatively, some of these 
variables may need to be combined.
Maximum likelihood estimators are calculated in order to deal with problems of data 
non-normality. Due the nature of this study, financial ratios are quite heavily used and 
financial ratios are normally heavily skewed or have large kurtosis, which violate the 
assumptions underlying multivariate techniques (Ezzamel et al. 1987; Kane and 
Meade 1998). It is therefore customary to transform this data to bring it closer to the 
distributional assumptions of the multivariate models (Ezzamel et al 1987; Kane and 
Meade 1998). The most widely used transformation methods in the literature include, 
but are not limited to, the log, square and root transformation. Another interesting 
method that has been used with success in examining financial ratios is to transform 
the data into ranks19 (Conover and Iman 1981; Kane and Meade 1998). In many cases,
i8VIFs can tell how well each independent (X;) variable is predicted from the other independent 
variables. VIF=1/Tolerance, where Tolerance = 1- R;2 , which in turn is R2 for the regression of Xj 
predicted by the other independent variables. When those R2 and VIF values are high for Xi, the model 
fit is affected by multicollinearity (Belsley et al. 1980).
19 Such rank transformation has the following desirable properties: it always has zero skew and a very 
slight negative kurtosis; there is no need to remove outliers as the most extreme outlier just becomes 
Rank 1 or N; unlike other algebraic transformations of data, which need to be carefully adjusted for 
each new variable, the ranking of independent variables is a single transformation for all problematic
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the goal is to achieve approximate distributions by means of a relatively simple 
transformation (Smith 1972). As logarithmic, square and root transformation are more 
widely used in regression analysis, and also to maintain the comparability to previous 
results, this thesis gives these methods priority wherever data transformation is 
needed. If these methods do not serve the goal, rank transformation is employed.
In addition to the non-normal distributions, financial ratios tend to exhibit some large 
outliers (Ezzamel and Mar-Molinero 1990). It is well acknowledged that outliers can 
affect the precision of parameter estimates (Hamilton 2004) and therefore they require 
special attention. The thesis first calculates the summary statistics for the full data set. 
Those observations with extreme values are identified, those values that fall outside 
the three standard deviations limit from the mean, which are usually recognised as 
extreme outliers in the literature (Ezzamel and Mar-Molinero 1990). Rather than 
simply removing the extreme values (as this would end up with a loss of large data 
points), I check back with the original annual reports to avoid wrongly entered and 
mis-reported data. Except for those data entry errors, which would be corrected, the 
remaining observations with high leverage (an observation with an extreme value on 
predictor variable) are paid special attention. If I do not have compelling reasons to 
simply delete these cases, these cases would be kept in the regressions. Extra checks 
are made to see how much these points affect the estimates of the models. After 
regression models are run, leverage-versus-residuals square plots are used to identify 
influential outliers. Corrections are made, wherever necessary, either by excluding 
outliers or using robust regression models, which are better in dealing with outliers by 
giving different weights to the observations, see Hamilton (2004). Robust regression
distributions. Also, experience has indicated that ranks themselves provide scores that are difficult to 
improve upon for general all-round use (Conover and Iman 1981; Kane and Meade 1998).
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methods are better than OLS efficiency in the face of non-normal, heavy-tailed error 
distributions (Hamilton 2004).
Simultaneous equations bias has been less-discussed in the executive remuneration 
literature, but it is a serious problem. Ciscel & Carroll (1980) identified the 
simultaneous equations bias problem between the two most popular explanatory 
variables: Sales (proxy for firm size) and Profit. They argued that the significance of 
sales as an explanatory variable of executive remuneration is compatible with the 
assumption that increasing sales tends to increase profit and the assumption that a 
firm’s manager seeks to increase sales as a proxy for firm size (Ciscel and Carroll 
1980). Also, performance and executive pay might be jointly determined (Gregg et al 
1993). Simple ordinary regression models do not allow us to sort out these scenarios 
since they require adding another equation for substitute effects. The thesis uses 
alternative measures to proxy variables, and also uses lagged terms, with the purpose 
that this would reduce the ambiguous causality (Conyon 1997a). Furthermore, the 
thesis runs two-staged least squares (models 2SLS) regressions with instrumental 
factors and compares the results to those of OLS with the Hausman tests. If the results 
are significantly different, then there is an endogeneity problem and thus the results of 
2SLS are more consistent and reliable (Wooldridge 2002b).
Moreover, as mentioned in the literature review, the incentives alignments and the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms can have both complementary and 
substitute effects (Ezzamel 2005; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Thorbum 1997). 
More specifically, for example, a more independent board tends to closely link 
executive remuneration to firm performance thus leading to a higher proportion of
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stock-related pay. However, it is equally sensible to argue that the more independent 
the board is, the less the need for incentive alignment thus leading to less stock- 
related pay. This has to be borne in mind when interpreting the empirical results.
Furthermore, OLS regression assumes that the residuals are independent. However, 
since the current data include the same companies over time, the OLS standard errors 
might be affected by a lack of independence (Peterson 2006). Following Peterson’s 
suggestion, this thesis re-estimates the models using the “cluster” option in Stata to 
correct for this problem (Chen et al. 2006), and compares the results with the OLS 
robust standard errors estimate.
Ciscel & Carroll (1980) also identified another problem in the executive remuneration 
research- possible measurement error in the data. Since most researchers make use of 
published data, rather than collecting their own observations, serious measurement 
errors may exist. Since the most important variables in the thesis are clearly defined 
and data have been carefully checked by the author manually, it is hoped that the 
measurement error can be largely alleviated.
Finally, model specification error can occur when relevant variables are omitted or 
irrelevant variables are included, which can substantially affect the estimate of 
regression coefficients. Therefore, this thesis adopts two methods to detect 
specification errors: Linktest20 and Ovtest21. Both tests test for the null hypothesis that
20 The Linkest test is based on the idea that if a regression is properly specified, one should not be able 
to find any additional independent variables that are significant by chance.
21 Ovtest performs a regression specification error test (RESET), using powers of the fitted values for 
omitted variables.
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the model has no specification errors. When the null hypothesis is rejected, the 
models have to be reconsidered.
4.6 Interviews
The few qualitative studies undertaken in the area of corporate governance, e.g. 
McNulty & Pettigrew (1999), Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) and Perkins and Hendry 
(2005), show that qualitative research methods can generate helpful insights into the 
processes and informal dynamics in the board room on corporate governance and 
executive pay. This thesis conducted a pilot study comprising in-depth interviews 
with 10 board members. Some questions were about determination of executive 
remuneration and the related findings are used to supplement the findings from 
quantitative analysis in the later Chapters. This section describes how these interviews 
were conducted.
4.6.1 THE SAMPLE
The interviews were conducted in China during the summer of 2004. The information 
about the interviewees is provided in Table 4.2. To preserve anonymity, the names of 
the interviewees and their companies are not disclosed. Instead, the interviewees are 
named as EDI, ED2,... etc. for those who are executive directors, and ID1, ID2,...etc. 
if the interviewees are independent directors.
As in similar studies involving boards (Perkins and Hendry 2005), a degree of 
opportunism was unavoidably exercised in forming my sample. Some of these
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directors were introduced by my friends, while a few were introduced by some of the 
people I interviewed earlier. Altogether, I interviewed 5 executive and 5 non­
executive directors. Although this may appear a small sample, their backgrounds are 
quite varied. First, the independent directors have multiple office holdings, 
consequently the number of firms represented is 19 (16 listed firms and 3 firms that 
were preparing for IPOs). Second, as ‘network stars’ (Pettigrew 1992), these directors 
have various channels for gathering knowledge about corporate governance issues in 
other firms and in China, more generally. As mentioned earlier, only a few studies 
have used interviews to collect data on executive pay issues probably due to the 
difficulty of gaining access to the busy directors and because of the sensitivity of the 
topic. Perkins and Hendry (2005) only managed to interview seven individuals, while 
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) interviewed 20 (part-time board members).
Table 4.2 Information about Interviewees
Code Location of
Registered 
capitalization (in 
RMB 000,000’s)
Position
Tenure (Number of 
years) Number of
interview with the 
firm
with the 
board
Directorship
EDI Office,Zhangzhou 150
Vice CEO, director, and 
Board secretary 16 7 1
ED2 Reception,Xiamen 371 Director; CEO 6 6 1
ED3 Office,Beijing 905
Board secretary, 
Finance director 6 2 1
ED4 Office,Zhangzhou 140
Vice CEO, 
Director 17 1 1
ED5 Office,Zhangzhou 361 Vice-Chairman 1 1 1
ID1 Home,Xiamen
150;
361
Professor in 
Accounting 2 2 3
ID2 Office,Beijing n/a ID; Consultant 1 1 1
ID3 Office,Beijing
480,
2196
589
Professor in 
Accounting;
4
3
2
4
3
2
5
ID4 Tea house Beijing 391;
Professor in
Accounting; Consultant
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
ID5 Tea house Beijing
218;
539
PhD in Accounting; 
CPA
2
1
2
1 2
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4.6.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
To retain flexibility in data gathering, semi-structured interviews were used, which 
allow respondents to reveal their perceptions concerning the range of factors they 
deem to be relevant to the question asked (Perkins and Hendry 2005). An outline for 
interviews (Appendix 1) was prepared in advance, to guide through the interview and 
reduce the risk of ‘an early exit from the interview’ (Roberts and Stiles 1999:38). 
Semi-structured interviews allow the respondents to talk around the questions and to 
develop any points they believed were important to them as directors or in terms of 
wider corporate governance concerns (Perkins and Hendry 2005). The main themes of 
the interviews are to understand better the current situation of corporate governance 
generally, to find out how executive remuneration is determined, and to explore how 
the independent directors and board sub-committees, if established, function in 
Chinese listed firms. For details please refer to the outline for interviews.
4.6.3 THE PROCEDURES
I contacted each interviewee in advance to secure participation and arrange the time 
and place for each interview. This also provided an opportunity for me to warn the 
participant of the interview questions beforehand, as executive remuneration is a 
sensitive topic. I also assured them of the confidentiality of their identity and the 
information they would reveal.
All the interviews were conducted face-to-face by me in the interviewees’ offices, 
except that two were held in a tea house and one in the reception room of the
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interviewee’s company. Each interview took from 40 to 60 minutes. A tape recorder 
was used with the permission of interviewees, who all gave their consent for the use 
of the tape recorder. For every interview, I first introduced myself and thanked the 
respondent for his/her participation, followed by briefly introducing my research and 
the purpose of the interviews.
The interviews began with introductory questions about the participants and their 
companies, followed by a series of open-ended questions related to the board of 
directors and executive remuneration. These questions allowed the participants to 
reveal their thoughts as freely as possible, thus the information given was not biased 
in a certain direction. Once no more new responses emerged in relation to a particular 
a question, I asked the participant if there was anything he would like to add or 
comment, which had not been covered in the interview. Finally, I ended the 
interviews by thanking the participants for their time, contribution and co-operation.
After conducting the interviews, I transcribed them from the tapes. Interview 
transcripts were then analysed to identify emergent themes. The answers for each 
question from each interviewee were grouped together. The transcripts were revisited 
several times to ensure that all related information was grasped. These grouped 
answers were then compared, contrasted and evaluated, in order to grasp a common 
understanding of a certain question (theme). This process was iterated several times 
with greater precision, until a clear evident grasp was achieved. Importantly, the 
manner of analysis took into account the fact that the interviews are not the main 
source of data for this thesis. This study is essentially a quantitative empirical study 
based on publicly available data. The interviews were intended to help in providing a
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better understanding of the results obtained from the quantitative empirical analyses. 
Therefore, only those interview findings relating to the setting of executive 
remuneration are used in this thesis, mainly to supplement and explain the empirical 
findings in Chapter 8.
4.7 Summary
This chapter first discusses the advantages and characteristics of panel data, especially 
compared to cross-sectional data. Most previous studies on executive remuneration 
used cross-sectional data, were subject to missing variables problem and failed to 
identify individual effects and time effects on the setting of executive pay. Panel data 
can alleviate these problems. Panel data methods - fixed effect and random effect 
methods- and how to choose between them ar e introduced afterwards. Also, the 
chapter identifies the requirements of data variation by fixed effects models and notes 
that this might make this technique unable to identify the effects of certain time- 
invariant variables. Hence, it is suggested that the results of OLS regression of the 
pooled data should be used.
The chapter then develops several multi-regression models to test the research 
hypotheses. The models specified are in the form of panel data; however, they are also 
applicable to OLS pooled models. These models are run with a panel data set 
consisting of 417 Chinese listed firms over 2001-2003. Multi-regression models are 
run on each of HPD pay and REST pay. The thesis also retests the models developed 
by Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) with Chinese data and also seeks to extend their 
models by including governance variables.
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Studies on executive remuneration, especially when using a large number of variables 
and financial ratios, are likely to suffer from some statistical problems such as non­
normality, omitted variables, multi-colinearity, outliers, heteroskadasticity, 
measurement errors and specification errors. This thesis considers these issues 
carefully.
Finally, the issues related to the interview research methods are introduced. Although 
interviews are not the main methods of data collection in this thesis, the insiders’ 
views of corporate governance in China are precious and should be very useful in 
better understanding the empirical results.
To sum up, this chapter has covered the analytical techniques, sample selection, data 
collection, model specification, the procedures of the statistical analyses, potential 
statistical problems and their possible solutions that are employed by this thesis. The 
results of data analyses will be presented and discussed in the following chapters. 
Interview results will be used to help understand the results of empirical analyses.
The next chapter deals with the initial analyses and presents the results of descriptive 
statistics and bi-variate analysis.
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CHAPTER 5 INITIAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 provided a profile of research design and methods, including statistical 
techniques, sample selection, data, modelling, variables, potential problems and 
methods to tackle these problems. As suggested in Chapter 4, data are analysed in 
three steps: descriptive analysis, bi-variate analysis and multivariate analysis. This 
chapter presents and discusses descriptive and bi-variate analyses.
Following the sampling process mentioned in Chapter 4, 417 companies were left in 
the Chinese sample, each having complete data for the highest paid directors’ pay 
(HPDs) covering the three years from 2001 to 2003. Therefore, there are 1251 firm 
observations, though other variables may have some missing values. Data for 1999 
and 2000 were also included in order to lag variables, but most firms do not have data 
for the pay variables in these two years. Data analysis was conducted using the 
STATA statistical software package, and the Excel spreadsheet was used for data 
housekeeping and cleaning.
Before testing the hypotheses, descriptive analyses of important variables were 
conducted. Then bi-variate correlations were run to identify the preliminary 
associations between variables. These initial analyses are useful in understanding the 
characteristics and nature of the data and in checking the variables for any violation of 
the assumptions underlying the multivariate statistical techniques applied to test the
167
CHAPTER 5 INITIAL ANALYSIS
research hypotheses. A series of multiple regression models were run to further 
investigate the data and to test the hypotheses, the results of which are reported in 
Chapters 6 & 7.
This chapter reports the results of initial analyses and is organised as follows. Section 
2 reports descriptive statistics of each variable and introduces data transformation 
wherever appropriate. Section 3 examines the correlation matrix of the variables and 
identifies the bi-variate correlation between variables. Section 4 summarises the main 
findings from the initial statistics.
5.2 Descriptive analysis of the key variables
The variables used in this thesis are grouped into 4 categories — executive 
compensation, characteristics of the board of directors, ownership structure and 
control variables. Continuous variables will be initially analysed by examining their 
mean, median, standard deviation, range, skewness and kurtosis; while categorical 
variables will be presented with their frequencies and dispersion.
5.2.1 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
As discussed in Chapter 4, the empirical analysis of the determination of executive 
remuneration is based on different measures: the average pay of the three highest paid 
directors (HPDs) (HPDpay) and the total remuneration of the rest of management 
other than the three highest paid directors (RESTpay). Table 5.1 presents the
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summary statistics of these two pay variables and also the total remuneration of the 
management team as a whole (Tot_man_pay), over the period of 2001 to 2003.
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Executive Pay Variables
Panel A Descriptive statistics with raw data of executive pay (pay and sd. in RMB 
000’s)
Variables year N mean Median Sd min max skew kurtosis
HPDpay
2001 417 102.9 73.3 103.6 3.4 1271.1 4.50 42.33
2002 417 126.6 98.5 105.8 7.7 747.3 2.12 8.89
2003 417 152.7 123.3 127.0 9.8 820.8 2.08 8.86
Pooled 1251 127.4 98.7 114.4 3.4 1271.1 2.71 16.19
RESTpay
2001 406 591.7 410.0 581.6 14.0 5344.5 2.92 16.96
2002 411 745.7 531.3 712.3 32.5 5819.9 2.66 13.53
2003 415 870.2 595.5 880.3 16.9 9441.8 3.57 26.45
Pooled 1232 736.9 516.0 744.2 14.0 9441.8 3.37 24.48
Tot_man_pay
2001 406 901.4 662.0 818.8 87.6 6971.7 2.57 13.32
2002 411 1126.2 871.0 973.7 117.6 7225.3 2.48 11.89
2003 415 1328.3 1006.9 1194.2 46.7 11900.0 3.04 19.77
Pooled 1232 1120.2 841.2 1022.9 46.7 11900.0 2.92 18.51
Panel B Descriptive statistics with log transformed executive pay
Variables year N mean Median sd min max skew kurtosis
LnHPDpay
2001 417 11.19 11.20 0.85 8.15 14.06 -0.14 3.10
2002 417 11.45 11.50 0.79 8.95 13.52 -0.15 2.90
2003 417 11.63 11.72 0.81 9.19 13.62 -0.26 2.94
Pooled 1251 11.42 11.50 0.84 8.15 14.06 -0.20 2.99
LnRESTpay
2001 406 12.92 12.92 0.88 9.55 15.49 -0.12 3.01
2002 411 13.17 13.18 0.86 10.39 15.58 -0.09 2.91
2003 415 13.29 13.30 0.92 9.74 16.06 -0.36 3.63
Total 1232 13.13 13.15 0.90 9.55 16.06 -0.18 3.16
Lntot_man_pay
2001 406 13.39 13.40 0.81 11.38 15.76 0.06 2.55
2002 411 13.64 13.68 0.77 11.68 15.79 0.01 2.76
2003 415 13.78 13.82 0.81 10.75 16.29 -0.18 3.13
Pooled 1232 13.61 13.64 0.81 10.75 16.29 -0.04 2.77
Panel C Growth Rate of Executive pay
Growth Rate HPDpav RESToav Tot man Pavmean Median mean Median mean Median
2001 - - - - - -
2002 0.23 0.34 0.26 0.30 0.25 0.32
2003 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.16
Annual 
growth Rate 0.22 0.30 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23
*For the definitions of the variables, please refer to Table 4.1 in Page 152, same hereafter.
As shown in Panel A of Table 5.1, over the period, the mean of HPD pay is RMB 
¥127,400 (about £8,493, assuming £1 ~ RMB ¥15), which suggests that on average,
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the managers in China are paid very much less than their western counterparts. For, 
example Ezzamel and Watson (2002) observed that the average cash compensation 
for the CEOs in their sampled firms in the UK was £387,000 in 1995, more than 45 
times of that of their counterparts in China; Conyon and Murphy (2000) reported that 
the average total remuneration of a CEO was £589,000 in the UK, and £3,565,000 in 
the USA, in 1997 in their sampled firms.
Table 5.1 also shows that all the pay variables, both their mean and median, 
experienced continuous increase every year over the period. Panel C in Table 5.1 
illustrates the growth rates of the three pay variables over the period. It is shown that 
the mean and median of HPD pay both increased, but the median grows at a much 
higher rate than the mean. The annual growth rate of the mean of HPD pay is about 
22% (30% for the median) and on average a HPD was paid RMB ¥102,900 (about 
£6,860) in 2001, compared to RMB ¥152.7 thousand (about £10,180) in 2003 - an 
increase of 53%. The growth rates for the mean of Tot_man_pay and REST pay are 
similar to that of HPD pay, although the growth rates of their median are lower. For 
instance, over the period 2001-2003, the median of REST pay rose by 21% every year, 
compared to 30% of HPD pay. The growth rate of Chinese executive pay seems to be 
much higher than that identified in the West. For example, in the Ezzamel and Watson 
(2002) sample, the growth rate of CEO cash remuneration was about 17%, and that 
for the other board members is 5.9%. Also, Ezzamel and Watson (2002) observed in 
their sample that CEO pay increased about 3 times faster than the pay for other board 
members; such big difference is not observed in this thesis. Instead, in Chinese firms, 
the annual growth rate of the mean of HPD pay and that of the mean of REST pay are 
similar, at 22% and 21% respectively, though in terms of the median, HPD pay grows
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faster than REST pay, at 30% and 21% respectively. This result suggests that the 
adjustment of cash payments for HPDs and that for the REST are quite even in 
Chinese firms. It should be noted that it is difficult to strictly compare HPD pay in the 
current study to Western HPD/CEO pay because the HPD pay here (the average pay 
of the aggregate pay of the three highest paid directors) does not show the pay 
dynamics between the highest paid director and the second highest paid director. This 
thesis acknowledges this limitation in the analysis due to data unavailability. However, 
given that Chinese firms emphasise the equality and stability among peers and 
employees (Warner 1995), the larger pay gap between the highest paid and the second 
highest paid directors attributed to tournament theory dynamics in the West is less 
likely to exist in China22 and therefore is less likely to affect the validity of the current 
analysis.
Panal A also shows that each of the three pay variables exhibits wide ranges. For 
instance, the average of HPD pay ranged from the RMB ¥3,400 to RMB ¥1,271,100 
(excluding firms where directors obtained no pay from the firm). The large standard 
deviations (114,400) for all the pay variables also demonstrate that there is a wide 
spread of pay levels across time and between firms in our sample.
22 Only in 1998 did most Chinese listed companies disclose individual managerial pay, and the data of 
my manually coded 100 firms shows that the gaps between the payments for the highest paid director, 
the second highest paid director, and the third highest paid director are not anywhere near to the 
differences reported in Western literature (e.g. Ezzamel and Watson 2002). The geometric mean of the 
ratio of the second highest paid over the highest paid is around 90%; so is the ratio of the third highest 
paid over the second highest paid. Also, pay levels of the three highest paid directors are very highly 
correlated: the bi-variate correlation coefficients are all above 0.958.
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Also, high levels of skewness (the third central moment) and kurtosis (the fourth 
moment)23 occur in the pay variables. For example, as the mean is much greater than 
the median, HPD pay is skewed to the right with a few firms having very large values. 
The values of skewness and kurtosis are 2.71 and 16.19 respectively for the whole 
sample. Since these high skewness and kurtosis values might cause problems in 
regressions, and because executive pay is usually log transformed in the literature 
(Conyon 1997b; Conyon et al. 2001; Ezzamel and Watson 2002; Gomez-Mejia et al 
2003), I transformed these pay variables by taking the Napierian logarithm of the raw 
values for later regression analyses. Panel B in Table 5.1 shows that the 
transformation has improved the distribution of pay values, with the value of 
skewness reduced to nearly zero and that of kurtosis reduced to around 3, suggesting 
that the distribution is now approximately normal.
5.2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the size, composition and leadership 
structure of the board of directors for the sampled 417 companies. To reflect the 
effects of the corporate governance reform on these variables, the statistics reported 
cover a five year period 1999-2003. As shown, the mean size of the board of directors 
across the years is 9.8 (ranging from 4 to 19), varying very little from year to year. 
The median board size remains the same, 9, for each year. These figures are 
reasonable as it is stated by Company Law (1993) in China that the number of 
directors should range from 5 to 19. Only 2 firm observations fall out of this range by 
having only 4 directors in their firms.
23 Stata uses Bock’s definition of kurtosis: Kurtosis =(x- X )4 /x2 (note this formula does not subtract 3), 
and as a result a normal distribution would have a kurtosis of 3 according to this definition.
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Board Characteristics
Panel A Board size and Proportion of Inde|pendent directors
Varaibles year N Mean Median sd min max skewness kurtosis
Boardsize
1999 414 9. 7 9 2. 67 4 19 0. 79 3.67
2000 416 9 .6 9 2. 55 5 19 0. 70 3. 61
2001 416 9 .6 9 2.55 4 19 0. 71 3.69
2002 417 10. 0 9 2.40 5 19 0. 96 4. 46
2003 417 9 .8 9 2. 15 5 19 0. 80 4. 11
Pooled 2080 9 .8 9 2.47 4 19 0. 78 3.92
No_inddir
1999 413 0. 1 0 0. 39 0 3 6.41 44.41
2000 416 0. 1 0 0. 52 0 3 3.94 17.98
2001 417 0 .6 0 1.05 0 5 1.46 4. 09
2002 417 2. 3 2 0. 80 0 6 0. 46 6. 22
2003 417 3. 1 3 0. 86 0 7 0. 38 5. 50
Pooled 2080 1.3 0 1.45 0 7 0. 67 2. 27
Proind
1999 412 0. 0 0 0. 04 0 0. 33 6. 93 52.88
2000 416 0. 0 0 0. 05 0 0. 33 4. 12 20. 11
2001 416 0. 1 0 0. 11 0 0. 50 1.47 4.07
2002 417 0. 2 0. 22 0. 08 0 0. 67 0. 09 5.41
2003 417 0.3 0.33 0. 06 0 0. 57 -1 .20 8.88
Pooled 2078 0. 1 0 0. 15 0 0. 67 0. 53 1. 75
Panel B Board leadership structure
D uality Type CEO-Chairman D u ality l Duality2 N one-duality Total
1 9 9 9
Freq. 82 264 32 378
Percent 21.69 69. 84 8.47 100
2 0 0 0
Freq. 60 294 38 392
Percent 15.31 75 9. 69 100
2 0 0 1
Freq. 46 320 36 402
Percent 11.44 79.6 8. 96 100
2 0 0 2
Freq. 42 321 39 402
Percent 10. 45 79. 85 9. 7 100
2 0 0 3
Freq. 46 304 57 407
Percent 11.3 74. 69 14 99. 99
P o o l e d
Freq. 276 1,503 202 1981
Percent 13.93 75.87 10.2 100
On average, there are fewer than 2 independent directors in each firm. However, as 
shown in Table 5.2, the mean of the number of independent directors has been 
increasing every year, from nearly 0 in 1999 to 3.1 in 2003. Given the stability of the 
overall board size (see the previous paragraph), the number of internal directors must 
be decreasing. The proportion of independent directors over board size ranges from
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0% to 67%, with the average of 10%, confirming the well-acknowledged argument 
that the boards of the Chinese companies are still insider dominated, see Chapter 2. 
The situation is changing over the period as more outside directors have been 
recruited. By 2003, the proportion of independent directors has increased to 30%, with 
a median of 33%.
These changes show the increased compliance in recent years with the 
aforementioned governance requirement in China. As introduced in Chapter 2, CSRC 
(2001) recommended that at least a third of the members on the board of directors of 
listed companies should be independent directors by June 2003. Many companies 
have a few independent directors but they make up a minority of the board. The 
Company Law (1993) stipulates that the shareholders’ general meeting is responsible 
for selecting and removing directors, but it does not indicate who is to nominate 
directors. Typically, independent directors are well-known to the executive directors 
(who recommend their appointment) and therefore may lack true independence from 
the executive directors (Cha 2001). As mentioned in Chapter 2, although the 
appointment of independent directors has been stressed in recent years, their roles are 
not effective in China yet (Orr 2004).
In terms of leadership structure, about 14% of the firm observations (excluding 
missing values) have the same person serving as the Chairman of the board and the 
CEO. As shown in Panel B Table 5.2 and also in Figure 5.1 the percentage of firms 
with CEO-Chairman duality has decreased over the 5 years, dropping from 21.7% in 
1999 to 11.3% in 2003 with a slight convex in 2002. This proportion is getting close 
to the figures reported in the western literature. It is also evident that another kind of
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duality is particularly prevalent, where the CEO is also the Vice Chairman of the 
board of directors or a board member. In about 76% of the sampled firms, the CEOs 
also serve as Vice Chairmen or board members. I surmise that some CEOs tend to 
shift to those board positions that are less explicit than the Chairman but can still 
ensure them to be able to influence the board. Therefore, if we judge whether a board 
is independent or not from its management by whether a CEO also serves on the 
board, only about 10% of Chinese listed companies have boards of directors’ 
independent from their CEOs. However, in 2003, the proportion of both firms with 
Duality 1 and those with Duality2 decreased while the clear separation of CEO and 
board role suddenly increased, which might be due to the effects of CSRC’s 
recommendation and the global trend of corporate governance reforms of establishing 
board independence. It is believed that by splitting the roles of the Chairman and the 
CEO into two persons the board independence would be strengthened (Cadbury 1992; 
Jensen 1993).
— —  duality 1
 ♦ — duality2
- - Non-duality
CEO Dualities
80
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Figure 5.1 CEO Dualities over time
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The findings are consistent with previous literature that formal governance structures 
of boards of directors in China are less common or less transparent than those in the 
USA and the UK (Schipani and Liu 2002; Tam 2002). The descriptive statistics in this 
sample show that the duality of CEO and board roles, as Chairman or Vice chairman, 
is common and that the boards of directors in China are insider dominated and are less 
independent from management.
5.2.3 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Table 5.3 summarises the descriptive statistics of ownership structure of the sampled 
firms from 1999 to 2003. It shows clearly that the Chinese government is still the 
major shareholder of listed companies. On average, of all the sampled firms over the 5 
years, the state owned about 32% of total shares (about 42% if only those firms 
without state ownership are excluded), rising to around 49% if the shares owned by 
SOEs are included. This confirms that the state is the dominating shareholder in the 
Chinese stock markets (Lin 2004; Schipani and Liu 2002). But these ratios have been 
declining over time, as illustrated in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2, reflecting the 
government’s efforts to reduce its intervention in enterprises.
On average, state-controlled legal persons (legal_share) own about 17% of the shares 
of sampled listed companies, private legal persons (private_share) hold about 9%, 
while foreign ownership is nearly 1% (however, this figure raises to 20.5% if those 
firms with zero foreign ownership are excluded). Given the fact that state shares and 
legal person shares are not freely tradable on the security markets, these results 
suggest that the Chinese stock markets are lacking in liquidity and may find it difficult
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to  operate efficiently (Cha 2001; Lin 2004). Given that the kurtosis of foreign 
ownership is very high (about 35) and that the usual transformations, such as the 
square root and the log, cannot improve the distribution markedly, a rank transform of 
foreign-ownership is introduced for regression analyses in later chapters. Also, 
because only 94 observations (out of 2085) have foreign ownership, I also introduce a 
dummy variable (coded 1 if a firm has foreign ownership, 0 otherwise) as an 
alternative proxy for foreign ownership to examine its effect.
State Ownership
34
33
5  3 2
5  31(O
o 30 
° 29
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Year
Figure 5.2 Percentage of state-ownership over time
Managerial ownership in the sample is very small, 0.00037% on average, which 
includes the shares owned by directors, members of supervisory board and other 
senior managers. The board of directors owns about 2/3 of the total management 
shares (0.00025% of total shares). Prima facie, it seems doubtful that this small 
amount of shares would provide sufficient incentive to executives to align their 
interests with those of the shareholders. Again, these two variables are highly skewed 
and need to be rank transformed.
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of Ownership Structure (for the definitions of the
variables, please refer to Table 4.1 in page 152, same hereafter).
Ownership (%) year N mean Median sd min max skewness kurtosis
State_Share
1999 417 33.44 35.84 26. 92 0 88. 58 0. 03 1.56
2000 417 32. 51 34. 94 26. 56 0 88. 58 0. 07 1. 58
2001 417 31.44 33.20 25.97 0 88. 58 0. 09 1.60
2002 417 30. 89 33. 10 25.82 0 88.58 0. 11 1. 59
2003 417 30. 23 31.54 25.48 0 84.98 0. 13 1. 60
Pooled 2085 31. 70 33.36 26. 16 0 88.58 0. 09 1. 59
Legal_Share
1999 417 17.05 1. 73 23.64 0 76. 02 1. 15 2.86
2000 417 16. 85 2. 37 23. 21 0 76.02 1. 15 2.86
2001 417 16. 73 2. 75 23.02 0 75.00 1. 15 2.88
2002 417 16. 72 2.41 23. 10 0 75.00 1. 14 2. 83
2003 417 16. 95 2.97 22. 89 0 74. 95 1.09 2. 73
Pooled 2085 16. 86 2. 41 23. 15 0 76. 02 1. 14 2.84
ForeignShare
1999 417 0. 94 0 4. 69 0 38.24 5.32 31.85
2000 417 0. 99 0 4. 74 0 38. 24 5.20 30. 68
2001 417 0. 91 0 4. 75 0 42. 17 5. 73 37. 50
2002 417 0.91 0 4. 75 0 42. 17 5. 74 37.55
2003 417 0. 87 0 4. 53 0 38.09 5.71 37. 16
Pooled 2085 0. 93 0 4. 69 0 42. 17 5.54 34.95
Private_Share
1999 417 8. 66 0 14. 15 0 72.90 2. 04 6. 93
2000 417 8.88 0 14. 44 0 72.90 1.99 6. 73
2001 417 8. 75 0 14. 48 0 72.90 2. 03 6. 89
2002 417 8.94 0 14. 44 0 72.90 1.94 6. 45
2003 417 9. 00 0 14. 89 0 72. 90 2.04 6. 93
Pooled 2085 8.84 0 14.47 0 72.90 2.01 6. 80
Management
Share
1999 417 0. 00067 0.00018 0.00538 0 0. 109 19.68 396. 52
2000 417 0. 00036 0. 00015 0. 00071 0 0. 007 5. 66 44. 70
2001 417 0. 00031 0. 00013 0. 00066 0 0. 006 5. 67 44. 08
2002 417 0. 00031 0. 00010 0. 00081 0 0. 009 6. 83 58.47
2003 417 0. 00021 0.00008 0. 00051 0 0. 007 8. 11 95. 73
Pooled 2085 0.00037 0. 00012 0. 00249 0 0. 109 40. 30 1757. 17
Directors’
Share
1999 417 0.00050 0.00010 0. 00464 0 0. 094 19.84 401. 10
2000 417 0. 00023 0.00009 0. 00051 0 0. 007 7. 16 75. 20
2001 417 0. 00020 0. 00007 0. 00048 0 0. 006 7. 19 72. 34
2002 417 0. 00018 0. 00006 0.00061 0 0. 009 10.22 125. 63
2003 417 0. 00012 0. 00003 0.00039 0 0. 007 13.25 223. 31
Pooled 2085 0. 00025 0. 00007 0. 00213 0 0. 094 41. 61 1834.72
HerfindahMO
1999 417 0. 26 0. 23 0. 16 0. 002 0. 78 0. 56 2. 36
2000 417 0. 25 0.21 0. 16 0. 003 0. 78 0. 63 2. 52
2001 417 0. 23 0. 20 0. 15 0.011 0. 72 0. 62 2.41
2002 417 0. 23 0. 19 0. 14 0. 006 0. 72 0. 68 2. 57
2003 417 0. 22 0. 18 0. 14 0. 006 0. 72 0. 78 2. 72
Pooled 2085 0. 24 0. 20 0. 15 0. 002 0. 78 0. 66 2. 53
The Herfindahl_10, the sum of the square of the percentage shareholding of the 
largest 10 shareholders, shows that ownership concentration has a wide range, from
0.2% to 78%, and a mean of 24% over the five years. The mean has been slowly
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decreasing over time, suggesting that ownership structure of listed firms is slowly 
getting more dispersed. However, compared to the West, the ownership structure in 
Chinese companies is still highly concentrated (Cha 2001; Lin 2004).
5.2.4 CONTROL VARIABLES
Both adjusted market value and sales, shown in Table 5.4, have a wide range, 
reducing concern that the sample might exhibit a firm size bias. The average adjusted 
market value is RMB ¥1,790 million with standard deviation of 1,710 million. Sales 
range from RMB ¥21.5 million to RMB ¥36,700 million with standard deviation of 
2,780 million. Log-transformations are used to deal with the high skewness and 
kurtosis of sales and adjusted market value.
Corporate performance can be measured by return on total asset (ROTA), Tobin’s Q, 
Adjusted mv and price-earning ratio (PEratio) respectively. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
market related performance indicators cannot reflect the reality of performance in a 
less efficient market like China; therefore ROTA will be the main measure while 
other performance measures will be used in supplementary analyses to test for 
robustness. The average ROTA over the five years is 0.7%, ranging from -998% to 
27%, while the mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.137, ranging from -0.34 to 21.13. The boxplot 
of ROTA (Figure 5.3) shows that most observations cluster around 0, with fat tails of 
very big negative numbers and extreme outliers, which might affect the regression 
effects of ROTA. Also about 40 out of the 2085 observations show negative profit,
i.e., that some firms made losses in certain years. To avoid significant data loss that 
will result from using traditional forms of data transformation or deleting outliers, a
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rank transformation of the values of ROTA (RYrota) is used for the multivariate 
analysis in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. However, the thesis also investigates the impact 
of the deletion of some extreme outliers on the results.
Table 5.4 Performance and Firm size
Variables year N mean Median sd min max skewness kurtosis
Tobin's Q
1999 417 1. 130 0. 99 0. 66 0.21 6. 63 3.37 24.94
2000 417 1.492 1. 30 0.83 0. 13 7.73 2.34 13.87
2001 417 1. 216 1.07 0. 62 0. 00 4. 43 1.84 8.47
2002 416 1.020 0. 86 1. 11 -0 .34 21. 13 14.51 261.33
2003 417 0. 829 0. 71 0. 62 0.14 9. 60 7.99 103.33
Pooled 2084 1. 137 0. 96 0. 82 -0. 34 21. 13 8.88 183. 35
Return on 
total assets
1999 417 0. 038 0. 05 0. 08 -0. 75 0. 27 -4 .33 34.48
2000 417 0. 029 0. 04 0. 10 -1 .07 0. 21 -6 .13 59.53
2001 417 0. 000 0. 03 0. 28 -3 .9 9 0. 14 -11.36 143. 77
2002 417 -0. 037 0. 02 0. 60 -9. 98 0. 18 -13.92 210. 74
2003 417 0. 005 0. 02 0. 12 -1 .5 6 0. 20 -8 .25 95.26
Pooled 2085 0. 007 0. 03 0. 31 -9. 98 0. 27 -23. 05 652. 33
Adjusted mv 
(in RMB 000,000’s)
1999 417 1390 1050 1370 163.0 17100 5.43 49.98
2000 417 2080 1590 1710 126.0 18900 3. 73 27.96
2001 417 1950 1510 1630 0.3 14800 2. 98 16. 59
2002 416 1740 1280 1590 -70 n 13500 3. 12 16.55
2003 417 1770 1160 2100 96.6 16100 3.60 18.95
Pooled 2084 1790 1310 1710 -70 18900 3.68 23.55
Sales
(in RMB 000,000’s)
1999 417 1670 1040 2320 139.0 27000 5. 54 47. 11
2000 417 1900 1220 2380 147.0 27000 5.00 40. 62
2001 417 2110 1390 2560 108.0 27400 4. 49 32.99
2002 417 2320 1480 2930 42.0 31400 4. 55 33. 62
2003 417 2630 1630 3470 21. 5 36700 4. 76 35.38
Pooled 2085 2130 1320 2780 21.5 36700 4. 97 39.97
Bitdprofit
(in RMB 000,000’s)
1999 417 83.3 58 160 -981 1550 2. 67 30. 83
2000 417 94.6 61.5 192 -716 1930 3.91 32. 55
2001 417 70.8 48.6 233 -2270 2120 -0. 23 45.69
2002 417 66.6 42.8 273 -3410 1990 -3 .33 73. 14
2003 417 99.6 43 311 -1470 2990 3.98 32.49
Pooled 2085 83 51.3 240 -3410 2990 1. 26 55.47
Total assets
(in RMB 000,000’s)
1999 417 1670 1040 2320 139 27000 5. 54 47. 11
2000 417 1900 1220 2380 147 27000 5.00 40. 62
2001 417 2110 1390 2560 108 27400 4. 49 32.99
2002 417 2320 1480 2930 42 31400 4. 55 33.62
2003 417 2630 1630 3470 21.5 36700 4.76 35.38
Pooled 2085 2130 1320 2780 21.5 36700 4. 97 39.97
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The box plot of Return on Total A sse ts
Figure 5.3 Box plot o f Return on Total Assets (Note that the outliers are so large that the 
‘box’ and the whiskers o f  the boxplot are squashed into the dark horizontal line)
Other firm characteristics such as capital structure, diversification (number of 
industries), how long a firm has been listed in the stock exchanges after IPOs (years 
of listing), industries and location are presented in Table 5.5. On average, the debt 
ratio is 0.52, with a standard deviation of 0.68 and a range from 0.01 to 23.80. This 
variable is also rank transformed because of the presence of extreme outliers and high 
skewness and kurtosis (Kane and Meade 1998). In terms of diversification, firms in 
the sample are involved in about 3 main businesses, ranging from 1 to 23. The mean 
of the number of years of listing is 6.13, ranging from 0 to 17, which is reasonable 
given that Chinese stock market came into existence in early 90s.
The remaining control variables are dummies such as location, industries and years, 
presented in Panel B Table 5.5. In terms of location, 30.5% of the total sampled firms 
are located in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. As expected, the two-way table (Panel 
B in Table 5.5) shown that, with the pooled data of 2001-2003, HPDs in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen (RMB ¥165,900) are paid RMB ¥55,300 more than those in 
other places (¥110,600) and an independent measures t-test shows that the difference 
is significant at the 1% level (t (1249) =-8.1, p<0.001).
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Table 5.5 Other control variables
Panel A Listing years, Diversification and Debt Ratio
Variables year N mean median sd min max skewness kurtosis
Listing years Pooled 2085 6.13 6 2.76 0 17 0.07 2.50
No of Industries
1999 411 2.30 2 1.62 1 11 1.62 6.28
2000 411 2.68 2 1.83 1 14 1.91 9.71
2001 415 3.02 3 1.78 1 11 1.06 4.57
2002 396 3.36 3 2.15 1 23 2.86 21.82
2003 417 2.96 3 1.82 1 10 1.08 4.18
Pooled 2050 2.86 3 1.87 1 23 1.86 11.99
Debt
1999 417 0.45 0.43 0.20 0.02 1.99 1.34 10.29
2000 417 0.47 0.46 0.23 0.01 2.36 2.68 21.73
2001 417 0.50 0.47 0.36 0.03 4.52 6.79 64.47
2002 417 0.57 0.50 0.76 0.07 10.38 9.57 107.01
2003 417 0.61 0.52 1.22 0.06 23.80 16.85 315.58
Pooled 2085 0.52 0.48 0.68 0.01 23.80 22.75 704.06
Panel B Industries and Location
Variables
Categories Code No. Of Firms Percent
Percentage of 
full sample24
HPD pay RMB 
000’s,
(Mean, 2001-2003)
Industries Agriculture Forestry Fishing and fanning 1 4 1.0% 2.2% 63.0
Construction 2 7 1.7% 1.8% 130.2
Information and 
Technology 3 40 9.6% 6.3% 157.2
Integrated 4 38 9.1% 9.4% 152.2
Manufacturing 5 181 43.4% 53.2% 107.8
Mining 6 25 6.0% 1.7% 114.2
Public Services 7 17 4.1% 2.6% 135.9
Real Estate 8 18 4.3% 3.6% 204.1
Textile 9 15 3.6% 4.8% 126.5
Transportation 10 13 3.1% 4.3% 129.4
Utilities 11 17 4.1% 4.2% 105.8
Wholesaling and 
Retailing 12 42 10.1% 5.9% 146.8
Banking and Finance 13 0 0 0 0
Location
Other places 0 290 69.5% 77.5% 110.6
Beijing, Shenzhen, 
and Shanghai 1 127 30.5% 22.5% 165.9
As listed in Panel B Table 5.5, the sample firms cover all of the 13 industries 
categorised by the Guide of Industrial Classification issued by CSRC in 2001, except 
the financial industry. It is shown that those HPDs in Real Estate, Information and
24 There were 1246 A-share listed firms in 2003 in the full sample, the sample that allowed firms to 
enter and exit during the period, see footnote 15 in page 142. This sample equals to the whole 
population o f A-share listed firms excluding those in financial industry.
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Technology, and integrated industries are paid more than those in Manufacturing, 
Utilities, and Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Farming. These results initially 
support the related arguments in Chapter 3 about the inclusion of these variables as 
control variables.
5.3 Correlation analysis
To check some of the assumptions of multi-regression analysis, namely multi­
colinearity, and also in order to initially identify the relationships between variables, 
Table 5.6 presents the correlation matrix for all the dependent and independent 
variables. HPD pay has positive and significant correlations with: REST pay, Board 
size, board structure, foreign ownership, managerial ownership, firm size (total sales 
and adjusted market value), accounting performance (ROTA), diversification, location, 
debt ratio and the years after IPOs. It also exhibits negative and significant 
correlations with the following: state ownership, ownership concentration (measured 
by Herfindahl0), market performance (PE ratios and Tobin’s Q). Supervisory board 
size, CEO duality, stated controlled legal ownership, and private legal ownership has 
negative but non significant correlations with HPD pay. Therefore, in terms of HPD 
pay, Hypotheses la, 4a and 8 are supported by the results of preliminary bi-variate 
analyses: executive pay is positively related to board size, state ownership and REST 
pay. Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 5a, and 6a relating executive pay to board composition (the 
proportion of independent directors), CEO-chairman duality and institutional 
ownership and managerial ownership are not supported. Indeed, the directions of 
correlation between HPD pay and board composition, foreign ownership and 
managerial ownership are contradictory to what are predicted.
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Similarly, REST pay is positively correlated with HPD pay, board size, board 
structure, foreign ownership, managerial ownership, firm size (total sales and adjusted 
market value), accounting performance (ROTA), diversification, location, debt ratio 
and the years after IPOs. Also, REST pay exhibits negative and significant correlation 
with ownership concentration (measured by HerfindahlO) and market performance 
(PE ratios and Tobin’s Q), as HPD pay does. CEO duality and private legal ownership 
have no significant correlation with REST pay. However, in contrast to HPD pay, 
REST pay is negatively correlated to state-controlled legal person ownership, and 
positively correlated to supervisory board size at the significance levels of the 1% and 
5% levels respectively, while the correlation between REST pay and state ownership 
becomes positive but not significant. Therefore, in terms of REST pay, Hypotheses la 
and 8 are supported by the preliminary bi-variate results. Hypotheses 5a concerning 
state-control legal person ownership is supported, but not in terms of private legal 
person ownership or foreign ownership. Other hypotheses are not supported.
These correlation coefficients provide some preliminary evidence of the explanatory 
power of the independent variables. However, bivariate correlation results are not 
fully meaningful because they do not take into account any effects other than the two 
variables being calculated and assume that other factors do not have explanatory 
power; while the literature has already demonstrated that the there are many other 
factors that jointly determine executive pay. The regression analyses in the next two 
chapters will deal with this issue.
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Table 5.6 Pearson Correlation Matrix
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
IHPDpay 1
2RESTpay 0.74*" 1
3Boardsiz 0.07" 0.16“ 1
4Size_sup -0.04 0.06" 0.3“ 1
5Proind 0 27“" 0.22“ 0 -0.03 1
6Duality1 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.08“ 1
7Duality2 0 0.01 0.03* 0.02 0.01 -0.71”
8State_sh -0.07" 0.03 0.04* 0.13“ -0.06“ -0.02
9Leg_sh -0.04 -0.09“ -0.07“ -0.07“ 0 -0.01
10Prv_sh 0 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03
11Forg_sh 0.2”* 0.11*" -0.01 -0.06“ 0.03 0.05"
12Tottopsh
ICMO ICMO -0.03 -0.02 -0.04" 0
13Dirshare 0.17- 0.14“ -0.02 -0.02 -0.04* 0
14Herf_10 -0.11“ -0.05" -0.05" -0.02* -0.08“ -0.06"
15Sales 0.33™ 0.38“ 0.16“ 0.09“ 0.16“ -0.06*
16Adj_mv 0.29“ 0.33“ 0.19“ 0.12“ 0.03 -0.01
17Rota 0.06" 0.06" 0.01 0.03 -0.07“ 0
18Peratio -0.14“ -0.13“ -0.05" -0.03 -0.02 -0.06*
19Tobins’Q -0.15"" -0.17“ -0.07“ -0.11“ -0.21“ 0.01
20No_ind 0.1“ 0.1“ 0.05" -0.01 0.09“ 0.01
21 Location 0.24“ 0.27“ 0.02 -0.05“ 0.09* -0.07"
22RYDebt 0.07“ 0.07” 0 0.02 0.01 -0.02
23Yaftipo 0.3“ 0.2“ 0.02 0.02* 0.44“ -0.07"
Note:1) ‘“ signifies the significance level of 1%, ** 5% and * for 1%;
2) For the definitions of the variables, s e e  Table 4.1 in P age 152.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1
0.03 1
0 -0.69“ 1
0.02 -0.33“ -0.23“ 1
-0.01 -0.16“ 0.08“ -0.09“ 1
0 -0.05" 0.03 0 0.11“ 1
0.01 -0.05" 0.03 -0.01 0.11“ 0.99“ 1
0.06“ 0.53“ 0.03 -0.43“ -0.09“ -0.05" -0.05" 1
0.03 0.11“ -0.1“ -0.09“ -0.09* 0 -0.01 0.12“
0.03* 0.07“ -0.09“ -0.12“ 0.04* -0.01 -0.01 0.09“
tCDOO 0.02 0.01 -0.07“ -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05"
0.05" -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
-0.01 -0.16“ 0.06“ 0.1“ -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.12*
0.01 -0.1“ 0.06“ 0.02 0 0.02 0.02 -0.09*
0.09“ 0.05" -0.06“ -0.05" 0.16“ 0.02* 0.02* 0.01
-0.05” 0.01 -0.11“ 0.15“ -0.02 0.04* -0.04" -0.15*
0.06“ -0.13“ -0.14“ 0.14“ 0.06“ -0.01 0 -0.32*
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1
0.68“ 1
0.05” 0.08“ 1
-0.08“ -0.07“ -0.34“ 1
-0.23“ -0.03 -0.42“ 0.07“ 1
0.05” 0.01 -0.05" 0.03 -0.03 1
0.07“ 0.07“ -0.01 0.05** -0.06“ 0.09*
0.08“ -0.17“ -0.17“ 0.07“ -0.25“ 0.05*
0.1“ 0.1“ -0.07“ 0.08“ -0.05” 0.11*
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The correlation matrix also reports the correlations between the independent variables. 
The results indicate that no serious problems of correlation exist between the 
independent variables, except that directors’ ownership is very highly correlated to 
management team ownership, with a correlation coefficient of 0.99, which suggests 
that these two variables might cause problems if they were put in the same regression 
models; therefore only directors’ ownership will be included for later analyses. These 
two variables should have substitute explanatory power anyway due to their 
extremely high correlation. The highest correlation coefficients for the remaining 
variables are 0.74 between HPD pay and REST pay, followed by -0.71 between 
duality 1 and duality2, and -0.69 between state ownership and legal person ownership, 
0.68 between adjusted market value and sales. These highly correlated variables will 
be observed carefully in the regression models, although they are not problematic for 
the regression model according to the rule of thumb cut-off point of a correlation 
coefficient of 0.8 (Studenmund 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell 1989). The other 
correlations are relatively low and are unlikely to cause problems of multicollinearity.
However, it should be noted that the use of simple correlation coefficients as an 
indicator of the extent of multicollinearity is limited because in multiple regressions 
groups of independent variables, acting together, might cause multicollinearity 
without any single simple correlation coefficient being higher than the cut-off point 
(Studenmund 2006). Therefore, to make sure that multicollinearity is adequately 
checked,, further tests will be conducted by estimating the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) after performing regressions.
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5.4 Summary
This chapter has reported the initial data analyses of a sample of 417 Chinese non- 
financial firms listed on the Shanghai and the Shenzhen stock exchanges over a period 
from 2001 to 2003. These 417 firms come from 12 different industries and cover a 
wide range of firm size.
Descriptive statistics are calculated to reveal the basic nature of the data. Presented in 
Section 5.2, the statistics show that many of the variables are not normally distributed. 
Although this is a common phenomenon for data related to financial ratios, certain 
kinds of data transformation are needed. Where traditional methods of transformation, 
such as the square root or the log, cannot satisfactorily solve the non-normality 
problem, rank transformation has been adopted. Though the method is less widely 
used, rank transform not only reduces the data loss problem, it also improves the 
distributions and hence increases the explanatory power and stability of the regression 
models (Kane and Meade 1998).
The descriptive statistics also show the pattern of changes in the data. For example, 
both the tables and scatter plots show that all the pay variables have been growing 
over the years. Moreover, the initial results reflect some of the effects of corporate 
governance reform in China, such as the decline of state ownership and the increase in 
the proportion of independent directors. The boards of directors of the sampled 
Chinese listed firms were working towards required independence from the executive 
managers, at least as shown by the reduction of CEO dualities and the increase of the
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proportion of independent directors. However, by the end of the sample period, the 
boards of directors were still insider dominated.
Correlation analyses were also conducted to explore the bi-variate associations 
between the dependent variables and the independent variables. The results report 
mixed support for the research hypotheses. However, these bi-variate analyses are 
preliminary in identifying relationships between variables; further analyses will be 
done by controlling the effects of other variables in later chapters.
The correlations were also calculated between independent variables to identify 
potential problems of multicollinearity. Some ownership variables such as state 
ownership and legal person ownership, and also total management ownership and 
directors’ ownership, are highly correlated. This suggests that special attention should 
be paid to their dynamics when they are put together into a regression model in the 
next chapters.
Chapter 6 will present and discuss the results of the multivariate analyses of executive 
pay level models.
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CHAPTER 6 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS-PAY 
LEVEL MODELS
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 reported the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this thesis and 
described the results of the initial correlation analyses. Chapters 6 and 7 present and 
discuss the results of multiple regression models that have been run to test the 
hypotheses developed on the determinants of executive pay in Chapter 3. The results 
of pay level models are presented in this chapter, while those for the pay change 
models are presented in chapter 7. These two chapters focus on reporting the 
empirical results. A more detailed discussion relating the results to research 
hypotheses and the literature is provided in Chapter 8.
As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis is interested in identifying the country specific 
factors that impact executive pay, both for the highest paid director (HPD) and the 
rest of management team members (REST), which in the case of China includes 
directors, senior managers and members of the supervisory board. The thesis first 
looks at the models for HPD pay. The results suggest that my focus variables, board 
characteristics and ownership structure both have significant power in explaining 
HPD pay levels. More specifically, the proportion of independent directors to board 
size, the duality of CEO and chairman roles, legal person ownership and managerial 
ownership all have positive and significant effects on HPD pay levels. The size of 
supervisory board and ownership concentration negatively impact HPD pay; whereas 
state ownership seems to have no significant effects on HPD pay. Most of the control 
variables contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the models.
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The thesis then examines the REST pay models. The results show that a number of 
common factors explain both the pay of HPDs and that of the REST. The effects of 
corporate governance are similar except the significance levels for some of the 
variables can be different. What is interesting is that the internal comparison factor 
plays an important role in terms of setting executive pay. A series of tests are 
conducted for the regression diagnostics and also to test the robustness of the results. 
These tests suggest that the models in this thesis are robust.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section reports the results of the HPD 
pay models and their robustness tests. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses of the 
REST pay level models. Section 4 discusses the effect of internal comparison factors 
on HPD pay. Section 5 sums up the results and concludes the chapter.
6.2 HPD pay level models
Chapter 3 has developed a number of research hypotheses for empirical testing. The 
models run in this chapter relate to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis la: Executive remuneration is related to the size of the board of directors 
(positive or negative).
Hypothesis lb: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is related to the size of the 
board of directors (positive or negative).
Hypothesis 2a: Executive remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of non­
executive directors.
Hypothesis 2b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of non-executive directors.
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Hypothesis 3a: Executive remuneration is positively related to CEO-Chairman 
duality.
Hypothesis 3b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is negatively related to CEO- 
Chairman duality.
Hypothesis 4a Executive remuneration is related to the proportion of state ownership 
(positive or negative)
Hypothesis 4b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is related to the proportion of 
state ownership (positive or negative)
Hypothesis 5a: Executive remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of 
legal person ownership
Hypothesis 5b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of legal person ownership
Hypothesis 6a: Executive remuneration is positively related to the proportion of 
managerial ownership.
Hypothesis 6b: Executive pay performance sensitivity is negatively related to the 
proportion of managerial ownership.
Hypotheses la, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6 a deal with the determinants of executive 
remuneration levels, which are proxied by cash pay for the HPD (HPDpay) and that 
for the REST (RESTpay). The results of regression analyses on HPD pay are reported 
in Table 6.1 and are discussed in this section, while the next section will present the 
models for REST pay. This chapter also initially tests Hypothesis 8 concerning the 
internal comparison effects on executive pay in the pay level models.
As shown in Table 6.1, several models were run to test the effects of explanatory 
variables on HPD pay. The values of the F-ratios show all four models to be 
significant at the 1% level. Model la, which only includes the log of sales, the rank of
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return on total assets and year dummies as independent variables, shows that the 
traditional agency models largely identified in the literature can explain 23.6% of the 
variance in HPD pay in China. Model 2b, which adds all the control variables, which 
explains 38.1% of the variance in HPD pay. Model lc, which is Model lb plus 
corporate governance variables, has a better overall explanatory power than Model lb, 
with R 2 improved from 0.381 to 0.420. The West-test shows that the improvement is 
significant ( F (11, 1140) = 7.33, p<0.001). Model Id adds the interaction terms 
between corporate governance variables and performance and the results show that 
most of these variables have no significant explanatory power over HPD pay and do 
not significantly increase the overall explanatory power of the model (F(8 , 1132) = 
1.12, p = 0.344). As the interaction terms in Model Id affect the individual 
coefficients, Model lc is used to as the main model to discuss the individual effects of 
the explanatory variables in more detail below. The results were run with the sample 
of 417 companies in 2001-2003, after addressing possible issues related to regression 
diagnostics, such as outliers, normality of residuals, homoscedasticity, multi- 
collinearity and model specification.
6.2.1 BOARD CHARACTERISTICS
Board size - The coefficient and t-statistics in Model lc in Table 6.1 show no 
significant effect of the log of board size on HPD pay. However, when those firms 
with a board size larger than 15 were excluded (58 observations), both raw data 
boardsize and lnboardsize show a positive and significant impact on HPD pay at the
'yc
5% level . I retested this relationship for the whole sample by including a dummy for
25 In the case of lnboardsize, t-statistics is 2.39, the adjusted R-square increases to 0.426.
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board size (Dboardsize), coded 1 for a board size between 5 to 15 and 0 otherwise, 
and found that Dboardsize has a significant positive impact on the level of HPD pay 
at the 5% level. These findings suggest that there might be a non-linear relationship 
between board size and HPD pay. To test for this, the thesis retested Model lc by 
replacing InBoardsize with Boardsize and Boardsize squared and found the 
coefficients for both variables to be significant at 1%, with a positive sign for 
Boardsize and a negative sign for Boardsize squared, suggesting that there is an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between board size and HPD pay . This finding is 
inconsistent with Rui et al. (2003) who found a negative relation between CEO pay
97and board size. My result suggests that, below a certain size (approximately 11) , 
larger boards are less efficient in controlling HPDs’ pay levels, therefore supporting 
Hypothesis la  and Boyd (1994), who found a significant explanatory power of board 
control over CEO pay. This result partly agrees with Yermack (1996), Core et al.
(1999) and Jensen (1993) etc. in that larger boards appear to be less effective. 
However, the nonlinear relation between board size and HPD pay also suggests that 
beyond a certain point (board size=l 1), an increase in board size would lead to a more 
effective board in controlling HPD pay. This finding seems to support the argument of 
Dalton et al. (1999) that the relation between board size and board effectiveness is 
complex and is determined by some other factors such as board independence.
Board composition - The coefficients for the proportion of independent directors 
over board size (Proind) are positive and significant at the 1% level, with and without 
controlling for industry effects. Thus, the higher the proportion of independent 
directors the higher is HPD pay, which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2a and the
26 Boardsize (cf=0.153, t=2.93), Boardsize squared (cf=-0.007, t=-3.18). When Boardsize and 
Boardsize square were put in the model individually, neither variable was found to be significant.
27 By simple application of calculus, pay maximizes when board size is 0.153/ (2*0.007), i.e. 11.
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findings in Rui et al (2003) and Lin et al (2005). At the first sight, this result seems 
to suggest the lack of governance efficiency of Chinese independent directors. 
However, given the special institutional situations in China, the result could be 
interpreted differently. A detailed discussion about this issue will be provided in 
Chapter 8 .
Table 6.1 HPD pay level models (Dependent variable: LnHPDpay)
Variables Model la Model lb Model lc Model Id Model le
LnRESTpay 0.576***
(25.58)
InBoardsize 0.08 0.143 -0.103
(0.91) (0.81) (-1.39)
S izesuper -0.039** -0.041*** -0.055***
(-2.53) (-2.63) (-4.84)
Proind 0.705*** 0.186 0.246
(3.07) (0.59) (1.3)
Dualityl 0.318*** 0.288** 0.29***
(3.43) (2.24) (3.95)
Duality2 0.227*** 0.218*** 0.222***
(3) (2.89) (3.84)
State_share 0.002 0 0.002
(1.04) (-0.13) (0.94)
L egalshare 0.003* 0 0.004**
(1.73) (0.13) (2.16)
RY p riv a te sh a re 0.003* 0 0.002
(1.68) (0.02) (1.48)
R Y Foreignshare 0.001*** 0 0.001
(2.78) (0.3) (1.49)
RYDirector_Share 0.001*** 0 o**
(5.56) (1.37) (2.35)
Herfindah_10 -0.362* -0.414* -0.251
(-1.73) (-1.93) (-1.45)
InSales 0.245*** 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.042**
(15.09) (6.09) (6.34) (6.17) (2.36)
RYRota 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001 0.001***
(5.48) (7.94) (6.85) (-0.39) (6.39)
lnAdjusted_mv 0.198*** 0 197*** 0.198*** 0.09***
(5.51) (5.66) (5.65) (3.15)
No_indus 0.032*** 0.024** 0.022** 0.01
(3.08) (2.37) (2.22) (1.41)
Location 0.221*** 0.17*** 0.172*** -0.018
(4.97) (3.55) (3.54) (-0.45)
RYDEBT 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.22) (3.91) (3.87) (3.52)
YearsafterlPO 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.042***
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Variables Model la Model lb Model lc Model Id Model le
(5.24) (4.97) (4.75) (5.35)
lnBoardsize*RY rota 0
(-0.24)
Proind*RYRota 0.003**
(2.15)
Duality 1 *RYRota 0
(0.21)
State*RYRota 0
(1.04)
Legal*RYRota 0
(1.17)
Private*RYRota 0
(1.04)
Ry foreign * R YRota 0
(0.98)
RYDirectorshare*RYRota 0*
(1.69)
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes yes
cons 6.416*** 3.791*** 2.647*** 3.106*** 0.49
(19.4) (7.21) (4.58) (4.45) (1.0)
No. of obs. (N) 1236 1211 1172 1172 1154
F-ratio 92.6*** 43.2*** 314*** 25.2*** 74.69***
R 2 0.236 0.381 0.420 0.421 0.655
MacKinnon & White (1985) HC3 heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parenthesis 
Significance level: *<=0.10, **<=0.05, ***<=0.01 
Coefficient 0 means less than 0.001
Ns are different due to the missing values in the newly added variables
For the definitions of the variables, please refer to Table 4.1 in Page 155, same hereafter.
Board leadership - The coefficients for duality 1 (CEO and Chairman) and duality2 
(CEO being also a Vice Chairman or a member of the board) are both positive and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that directors in firms with either of these two 
types of duality are paid more compared to those without. This finding is inconsistent 
with Cheung et al. (2005), who observed a negative relationship between CEO duality 
and CEO cash compensation, and Conyon (1997a), who found that separating the 
roles of chairman and CEO did not play significant roles in shaping director’s pay. 
But this finding supports Hypothesis 3a and the majority of previous findings (Core et 
al. 1999; Cyert et al. 2002; Sridharan 1996). This positive relationship can be
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explained by the argument that when governance is weak, the CEOs, being also the 
Chairmen, are in a powerful position to entrench the companies by overpaying 
themselves (Core et al. 1999; Jensen 1993). It could also be because having two roles 
in one means more responsibilities and higher demand on the CEO’s capability and 
efforts, from a human capital perspective, which in turn entitles the CEO to be paid 
more.
Supervisory Board Size-The size of supervisory board has a negative and significant 
impact on HPD pay, which suggests that more supervisors bring more monitoring and 
constraints on executive pay. This runs counter to the findings of previous studies that 
have found that the supervisory board was a non-functioning mechanism in China 
(Cha 2001; Xiao et al. 2004).
6.2.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
State ownership -  The coefficient for state ownership is negative but non significant, 
no matter whether it is measured by the proportion of shares held by just the state 
share (state_share), state-controlled legal persons, or the sum of the two. Therefore 
Hypothesis 4a is not supported. The non-significant result is quite similar to the sparse 
literature that has examined the impact of state ownership on executive remuneration 
(Firth et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2005). However, Lin et al. (2005) reported a significant 
positive relation between state ownership and executive remuneration, but the 
significance only existed when their data was analyzed using firm fixed effects 
models, not when analyzed by individual fixed effects models. My results also 
support some other previous studies on other related topics, such as Gul and Zhao
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(2000) and Hovey et al (2003), who found that state ownership did not have 
significant power in explaining variations in firm performance. The non-significant 
relationship might be due to the offsetting effects I discussed when developing the 
hypothesis in Chapter 3. On the one hand, firms with a higher proportion of state 
shares are more likely to experience pressure from the State to keep down executive 
compensation in order to maintain equivalent pay levels between executives and 
bureaucrats in the government hierarchy and to avoid social unrest (Firth et al. 2006). 
On the other hand, firms with higher state ownership are more likely to suffer from 
management entrenchment and overpay their executives due to inefficient monitoring 
by the main shareholder—the state (Berkman et al. 2002; Zou and Xiao 2005).
Legal person ownership -  After controlling for other factors, state-controlled legal 
person’s share (legal share) and private legal person’s share (private_share) are both 
positive and significantly related to HPD pay at the 10% level. I also combined these 
two variables into one variable, domestic legal person share, and tested its effect; the 
results remained broadly similar. Foreign ownership has a positive and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level , indicating that firms with larger proportions of foreign 
shares pay their directors more, possibly because foreign investors exert pressure to 
hire better quality executives and to do so requires a higher rate of pay (Firth et al 
2006). Therefore, my findings show that companies with larger shares held by 
institutions pay their directors more, which is counter to the prediction of agency 
theory that external blockholding will lead to closer monitoring of executives’ actions 
and lower compensation (Mehran 1995). Hypothesis 5a is therefore not supported.
28 The raw data of the proportion of foreign shares is highly skewed, with a kurtosis of 31. Square root 
and log transformation did not improve the distribution much; hence rank transformation was 
employed. The overall results were similar for the raw data and the different transformations I 
employed.
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Contrary to what is predicted in Hypothesis 5a, firms with more legal person shares 
seem to pay HPDs more. I retested the hypothesis by substituting the three individual 
categories of legal shares with institutional shares (the sum of the three), and the 
coefficient is positively significant at 1%, with other variables unaffected.
Managerial ownership - The coefficients for total directors’ shareholdings are 
positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the larger the board ownership 
the higher the HPD pay. The finding does not support hypothesis 6 a and is not 
consistent with the incentive alignment predicted by agency theory. It also suggests 
that managerial share ownership is not a complementary element to cash 
compensation in Chinese listed firms. This result is opposite to that reported by 
Goldberg and Idson (1995), but is consistent with the findings of Holdemess and 
Sheehan (1988), Chung and Pruitt (1996) and Cheung et al. (2005). If this is not 
caused by the proportion of shares held by managers being too small to have any 
incentive effect, this result might suggest that the more shares managers have, the 
more likely they are in a position to entrench the company and extract higher pay. 
Cheung et al. (2005) found that this positive relationship did not result from a positive 
link between managerial ownership and performance, in contrast to Chung and Pruitt 
(1996), and therefore they suggested that entrenched managers may be using their 
ownership rights to extract higher salaries for themselves. This could hold, especially 
in the presence of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors, 
which is more likely to be the case in small firms.
Ownership concentration- In terms of ownership concentration (Herfindalh lO), it 
has a negative impact on HPD pay at the 10% level. This negative relation is as
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expected and is consistent with previous literature and agency theory (Goldberg and 
Idson 1995; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Under 
agency theory, individuals are self-interest seeking. Therefore, the fewer shares 
shareholders hold, the less likely they are to monitor the firm, especially when they 
have to bear the cost of monitoring while sharing its benefits with others (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). When the shares are concentrated in a few shareholders’ hands, it is 
more likely for these larger shareholders to exercise effective monitoring. First, being 
large stakeholders, they are more motivated to monitor; second, they are likely to 
have the capability to monitor, especially if they are institutional investors. As a 
consequence, it is more difficult for the management team in firms with concentrated 
ownership to entrench the firm by overpaying themselves.
6.2.3 CONTROL VARIABLES
Firm performance -  As discussed in Chapter 4, firm performance can be measured 
by accounting performance and market performance both commonly used in the 
literature (Clarkson 1995; Firth et al 1999). Model lc presented in Table 6.1 was run 
with accounting performance-retum on total asset (ROTA). However, the model was 
also tested with other accounting measures and market related measures (Tobin’s Q 
and Price-Earning Ratio). The different accounting measures provide consistent 
results. The coefficient of the rank transformation of return on total asset (b=0.001) is 
significant at 1% (see Table 6.1), a result that holds for the other accounting 
performance proxy: profit before interest, tax and dividend (Bitdprofit) . This finding
29The coefficient for the rank-transformed Bitdprofit is positive at the 1% significant level. The R 2 of 
the model is 0.420, similar to that in Model lc.
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is consistent with the prediction of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and 
previous literature (Lin et al. 2005; Rui et al. 2003).
However, the results are different when market performance measures are used. When 
price-earning ratios (PEratio) are included, the coefficient between the rank 
transformed PEratio and HPD pay is negative and significant at the 1% level, and also 
the coefficient of state_share becomes positive and significant at the 5% level, while 
all the legal person ownership proxies become positive and significant at the 1% level. 
No indus is not significant. When Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy, either in its raw form 
or as log or rank transformation, the coefficients are not significant. When firm size is 
measured as the adjusted market value of the firm, the coefficients for the log of 
Tobin’s Q or the rank of Tobin’s Q (RYTobin’sQ) become negatively significant at 
the 1% level. The correlation between InSales and InTobin’sQ is -0.52, suggesting 
that the market does not favour large-sized firms. Given the possibility that the market 
price does not reflect the reality of firm performance in China (Qiang 2003), I 
consider that the robust results with accounting performance measures are more 
meaningful than those with the market related measures.
Firm Size -  The log of sales (LnSales) is significantly positively correlated with HPD 
pay, a result that is robust to the use of different proxies (adjusted market value or 
total assets) for the other variables and different model specifications, and this is 
consistent with most previous literature (Boyd 1994; Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003; 
Jensen and Murphy 1990a; Kostiuk 1990; Lambert et al. 1991) which also found a 
positive relationship between firm size and executive compensation, see also a meta 
analysis by Tosi et al. (2000). The coefficient 0.14 between LnSales and LnHPDpay
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in Model lc suggests that if firm A is 1% bigger than firm B, the HPD in firm A will 
be paid approximately 0.14% more .
Capital Structure - The coefficient for capital structure (measured by either total 
debt over total assets or equity) is positively significant at 1%. Because raw data had 
high skewness and kurtosis, rank and cubic root transformations were used (Kane and 
Meade 1998), and the results for the transformed variables are similar. Thus, as firms 
become more geared, they become more exposed to financial risk, and therefore they 
need to pay risk-adverse executives more.
Location -  The coefficient of the Location dummy is significant and positive at the 
1% level; thus companies located in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen pay their HPD 
more. This result is consistent with the report of White Paper on Chinese 
Entrepreneurs (WPCE) (SRIC 2003) that executive pay is much higher in these 
bigger cities. This result could be due to the relatively greater scope for competitive 
job opportunities for executives and also the higher cost of living in these three cities 
compared to the rest of China, an argument that is analogous to a “London weighting” 
for salaries in the UK.
Diversification -  The effect of number of industries on HPD is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, implying that greater firm diversification results in greater 
complexity for which executives should be rewarded with higher pay. However, it is 
contradictory to the argument that due to the lower risk of executive unemployment in
30 The precise value is (1.01)0'14-1=0.1394%
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more diversified firms (Amihud and Lev 1981), executives would not be offered 
higher pay.
Firm age -  The number of years a company has been listed since its IPO 
(YearafterlPO) has a positive and significant impact on HPD pay at the 1% level, 
indicating that the longer the firm has been listed the more the HPD is paid. Newly 
listed firms attract more monitoring from regulators, investors, and the media, 
suggesting more caution in offering higher pay to executives. Also, the longer a 
company has been listed, the more likely it is that its HPD has been employed by the 
company for a time long enough for him/her to consolidate his/her power-base 
amongst his peers, his subordinates and the market, and hence commands more pay. 
However, due to data limitations, this thesis is not able to examine the impact of HPD 
tenure on pay to clarify the precise nature of the mechanism here.
Industry differential -  The inclusion of industry dummies marginally improves the 
explanatory power of the models. Overall, compared to those working in wholesaling 
and retailing industries HPDs serving in integrated industry and transportation are 
paid more, while those working in manufacturing and utilities tend to be paid less. 
HPDs working in, integrated, IT, transportation and construction industries receive 
higher pay compared to those in manufacturing industry.
Year Dummies - The significance levels of year dummies for 2001 and 2002 vary a 
little across different models, but the negative sign holds, suggesting that as expected, 
HPDs were rewarded more in 2003, compared to 2001 and 2002. The signs of the
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coefficients are consistent with the trend shown by the descriptive statistics that on 
average, the HPD pay has gone up every year as one might expect.
6.2.4 INTERACTION TERMS
The results of Model Id (which adds interaction terms between governance variables 
and firm performance to Model lc) in Table 6.1 are related to Hypotheses lb, 2b, 3b, 
4b, 5b, 6 b concerning whether the existence of a certain governance mechanism 
increases pay-performance sensitivity. The R 2 of Model Id is 0.421, compared to 
0.420 in Model lc. The result of a Wald test (F (8 , 1132) = 1.12, p = 0.344) shows 
that adding the interaction terms does not significantly improve the overall 
explanatory power of Model lc. Only two of the interaction terms have a weakly 
significant impact.
The interaction term between RYRota and the proportion of independent directors is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. This provides some support for Hypothesis 2b 
that a higher proportion of independent directors leads to a stronger pay-performance 
link. The interaction term between RYrota and RYDirectorshare is positive and 
significant at 1 0 %, suggesting that firms with higher director shares have stronger 
executive pay-performance link. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b and 6 b are supported, 
though weakly. Other interaction terms have no significant impact, therefore 
Hypothesis lb, 3b, 4b, 5b are not supported. The board size and ownership structure 
seem not to affect the pay-performance sensitivity. These results are inconsistent with 
those reported in Firth et al. (2006), who found that firms whose controlling 
shareholders were legal persons used more incentive pay schemes. However, their
203
CHAPTER 6 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS-PAY LEVEL MODELS
finding only held when firm performance was measured by operating income, not in 
the case of shareholders’ wealth. Also, Firth et al (2006) used dummy variable for 
legal person ownership. The different definitions might account for the different 
findings in my study from theirs. These findings will be further discussed in Chapter 8 .
6.2.5 INTERNAL COMPARISON EFFECTS
One of the research aims of this thesis is to examine the internal comparison effects 
on executive pay. To test for these effects, the level of the pay for the rest of the 
management members other than the three highest paid directors (REST pay) was 
introduced into Model lc to produce Model le. As shown in Model le in Table 6.1, 
the inclusion of REST pay significantly improves the explanatory power of the model. 
The R 2 increases from 0.420 (Model lc) in Model lc to 0.655. The coefficient of the 
log of REST pay is significant at 1%, with a t-value of 25.58. However, some of the 
other independent variables become less significant or even not significant. For 
example, the coefficient of sales and that for managerial shares become significant at 
5%, rather than 1% in Model lc, while location and firm diversification become non­
significant even at the 10% level. This instability in the model gives rise to the 
suspicion of the presence of an endogeneity problem caused by the possibility that 
HPD pay and the rest of the management pay are simultaneously determined by the 
other independent variables. To deal with this issue, I partial out the effect of these 
variables before putting the level of REST pay into the model, which will be 
discussed Section 6.4.
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6.2.6 REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS
6.2.6.1 Regression Diagnostics
After running Model lc originally, a series of checks were conducted for regression 
diagnostics. First, some outliers were identified with the help of the leverage versus 
residual-squared plot (lvr2 plot) and the model was re-estimated by deleting the few 
outliers (5 firms in this case); this resulted in R 2 improving from 0.394 to 0.42, 
without any substantial changes in the effects of the explanatory variables.
The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test was run to test for possible 
heteroskedasticity and a slight heteroskedastisity problem was identified (x (1) = 5.15, 
p= 0.023). MacKinnon and White (1985) hc3 correction was therefore used to address 
this problem as suggested by Long and Ervin (2000). The residuals versus fitted 
values plot (Figure 6.1) shows that the variance of residuals is quite homogenous after 
the correction.
re s id u a ls  v e r su s  fitted v a lu e s  plot
Fitted va lu es
Figure 6.1 Residuals versus Fitted Values Plot of Model lc
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A Shapiro-Wilk W test was run to test for the normality of the residuals of the final 
model lc, the results (W = 0.998, p = 0.103) suggest that the residuals of the model 
are normally distributed. The Shapiro-Francia W' test provided similar results 
(W=0.999,p=0.169)31.
Also, to ensure that there is no multicolineality problem, variance inflation factors 
(VIF) were calculated after every regression. I did not find any evidence of 
problematic collinearity in the models, as the VIFs for all the models (except model 
Id due to the use of interaction terms) are all less than 1 0 , given that “a maximum 
VIF greater than 10 is thought to signal harmful collinearity” (Mason and Perreault 
1991). For example, the highest VIF in Model lc is 8.11 and the mean is 2.24, as 
shown in Table 6.2. However, to ensure that the inclusion of state ownership and legal 
person ownership (the two variables with high bi-variate correlation coefficient 0.69 
and the maximum VIFs) in the same model does not bias the results, I re-estimated 
the model by putting these two variables in the models individually and retested the 
above models. The results show that this is not a problem (in none of the models is the 
coefficient of state ownership significant, while legal person ownership is positive at 
10% level, the results for other variables remain similar). This thesis also included 
Duality 1 and Duality2 (correlation coefficient =0.71, see Chapter 5) both separately 
and as a combined variables, and found the results no significantly different from 
earlier results.
31 The null hypothesis for both these tests is that the distribution is normal.
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Table 6.2 Table of VIFs for Model lc
Variable VIF 1/VIF
State_share 8.11 0.123340
Legalshare 6.37 0.157015
Year2001 3.92 0.255229
Manufacture 3.78 0.264683
Proind 2.84 0.352264
Private_share 2.80 0.356687
Herfindah~10 2.69 0.371766
LnAdjusted_mv 2.59 0.386495
InSales 2.51 0.398786
IT 2.00 0.501002
Integrated 1.99 0.502238
Duality 2 1.97 0.507472
Duality 1 1.96 0.510282
YearafterlPO 1.83 0.547899
Mining 1.80 0.556063
RYDebt 1.69 0.593420
Utilities 1.67 0.598209
Year2002 1.65 0.606654
Realestate 1.60 0.623574
Publicservices 1.58 0.631402
Location 1.46 0.686968
RYrota 1.45 0.690647
Transportation 1.45 0.691724
Textile 1.43 0.701011
Construction 1.27 0.788016
InBoardsize 1.22 0.821442
Sizesuper 1.22 0.821845
R YD i rectorshare 1.18 0.849813
Agri_for_fish_farm 1.16 0.863233
RYforeignshare 1.16 0.863744
No_indus 1.10 0.910558
Mean VIF 2.24
Moreover, scatter-plots of the residuals against predictors were also used to check for 
nonlinearity after estimating linear regression models. Some adjustments were made 
to the model if there was a problem. For example, having spotted a non-linear pattern 
of the relationship between board size and HPD pay, I used lnboardsize in the model
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instead of board size, and then replaced lnboardsize with boardsize and boardsize to 
check for the possibility of a downturn effect. A link test for model specification and a 
Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables were performed. Basically, these tests are 
set to test for the Null Hypotheses that there is no specification error/omitted variables 
in the model. Both tests failed to reject Ho (p-value= 0.87 and p-value=0.34 
respectively). Therefore, Model lc seems to be correctly specified.
6.2.6.2 Endogeneity
Finally, it has been argued that if there is an endogeneity issue in an OLS model, the 
estimates would be inconsistent, as some of the effects of the error would be wrongly 
attributed to the regressors (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1970), therefore it is important 
to investigate this issue in my OLS models. Though most of the variables used in the 
thesis are exogenous, there are two possible sources of endogeneity related to the 
relationship between firm performance and executive pay that might cause bias in the 
estimates. The first source is related to the argument that both pay level and firm 
performance might be simultaneously determined by the other independent variables 
in the model, as previous literature has reported some significant results for the effects 
of corporate governance on firm performance (Brickley et al. 1994; Holdemess et al. 
1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This is less worrying as no serious multicollinearity 
problem has been found in the model. The other source arises from the ambiguous 
causal relationship between executive pay and firm performance, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Although the results discussed above provide strong evidence that HPD 
pay is positively related to firm performance, one could argue that those HPDs who 
are paid more might exert more efforts so that their firms perform better. Therefore,
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the alternative interpretation is that pay is a reward for better performance; or it is an 
incentive to entice managers to perform.
To address the endogeneity problem, a two-stage least-square (2SLS) is adopted to re- 
estimate the model. However, as argued by Wooldridge (2002b), the 2SLS estimate is 
less efficient than OLS when the explanatory variables are exogenous due to the 
presence of very large standard errors, therefore, it is useful to have a test for 
endogeneity of an explanatory variable first to see whether 2SLS is even necessary. I 
followed the procedures suggested by Wooldridge (2002b) and first tested whether 
firm performance is an endogenous variable using 2SLS method. To assist the 
discussion below, Model lc, Equation (1), is recalled:
LnHPDpayit = Po Pi Performancejt + P2 LnSaleSit + P3 Boardsizejt + P4 ProNedit + P5 
Duality^ + p6 StateOwn* + p7 LegalOwn^ + Ps PrivateOwnjt + P9 
ForeignOwnu +pioManageOwnjt+ XPcControlCjt + X5tDt +Sjt 
for i=  1,2, . . . ,N ; t=  1,2, ...,T  (6.1)
Sjt is the error term. To test whether firm performance is endogenous or not, I 
identified last year’s firm performance (performancejt-1) as an instrumental variable 
(IV) since it fulfils the properties of an IV: performancejt-i is exogenous in equation 
(6.1) as the HPD pay and the governance mechanism this year would not affect the 
performance of last year and that it is correlated with this year’s performance (the 
correlation coefficient for RYrota and RYrota_l is 0.71, significant at <0.001 level) 
(Wooldridge 2002b). Therefore, a reduced form of the equation of a suspected 
endogenous variable can be written as followed:
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Performanceit = Po +  P i  Performancejt. 1 + P2 LnSalesjt + p3 Boardsizejt + P4 ProNedjt + 
P5 Dualityit + P6 StateOwnjt + P7 LegalOwnjt + ps PrivateOwnjt + P9 ForeignOwnjt 
pioManageOwnjt + £  pcControlCjt + X5tDt+Ujt For i = 1, 2, . . N; t
= 1,2, T (6.2)
Performancejt-1 is the firm performance in year t-1, while the other variables are the 
same as in equation (6.1). Therefore, if the residuals of the two equations, Ujt and 8 jt) 
are correlated, firm performance is endogenous in Model lc, and OLS estimates 
would be biased and thus a 2SLS should be preferred; otherwise, 2SLS would not be 
necessary (Wooldridge 2002b). The results show that the correlation between Ujt and 
Sjt (both heteroskedasitcity robust) is not significant (coef= -0.031, p =0.288) and thus 
there is no worrisome endogeneity problem for in the original estimation of the
39models used here . Therefore, the OLS regress is consistent and preferred.
6.2.6.3 Fixed Effects Models
As planned in Chapter 4, I further estimated the effects of the main dependent 
variables with panel data techniques—fixed effects model and random effects model 
-  to control for unobserved and time-constant firm effects. The Hausman test was run 
to decide whether a fixed or random effects model is more appropriate to treat the 
error structure (Baltagi 2001; Hausman 1978). The estimates with random effects 
model are more efficient under the null hypothesis of the Hausman test. But if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, random effects estimates are inconsistent and fixed effects
321 retested HPD pay level Model lc using both 2SLS and OLS method and ran a Hausman test 
afterwards, the result of the Hausman test shows that the estimates by these two methods are not 
significantly different at the 5% level (x2 (1)=3.15, p = 0.08).
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estimates which are consistent should be used. Because fixed effects regression 
requires variation in independent variables over time, those variables which are 
constant over time should be excluded: location, firm age, and industry dummies. 
Year dummies were retained in order to control for time effects (e.g. macroeconomic 
impacts).
The results of the Hausman test (x2 (18) = 52.81, p < 0.0001) show that random 
effects model is inconsistent; therefore the fixed effects model is used. The results of 
the fixed effects model show that firm effects are significant (F (410, 743) =8.01 ,P <  
0.0001) indicating that fixed effects models are more efficient than OLS models with 
pooled data. The results show that within-firm variations of the model can explain 
33.6% of HPD pay variation (R2within =0.336). The coefficients for Sales, ROTA, and 
Adjusted_mv remain positive and significant at the 1% level while year dummies 
have negative and significant coefficients at 1%, similar to the results in Model lc, 
showing a significant and positive relation with HPD pay at the 5% level, the other 
governance variables are all non-significant. These results are different from those in 
Model lc, in which board structure, supervisory board size, duality dummies, foreign 
ownership, legal ownership, private legal ownership and ownership concentration all 
have significant impacts.
The discrepancies in results between fixed effects models and cross-sectional OLS 
models are similar to those found in Himmelberg et al. (1999). By comparing the 
results of OLS models and panel data models, they found that a large fraction of the 
cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and that, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and
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firm fixed effects, the significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance found in OLS models become non-significant. They also explained that 
the non-significant result might be due to the lack of variation in the ownership data.
The governance variables used in this thesis also vary very little over time (most of 
the within-variable correlations between years are greater than 0.8, especially those 
for the ownership variables33). Insufficient variation in a variable can adversely affect 
statistical power, resulting in Type II errors (failing to reject a null hypothesis when 
the null hypothesis is false), a point that has been made in connection with fixed effect 
panel models (Greene 2003; Stock and Watson 2003). This might explain the 
divergence between the results of the fixed effects model and those of Model lc. As 
the purpose of this thesis is to identify the individual effect of these governance 
variables, OLS models are used as main models, though the firm specific effects 
should also be borne in mind.
6.2.6.4 Other Robustness Tests
I substituted other commonly used firm performance measures (such as net earnings 
per shares and return on equity separately) for return on total assets or adjusted market 
value for total sales as firm size, and debt equity ratio for total debt over total asset 
ratio as a capital structure measure, and Herfindahl_5 for Herfindahl_10 as ownership 
concentration measures. The results remain robust to the use of these different proxies. 
I repeated the analysis using lagged independent variables and the results remain
33 The variations in the levels of state ownership, legal ownership, private legal ownership and foreign 
ownership between years are less than 2%, which is not difficult to understand, given state shares and 
legal person shares are not freely tradable in China, as introduced in Chapter 2.
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broadly consistent with those shown in Table 6.1 except that the R 2 of the lagged 
models is slightly lower (0.379 when lagging all independent variables and 0.398 
when only InSales and RYrota were lagged, compared to 0.420 in Model lc without 
lagging), and the coefficient for Herfindalh_10 loses its significance, though the sign 
remains unchanged.
Also, the 417 sample firms were selected from those firms that have the continuous 
data for HPD pay from 2001 to 2003; thus my results might suffer from survivorship 
bias. However, Chen and Ezzamel (2006) have tested for this issue and their results 
showed that the survivorship bias does not cause serious problem in this case34. In 
addition, to correct for the possible autocorrelation of OLS standard errors, Model lc 
was re-estimated with Stata’s “cluster” option selected. The results are not 
substantially different from the OLS robust standard errors estimates. Only the 
significance levels of a few variables vary: Duality2 and foreign ownership change 
from 1% to 5%, while the coefficient for the legal person ownership becomes non­
significant, which was marginally significant at 10% in the reported Model lc without 
the “cluster” option. Actually, except for a higher R 2, the results with the “cluster” 
option are very similar to the results estimated with the full sample in Chen and 
Ezzamel (2006).
Because of the rapidly changing nature of the Chinese economy, I repeated the
analysis on a yearly basis to explore the possibility of model change over time. While
34 Chen and Ezzamel (2006) ran the models with a larger sample of 2819 observations from 2001 to 
2003 (compared to 417* 3=1251 previously), which allowed firms to enter and exit the dataset. Their 
results were more or less the same as those reported in my fixed 417 sample, except that: taking model 
lc as an example, legal ownership was not-significant; herfmdahl lO was negatively significant at 1%;
No indus and RYdebt both were less significant, at 10% and 5% respectively; and R2 reduced to 
31.8%, compared to 0.420 for the original 417 sample. As they explained, these differences might be 
due to the more noisy data in the larger sample as firms were bom or died during the period.
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the explanatory power of the general model across the years is quite similar, ranging 
from 0.411 to 0.435, with 2001 having the highest R 2, only the effects for dualityl, 
RYDirectorshare, LnSales, RYRota and lnAdjusted_mv remain consistently the same. 
The significance levels for other factors vary across years, suggesting that the 
importance of determinants of executive remuneration fluctuates, though slightly, 
over time. However, this lower significance might just be caused by the smaller 
sample size, which automatically reduces power.
6.3 The rest of management pay models
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the research interest of this thesis lies not only in 
examining the setting and dynamics of the HPD pay, but also in investigating the 
determination and dynamics of the pay of other management members. To fulfill this 
research interest, I ran similar regression models on the rest of management pay, such 
as Model lc and Model Id by substituting HPD pay with the total pay for the rest of 
board and management other than the highest paid directors. Therefore Model lc-Rest 
and Model ld-Rest is simply the RESTpay version of Model lc and Model Id (Model 
lc plus the interaction terms).
To investigate the possible effects of the internal comparison factor, several models 
were run by including the HPD pay variables into Model lc-Rest respectively, first 
the log transformation of absolute pay level of HPD pay (Model le-Rest), then the 
residual of Model lc (ResidHPD) which takes out the simultaneous determination 
effects of other factors (Model lf-Rest), and finally both Resid HPD and the square
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term of Resid HPD (Model lg-Rest) to detect the non-linear function of Resid HPD. 
The empirical results of these models are presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 REST Pay Level Models (Dependent variable: InRESTpay, 2001-2003)
Variables Model lc-Rest Model Id-Rest Modelle-Rest Model lf-Rest Model lg-
InHPDpay 0.7***
(24.64)
ResidJHPD 0.7***
(24.64)
0.726***
(26.92)
ResidJHPDsq 0.121***
(3.19)
InBoardsize 0.306*** 0.44** 0.195** 0.252*** 0.276***
(2.91) (2.33) (2.42) (3-11) (3-42)
Size_super 0.021 0.02 0.056*** 0.029** 0.025**
(1.2) (1.16) (4.51) (2.32) (2.03)
Proind 0.818*** 0.654* 0.298 0.792*** 0.766***
(3.32) (1.89) (1.47) (3.91) (3.74)
D ualityl 0.039 0.155 -0.154** 0.068 0.092
(0.4) (1.08) (-1.98) (0.86) (1.17)
Duality2 -0.022 -0.03 -0.164*** -0.005 0.026
(-0.29) (-0.38) (-2.73) (-0.07) (0.43)
State_share 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0 0
(0.27) (-0.59) (-0.54) (0.14) (0.05)
L eg a lsh a re 0 -0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.001
(-0.02) (-0.5) (-1.74) (-0.57) (-0.63)
Private_share 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.57) (0.17) (-0.7) (0.46) (0.55)
RYforeign_share 0.001* -0.002 0 0.001*** 0.001***
(1.77) (-1.56) (0.88) (2.67) (2.69)
R Y directorshare 0.001*** 0.001** 0*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(5.32) (2) (2.95) (7.54) (7.51)
Herfindahl_10 -0.232 -0.244 0.071 -0.182 -0.182
(-0.99) (-1.04) (0.37) (-0.94) (-0.96)
Lnboard*RYrota 0
(-0.62)
Proind*RYrota 0.001
(0.77)
D ualityl *RYrota -0.001
(-1.28)
State*RYr ota 0
(1.01)
Legal*RYrota 0
(0.66)
Private* RYrota 0
(-0.56)
RY foreign *RY rota 0**
(2.43)
RYDirect*RY rota 0
(0.81)
InSales 0.158*** 0.16*** 0.069***
q  J 7 * * * 0.172***
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Variables M odellc-Rest______Modelld-Rest Model le-Rest Modellf-Rest Model lg-Rest
(5.63) (5.61) (3.37) (8.44) (8.5)
RYrota 0.001*** -0.001 0 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.22) (-0.56) (-1.57) (4.46) (3.96)
InAdjustedmv 0.211*** 0.205*** 0.046 0.184*** 0.18***
(4.51) (4.39) (1.43) (5.73) (5.74)
Noindus 0.022* 0.02* 0.006 0.023*** 0.024***
(1.81) (1.65) (0.73) (2.64) (2.8)
Location 0.332*** 0.329*** 0.22*** 0.339*** 0.348***
(6.51) (6.37) (5.17) (8.07) (8.34)
RYDebt 0.001** 0.001** 0 0.001*** O***
(2.21) (2.22) (-0.25) (2.99) (2.82)
YearafterlPO 0.016 0.017 -0.018** 0.018** 0.018**
(1.42) (1.49) (-2.05) (2.2) (2.18)
Industries yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
cons 3.708*** 4.201*** 2.121*** 3.974*** 3.939***
(5.08) (4.66) (3.85) (7.35) (7.31)
No. of obs. 1161 1161 1158 1158 1158
F-ratio 26.11*** 20.49*** 63.57*** 63.57*** 69.37***
R 2 0.384 0.385 0.644 0.644 0.651
■ MacKinnon & White (1985) HC3 heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics
■ Significance level: *<=0.10, **<=0.05, ***<=0.01
in parenthesis
■ Coefficient 0 means <0.001 
 ■ No. of observations are different due to some missing values of new introduced variables
6.3.1 MODEL 1C-REST
Model lc-Rest is based on Equation 6.1, but using the log of REST pay as dependent 
variable.
LnRESTpayit -  (3o Pi Performance^ + 02LnSalesjt + 03 Boardsizejt + 04ProNedjt + P5 
Duality it + 06 StateOwnjt + 07 LegalOwnu + 08 PrivateOwnu + 09 ForeignOwnjt +0iO 
ManageOwnit + X Pc ControlCit + X^tDt +£it
For i = 1, 2, ..., N; t = 1, 2, ..., T (6.3)
By comparing the results of Model lc-REST with those of Model lc, the differences, 
if any, between the determination of HPD pay and that of the rest of management pay 
can be identified.
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6.3.1.1 Board Characteristics
As can be seen from Table 6.3, the effect of board structure (Proind) on REST pay is 
similar to that on HPD pay: REST pay is positively related to the proportion of 
independent directors, at the 1% significant level. The coefficient of lnboardsize has a 
positive and significant impact on REST pay at 1%, which is different from that in 
Model lc (the coefficient of lnboardsize in Model lc is not significant)35. Supervisory 
board size has a positive, but not significant, impact. Dualityl has a positive 
coefficient with REST pay while Duality2 has a negative coefficient, but neither is 
significant, and these non-significant results are robust both when Dualityl and 
Duality2 are entered into the model separately, and when they are combined and 
entered as a single variable (Duality 12).
6.3.1.2 Ownership Structure
The impact of managerial ownership on REST pay is similar to that on HPD pay: 
director ownership has a positive relation with REST pay at 1%. However, the 
coefficient of foreign ownership is only significant at the 10% level (instead of 1% as 
in Model lc) though the sign remains positive. Other ownership variables, state 
ownership, legal person ownership, and private legal ownership and Herfindah_10, 
have no significant effects on REST pay.
2Replacing lnboardsize with boardsize and boardsize gives similar significant results to what is obtained when 
testing for HPD pay, the coefficients and t-statistics for the two variables are 0.191 (3.44) and -0.008 (-2.94) 
respectively, suggesting that there is a downturn of the association between board size and executive pay.
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6.3.1.3 Control Variables
The effects of firm performance, size, market value, diversification, location dummy, 
and debt ratio remain as those on HPD pay. LnSales, ROTA, Adjusted mv, No_indus, 
location and the debt ratio all have significant and positive impact on REST pay. The 
significance level for debt ratio is weaker in terms of REST pay, at the 5% level 
compared to 1% in Model lc. Firm age (YearafterlPO) still has a positive, but non­
significant coefficient. This difference can be explained by the argument that HPDs 
are the figure heads answering for the successes or failures of the firm, so the 
correlation of their pay and firm risks is stronger. Both the coefficients for the two 
year dummies are negative, confirming the increase of pay over the years, but neither 
of them is significant. The industrial dummies also have significant explanatory 
power. Generally speaking, compared to firms in the wholesaling and retailing 
industry, those firms in IT, Transportation and Real Estate industries reward higher 
pay to their management; while those in Utilities, Manufacturing, Mining and 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Farming pay less.
6.3.1.4 Further Checks
Robustness tests and regression diagnostics were also undertaken to test the fit of the 
Model lc-Rest. First, analyses were done with and without outlier observations (3 
firms are identified as outliers by leverage versus residuals squared plots), the results 
are robust, with no substantial changes in R 2 with or without outliers (0.381 and 
0.384 respectively). The results reported in Table 6.3 are those with outliers excluded.
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Both the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test (% (1) = 0.01, p = 0.912) and the 
residuals versus fitted values plot show that there is no serious heteroskedasticity in 
Model lc-Rest. However, even if there were a small degree of heteroskedasticity, it 
would have been addressed by the robust and MacKinnon and White (1985) hc3 
correction when the model was estimated. Although the residuals of model lc-Rest 
fail to satisfy the Shapiro-Wilk W test (W=0.996, p=0.008) or Shapiro-Francia W’ 
test (W’=0.997, p= 0.02) for normality, the high W-value (W’=0.996) and also the 
skewness and kurtosis (skewness=-0.214 and kurtosis=2.94) show that departure from 
normality is only minor and not practically significant, as shown in the kernel density 
plot of the residuals in Figure 6.2. After all, few large datasets are likely to be judged 
to be normally distributed by a sensitive test such as the Shapiro-Wilk W test. With 
large N this test can detect very small departures from normality, though these small 
departures in a large data set might not be practically significant (Chen et al 2006; 
Ezzamel and Mar-Molinero 1990).
o -
R esiduals
— Kernel density estim ate
- Normal density
Figure 6.2 the distribution of residuals of Model lc-Rest
219
CHAPTER 6 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS-PAY LEVEL MODELS
The calculation of variance inflation factors (VIFs) suggests that multicollinearity is 
not problematic: the highest VIFs are 8.35 for State_share and 6.43 for Legal_share. I 
retested the model by including these two variables individually and estimated their 
effects separately. Separately, the effects of these two variables are still not significant 
and the results of the other variables remain similar, which confirms that even 
including these variables in the same model does not bias the estimation. Finally, 
Model lc-Rest stands the specification tests: both the Link test (p-value=0.649) and 
the Ramsey RESET test (p-value=0.31) could not reject the null hypothesis that the 
model is correctly specified.
6.3.2 INTERACTION TERMS
Model ld-Rest adds the interaction terms between the governance mechanisms and 
firm performance to Model lc-Rest. The results, in Table 6.3, show that the inclusion 
of the interaction terms does not bring a significant increase in the AR2 (F (8, 1121) =
1.21, p = 0.287): The R 2of  Model ld-Rest is 0.385, compared to 0.384 in Model lc- 
Rest. Only the interaction term between RYrota and RYforeign_share is positively 
correlated with rest management pay at the 5% level. Firms with higher foreign 
ownership or state ownership are more likely to use performance-based pay schemes 
when setting pay for rest management members other than the HPDs. None of the 
other interaction terms has a significant effect. Therefore, in terms of REST pay, only 
Hypothesis 5b is supported, while none of the Hypotheses lb, 2b, 3b, 4b, and 6b is 
supported.
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6.3.3 INTERNAL COMPARISON EFFECTS ON REST PAY
In this section, I discuss the effects of HPD pay on REST pay to explore how the 
internal comparison pay level impacts executive pay. Three models have been run, all 
based on Model lc-Rest. Model le-Rest is Model lc-Rest with HPDpay included as 
an independent variable. Model lf-Rest replaces HPDpay with the residuals of Model 
lc of HPD pay level (Resid_HPD), which partials out the effects of the observed 
common factors of HPD pay and REST pay. Model lg-Rest adds the square term of 
Resid_HPD to explore the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
Resid HPD and REST pay.
6.3.3.1 Model le-Rest
Model le-Rest incorporates the internal comparison factor- HPD pay level into model 
lc-Rest. The results reported in Table 6.3 show that the overall explanatory power of 
the model is substantially improved:/?2 increases to 0.644 compared to 0.384 in 
Model lc-Rest and this AR2 is significant (F (1, 1125) = 607.01, p <0.001). 
LnHPDpay has a significantly positive coefficient with REST pay at 1% (t =24.64, 
P<0.001). Therefore, Hypothesis 8 is supported: HPD has a significant impact on 
REST pay. The coefficient of 0.7 implies that an increase of 1% in HPD pay will lead 
to an increase of about 0.7% in REST pay. However, as shown in the table, the 
inclusion of InHPDpay substantially affects the results of other variables due to the 
fact that HPD pay and REST pay are simultaneously determined by the other 
explanatory factors in the model so that the impact of individual variables in Model 
le-Rest could be misleading. To address this problem, I separated the effects of the
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explanatory factors by taking out the effects of the other factors on HPD pay by using 
the residuals from Model lc (Resid_HPD) rather than the HPD pay in Model lf-Rest. 
Thus, endogenous variable HPD pay is replaced by the exogenous variable -- 
Resid_HPD, and the results are discussed below.
6.3.3.2 Model lf-Rest
The results of Model lf-Rest, also reported in Table 6.3, show that the overall 
explanatory power of Model lf-Rest remains the same as that of Model le-Rest ( R 2 
=0.644), so do the coefficients and t-statistics of the internal comparison factor (here 
the residual of HPD pay Model lc). Therefore, even the filtered HPD pay level has a 
positive and significant relationship with REST pay.
The increase in the explanatory power of Model lf-Rest over Model lc-rest can be 
explained by two factors contained in Resid HPD. The first factor is the benchmark 
effect of the internal comparison factor, HPD pay, which is likely to be compatible 
with business practices. The directors, when setting the pay for other senior managers 
in the firm, are likely to want to observe social equity and comparability among the 
management team in order to reduce internal conflicts. The other factor relates to 
those variables which might have been missed out in other models but are caught in 
the residuals of Model lc, such as immeasurable firm specific factors. Therefore 
introducing Resid_HPD into the model increases the overall explanatory power. The 
other 34.6% of variance of REST pay, which cannot be explained by Model lf-Rest, 
might be due to executive individual effects and other measurement errors.
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The effects of most of the other factors in the Model lf-Rest remain similar to Model 
lc-Rest except that some variables become more significant. For example, foreign 
ownership, No_indus and RYDebt are all now significant at the 1% level instead of 
10%, 10% and 5% respectively in Model lc-Rest; the previous non-significant effects 
of supervisory board size and the number of years after IPO now become significant 
at the 5% level.
As mentioned before, robustness tests and regression diagnostics were conducted for 
every regression model. The specification tests for Model lf-Rest detected that there 
might be a model specification problem as the Ramsey RESET test (using powers of 
the fitted values of InRESTpay) rejects the Ho that the model has no omitted variables 
( F(3, 1122) = 5.52, p = 0.0009). As the modeling of other variables seemed to pose 
no problems in Model lc-Rest, the specification errors might be caused by the newly 
included variable- Resid_HPD. There might be a nonlinear association between 
InRESTpay and Resid_HPD. Therefore, I tested for this possibility by adding the 
square term of Resid_HPD (Resid_HPDsq) to Model lf-Rest and created Model lg- 
Rest.
6.3.3.3 Model lg-Rest
As shown in Table 6.3, the overall explanatory power of Model lg-Rest over REST 
pay is R 2 =0.651, compared to R 2 =0.644 in Model lf-Rest. The coefficients for both 
Resid HPD and Resid HPDsq are positive and significant at 1%, with bigger t- 
statistics for Resid HPD (t=26.92) and smaller t for Resid_HPDsq (t=3.19), 
suggesting that there is a positive association between REST pay and Resid_HPD and
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there is a U-shaped association between the two. Compared to Model lf-Rest, there is 
a significant marginal contribution from the additional variable Resid HPDsq: F (1, 
1124) = 10.2, p<0.001. Also, Model lc-Rest passed both the Link test (p=0.58) and 
the Ramsey RESET omitted variable test (p = 0.138). Therefore Model lg-Rest is a 
better fit than Model lf-Rest. The results for other variables are similar to those in 
Model lf-Rest, except that the year dummy Year2001 becomes significant at 10%.
6.4 The effect of internal comparison factors on HPD pay
Model le in Section 6.2.5 exhibits a significant relationship between REST pay and 
HPD pay, however, due to the simultaneous determining problem, the individual 
coefficients of the model are biased. Also, the results in Section 6.3.3 show that HPD 
pay has a significant impact on REST pay as well. Therefore, the internal comparison 
effects might be reciprocal. This section further discusses the effects of the internal 
comparison factor on HPD pay taking out the endogenous effect of REST pay. To 
distinguish from the models for REST pay, the models run in this section are named 
Model le-HPD (the same as Model le in Table 6.1), Model lf-HPD, and Model lg- 
HPD and the results are reported in Table 6.4.
6.4.1 MODEL 1E-HPD AND MODEL 1F-HPD
As discussed in Section 6.2.5, Model le-HPD use the log of REST pay as a proxy of 
the internal comparison factor. The endogeneity of REST pay leads to inaccurate 
estimates of the individual effects of the independent variables. Therefore, Model lf- 
HPD avoids this problem by using the residuals of Model lc-Rest (Resid_REST). The
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results in Table 6.4 indicate that the overall explanatory power of Model lf-HPD is 
equal to that of Model le-HPD. Again, the inclusion of ResidREST significantly 
increases the explanatory power of Model lc, R 2 increases to 0.655 from 0.420 in 
Model lc. Resid_REST is positively and significantly related to HPD pay at 1% 
(t=25.58), which implies that HPD pay increases with REST pay.
As shown in Table 6.4, since Resid REST is independent from any other explanatory 
variables, the estimates of other variables are less affected; therefore, the results of 
other variables in Model lf-HPD are not very different from those in Model lc, 
except that the significance of some variables becomes stronger: the coefficient for 
supervisory board size and that for No_indus are now significant at thel% level, 
instead of 5% in Model lc; while those for Legal_share and Herfindalh_10 are 
significant at 5% instead of 10%, and those for both year dummies become significant 
at 5%, while in Model lc only Year2001 is significant at 10%. The signs of all the 
coefficients remain unchanged.
6.4.2 MODEL 1G-HPD
Similar to Model lg-Rest, Model lg-HPD adds the squared term of Resid_REST 
(Resid_RESTsq) to Model lf-HPD, which brings a significant increase in the 
explanatory power of Model lg-HPD ( R 2 =0.665) compared to Model lf-HPD 
( R 2 =0.655) ( F(l, 1120) = 25.04, p< 0.0001). The coefficients of Resid_REST and 
Resid_RESTsq are both positive and significant at 1%. Therefore, HPD pay is 
positively associated with REST pay and the association between the two variables is
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non-linear: there is a U-shape in the association. The results of other variables are 
similar to Model lf-HPD and therefore are not repeated.
The results of Model le-HPD to Model lg-HPD suggest that in terms of HPD pay, 
Hypothesis 8 is supported. There is a positive relationship between REST pay and 
HPD pay, with a U-shaped element. This finding is consistent with previous findings 
in Ezzamel and Watson (2002) and O'Reilly et al. (1988) in that when the board of 
directors set executive pay, they refer to the pay situations within the firm. This issue 
will be further discussed in Chapter 8 after I test Hypothesis 8 with pay change 
models in Chapter 7.
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Table 6.4 HPD pay level models (Dependent variable=LnHPDpay, 2001-2003)
Variables Model le-HPD Model lf-HPD Model lg-HPD
LnRESTpay
R esidR E ST
0.576***
(25.58)
0.576*** 0 .6 ***
Resid_RESTsq
InBoardsize -0.103
(25.58)
0.075
(28.08) 
q i i 9 ***
(5.00)
0.071
(-1.39) ( 1 .0 1 ) (0.98)
S izesuper -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.042***
(-4.84) (-3.79) (-3.74)
Proind 0.246 0.719*** 0.736***
(1.3) (3.8) (3.91)
Dualityl 0.29*** 0.315*** 0.323***
(3.95) (4.3) (4.55)
Duality2 0 .2 2 2 *** 0 .2 1 1 *** 0.23***
(3.84) (3.64) (4.03)
State_share 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2
(0.94) (0.99) (1.05)
Legal-Share 0.004** 0.003** 0.004**
(2.16) (1.99) (2.05)
Private_share 0 . 0 0 2 0.003* 0.003**
(1.48) (1.9) (2.09)
RYforeign_share 0 . 0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 ** 0 .0 0 1 ***
(1.49) (2.52) (2.62)
R Y D irectorshare o** 0 .0 0 1 ***
***ooo
(2.35) (6 .8 8 ) (6 .8 8 )
Herfindah_10 -0.251 -0.372** -0.402**
(-1.45) (-2.14) (-2.31)
InSales 0.042** q 139* * * 0.14***
(2.36) (8 .0 2 ) (8.08)
RYrota 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 ***
(6.39) (9.01) (8.71)
lnAdjusted_mv 0.09*** 0.198*** 0.197***
(3.15) (6.98) (7.18)
N o indus 0 . 0 1 0.023*** 0.023***
(1.41) (3.13) (3.22)
Location -0.018 0.173*** 0.182***
(-0.45) (4.32) (4.56)
RYDebt 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 1 ***
(3.52) (5.26) (5.25)
Y earafterlPO 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(5.35) (6.49) (6.51)
Indus dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
_cons 0.49 2.802*** 2.703***
( 1 .0 ) (5.88) (5.74)
No. of obs. 1154 1154 1154
F-ratio 74.69*** 74.69*** 80.23***
R 2 0.655 0.655 0.665
■ MacKinnon & White (1985) HC3 heteroskedastisity-consistent t-statistics in pa
■ If a coefficient is 0, it means that the coefficient is small than 0.001.
■ Significance level: *<=0.10, **<=0.05, ***<=0.01
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6.5 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter has presented and discussed the empirical results of the impact of 
corporate governance on the pay level of executives in Chinese listed companies, 
using a sample of 417 firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
over a period from 2001-2003. Multiple regressions were run separately for HPD pay 
and the pay for the rest of management as dependent variables. Although there are 
some nuances, I found that HPD pay and REST pay are determined by some common 
factors.
In terms of the board of directors, the results consistently show that there is an inverse 
U-shaped association between executive pay and the size of the board of directors. 
This is an interesting result as it does not support agency theory, nor does it support 
the argument of previous studies drawn from resource dependence theory (Dalton et 
al. 1999). However, my findings support the argument of Dalton et al. (1999) that the 
effect of board size is complicated and is moderated by other factors such as board 
independence, board roles and firm size. Further research is needed in order to 
thoroughly understand the relationship between board size, board effectiveness and 
executive pay. The results also show that both HPD pay and REST pay are positively 
related to the proportion of independent directors, which runs counter to the 
prediction of agency theory. It seems that in China’s context, independent directors 
are inefficient in monitoring top management, which supports previous studies (Peng 
2004). As discussed in Chapter 2, independent directors lack the legal backup, formal 
incentives, and sometimes the ability to performance the duties expected (Cha 2001). 
However, given that Chinese executives are known as generally underpaid, the results
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might be instead interpreted as that the independent directors help to bring executive 
pay to the level that the executives deserve. Consistent with Agency theory, I found a 
positive relationship between CEO and chairman duality and HPD pay, but duality 
has a lesser impact on rest of management pay.
In the case of ownership structure, the results show that state ownership has no 
significant impact on executive pay which seems to be consistent with the literature 
that reports on the inefficiency of state ownership (Chen 2001). I also found positive 
and significant relations between HPD pay and the proportion of domestic legal 
person ownership, foreign ownership and managerial ownership, results which do not 
support agency theory. But the impact of legal ownership is less significant when 
considering REST pay. While the impact of managerial ownership is complex in the 
western literature, the monitoring effect of institutional ownership is quite consistent. 
Given the quite consistent result in the literature on China of a positive effect of 
institutional ownership on firm performance, caution should be exercised in 
interpreting my result. Instead of management entrenchment, it might just be because 
those firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to employ more 
competent directors and therefore pay them more (Firth et al. 2006). Unfortunately, 
the data does not allow me to further explore this issue.
Moreover, the results show a significant impact of the internal comparison factor. The 
inclusion of the internal comparison factor substantially improves the explanatory 
power of the models. HPD pay and REST pay have a positive and significant 
relationship, even after the effects of other factors are partialed out. Therefore, a quid
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pro quo arrangement between directors and management is suspected and should be 
further investigated in the pay change models.
To sum up, the results suggest that some corporate governance mechanisms have a 
significant impact on executive pay; however, these effects are not all consistent with 
the hypotheses. Hypotheses la, 3a, 2b, and 8 are supported, which suggest that board 
size, CEO-chairman duality and the internal comparison factors all have significant 
impacts on executive pay, and that higher proportion of independent directors lead to 
stronger executive pay-performance sensitivity. Hypothesis 5b and 6b receives partial 
support that higher foreign ownership and managerial ownership leads to stronger 
executive pay-performance linkage, but other legal person ownership types have no 
such effect. Hypotheses lb, 3b, 4a, and 4b receive no support, which indicate that 
board size, CEO-chairman duality and state ownership have no significant impacts on 
executive pay-performance sensitivity and that state ownership does not impact 
executive pay significantly either. In addition, this thesis provides contradictory 
evidence for Hypotheses 2a, 5a and 6a: the proportion of independent directors, 
institutional ownership and managerial ownership are all positively related to 
executive pay. These findings are further discussed in Chapter 8.
It should be noted that executive individual characteristics are not captured due to 
data limitation, which might have an important impact on executive pay. Further, 
although the significant effects of internal comparisons were identified, the causal 
process is difficult to detect.
Next chapter presents and discusses the results of the executive pay change models.
230
CHAPTER 7 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES - PAY CHANGE MODELS
CHAPTER 7 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES - PAY 
CHANGE MODELS
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 presented the results of the multivariate models of executive pay levels. 
This chapter reports the results of the first difference models, which explain the 
determinants of changes in pay. As discussed in Chapter 4, first difference models 
help control for special conditions that apply to specific companies which otherwise 
are either difficult or impossible to identify or measure (Wooldridge 2002a).
Similar to the analysis in Chapter 6, I estimate the first difference models separately 
for HPD pay and REST pay. Again, the results show that there are common factors 
determining pay adjustments for both HPDs and the rest of management team. 
However, the relative importance of these factors differs between HPD pay 
adjustment and REST pay adjustment.
This chapter also replicates and extends the models of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 
2002) in the Chinese context, to test Hypotheses 7a, 7b, 8 and 9. The thesis first 
follows their design by using the traditional principal-agent executive pay estimate as 
the external and internal benchmarking pay levels. The results support the hypotheses 
that both external and internal comparison factors are important in explaining 
executive pay adjustments, although there are also differences in the way they impact 
in my sample compared to the Ezzamel and Watson’s UK sample. The thesis then
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extends the Ezzamel and Watson models by introducing the effects of corporate 
governance and other control factors. The results of the pay level models in Chapter 6 
have shown that the inclusion of governance variables and control variables 
significantly increased the overall explanatory power of the models. The more 
variance of executive pay can be explained by the estimate model, the less noisy the 
estimation of the pay anomalies (the residuals of the estimate model) will be, which in 
turn will better reflect the effects of pay comparison factors. My results show that the 
models with extensions have higher overall explanatory power compared with the 
models that duplicate Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the results 
for the HPD and REST pay change models. Section 3 presents the results of modeling 
the external and internal comparison effects following Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 
2002). Section 4 introduces extensions to Ezzamel and Watson models and discusses 
the impact of the extensions. Finally, Section 5 contains discussion and a conclusion.
7.2 First difference models of executive pay
Table 7.1 reports the results for the pay dynamics models, taking the changes in the 
(natural) log of HPD pay and of REST pay as the dependent variables. Model 2a only 
includes the year dummies and the variables most commonly assumed by the 
literature to affect executive pay: the change in log of sales (ChlnSales), the changes 
in the rank of return on total assets (ChRYRota), and the change in log of adjusted 
market value (ChlnAdjusted_mv). Model 2b adds to Model 2a the lagged variables of 
board characteristics (LnBoardsize_l, Size_super_l, Duality 1_1) and ownership
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structures (State_share_l, Legal_share_l, RYforeign_sha_l, RYDirectorshare_l and 
H erfm dahllO l). Model 2c adds to Model 2b other lagged control variables in the 
pay level models, namely No_indus_l, Location, RYDebt_l, Yearaftipol and 
industry dummies. Model 2a-Rest, 2b-Rest, and 2c-Rest are the same models as 
Model 2a, 2b, and 2c but with the changes in REST pay as the dependent variable. 
Year dummies are included in all the models to control for macroeconomic effects. 
The results show that all these models are statistically significant at the 1% level 
except for Model 2c-Rest (at 5%).
7.2.1 HPD PAY CHANGES
As can be seen from Table 7.1, Model 2a explains just below 5.9% of the variance in 
the changes in HPD pay. All the explanatory variables and the constant are positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Changes in Sales, changes in return on total assets and 
changes in market value all have explanatory power over HPD pay changes. The 
positive signs of the coefficients for year dummies show that the magnitude of change 
in HPD pay in 2003 is smaller than that of 2001 and 2002. This model returns slightly 
better results, in terms of variance explained, compared to the counterpart models 
used by Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) and Firth et al. (2006) which explained 
only l%-3% of the variance in CEO pay changes. The positive relationship between 
pay changes and the change of performance is consistent with agency theory in that 
shareholders attempt to align managers’ interests with theirs by tying managers’ 
reward to firm performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
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Table 7.1 Executive Pay Change Models (Dependent Variable: HPD pay
Changes REST Pay Changes)
Variables
HPDPAY REST PAY
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c
Model
2a-Rest
Model
2b-Rest
Model
2c-Rest
ChlnSales 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.158*** 0.087 0.082 0.055
(3.16) (3.19) (3.19) (1.57) (1.52) (1.08)
ChRYRota 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0* 0 0
(3.15) (2.75) (2.89) (1.67) (1.4) (1.45)
ChlnAdjustedmv 0.125*** 0.126** 0.111** 0.183*** 0.19*** 0.189***
(2.67) (2.35) (2.19) (2.88) (2.7) (2.68)
LnBoardsizel -0.031 -0.046 -0.099 -0.155*
(-0.45) (-0.63) (-1.21) (-1.85)
Size_super_l -0.013 -0.013 -0.006 0
(-1.13) (-1.01) (-0.45) (-0.01)
P ro in d l -0.024 0.037 0.33 0.273
(-0.13) (0.19) (1.46) (1.28)
Dualityl_l -0.13** -0.127** -0.082 -0.059
(-2.33) (-2.14) (-1.29) (-0.9)
State_share_l -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.6) (-0.56) (0.31) (0.35)
Legal_share_l -0.001 -0.001 0 0.001
(-0.36) (-0.37) (0.11) (0.23)
Private_share_l 0 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.32) (0.38) (0.39) (0.75)
RYForeign_share_l -0.001** -0.001 0 0
(-2.14) (-1.41) (0.41) (0.25)
RYDirectorshare_l 0** 0** 0 0
(-2.35) (-2.51) (-0.91) (-0.2)
Herfindahl_10_l 0.181 0.193 0.019 0.117
(1.06) (1.05) (0.09) (0.49)
No_indus_l -0.005 -0.009
(-0.66) (-0.96)
Location -0.009 -0.061
(-0.2) (-1.29)
R Y D ebtl 0 0
(-0.77) (0.87)
Y earafterlPO l -0.002 0.008
(-0.23) (0.73)
Industry dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
_cons 0.168*** 0.548*** 0.619** 0.128*** 0.252 0.263
(7.53) (2.8) (2.48) (4.75) (0.93) (0.85)
N 878 844 821 858 825 802
F-ratio 9.37*** 3.96*** 2.25*** 6.09*** 2.39*** 1.68**
R 2 0.059 0.068 0.062 0.034 0.035 0.024
■ MacKinnon & White (1985) hc3 heteroskedasticity-corrected and robust standard error t-statistics in parentheses
■ Significance levels: * for p<0.10; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01
■ Coefficient 0 means <0.001
■ Ns are different across models due to some missing values in the newly introduced variables__________________
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The results of Model 2b show that most of the governance variables have no 
significant impact on changes in HPD pay except that foreign ownership, director 
ownership and CEO-Chairman duality are all negatively and significantly related to 
the change in HPD pay at the 5% level. This suggests that HPD pay increases less in 
firms with CEO-chairman duality, and those with larger proportions of shares held by 
foreign investors or directors. The R 2 increases from 0.059 in Model 2a to 0.068 in 
Model 2b and a Wald test shows that this increase in R 2 is significant and these 
governance variables taken together have statistically significant additional 
explanatory power: F (10, 828) = 2.24, p = 0.014. The lack of significance for the 
ownership variables might be due to the lack of variation in their data, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. The results for other variables are not substantially different from those of 
Model 2a except that the significance level for changes in Adjusted_mv is 5% and 
that for both year dummies is 10%.
The results in Model 2c show that none of the additional control variables has a 
significant impact on explaining HPD pay dynamics and that the inclusion of these 
variables slightly decreases the explanatory power of the model. Overall, Model 2c 
explains only 6.21% of changes in HPD pay. The signs and significance levels of the 
variables are similar to those in Model 2a except that the coefficient for foreign 
ownership becomes non-significant.
7.2.2 REST PAY CHANGES
Table 7.1 also reports the results for the first models of REST pay. As mentioned 
earlier, Model 2a-Rest, Model 2b-Rest and Model 2c-Rest are just the REST pay
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change version of Model 2a, Model 2b and Model 2c. Although all these models are 
significant as indicated by the F-ratios, their overall explanatory power is much lower 
than their counterpart models for HPD pay changes. For instance, the R 2 of Model 2a- 
Rest is only 0.034, compared with 0.058 in Model 2a. The inclusion of the 
governance variables and other variables does not significantly affect the results. On 
the contrary, the inclusion of these variables reduces the overall explanatory power of 
the model: the R 2 of Model 2c-Rest is only 0.024 and only significant at the 5% level. 
Most of the variables are not significant except for board size in Model 2c-Rest, 
which has a negative impact on the change in REST pay, but is only significant at the 
10% level, suggesting that REST pay increases more in firms with smaller boards of 
directors.
Across the models, the coefficient for ChlnAdjusted_mv is positive and significant at 
1%. The changes in Sales and in return on total assets have no significant impact on
REST pay changes, which indicates that REST pay changes are not related to the
'1 /:
changes in either size or return on total assets , except in Model 2a-Rest where the 
coefficient for ChRYRota is positively significant at 10%. This finding is different 
from that for HPD pay changes. Again, both year dummies are positive and 
significant.
36 The results reported in Table 8.1 are after the standard heteroskedasticity and robust corrections. In 
the OLS model, Chlnsales and ChRYrota are significant at 5% and 10% respectively, but the results are 
not robust to heteroskedasticity corrections.
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7.3 Replicating the Ezzamel and Watson models (1998; 2002)
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) were among the first to empirically test the 
influence of external labour market and within-board pay comparisons upon the pay 
awards of the CEO and other board members. They demonstrated a significant 
increase in the explanatory power of the models estimated by including the pay 
comparison factors. As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the aims of this thesis is to 
retest and extend the models developed by Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) using 
my Chinese sample, to see whether the models they developed in the UK can be 
equally applied to the transitional economy of China. This section replicates the 
models of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), by estimating the comparison pay 
levels using the traditional agency pay models, i.e. Model la and Model la-Rest in 
this case, regressions of HPD and REST pay on firm size and firm performance (see 
Chapter 6). Then the next section will examine whether and to what extent the 
inclusion of governance variables affects the findings. For these reasons, the 
following analyses rely heavily on Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002).
7.3.1 THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL PAY COMPARISON FACTORS
The thesis imports the concept of external pay comparison from Ezzamel and Watson 
(1998; 2002) and examines its effects on executive pay dynamics in China. 
Hypothesis 7a states that executive remuneration is positively related to the external 
market pay level: pay anomalies explain subsequent-period pay changes; while 
Hypothesis 7b presumes that the strength of the pay adjustments towards the external 
market pay level is greater for those underpaid executives than for those overpaid
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ones. The empirical results are reported in Table 7.2, which are the results after
37‘robust hc3’ corrections and with two outlier firms excluded .
7.3.1.1 External Comparison Factors and HPD Pay Changes
To indicate the difference that the pay anomaly variables make upon the ability to 
explain changes in HPD pay, the traditional principal-agency pay change model was 
used as a benchmark, reported as Model 3a (=Model 2a), which has been discussed 
above and is only able to explain a small proportion of the variance in HPD pay 
changes, R 2 = 0.059. Building on Model 3a, Models 3b, 3c, 3d and 3e incorporate pay 
anomaly variables. Following Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), I first proxy pay 
anomaly as the previous year’s residuals of the within-sample firm size and 
performance estimate in Model la, i.e., the traditional agency executive pay level 
model. Later, in Section 7.4, all these will be retested using Model lc (Model la plus 
governance variables and control variables, see Chapter 6). To support Hypothesis 7a 
and 7b, pay anomalies should have a negative sign and also the magnitude of the 
coefficient for underpaid anomalies should be greater than that for the overpaid 
anomalies.
37 For every model run, a leverage-versus-residuals plot was produced to identify possible outliers. The 
results reported are after outlier firms were excluded. However, except for those specially mentioned 
cases in my analyses, the results reported, other than the adjusted R-squared, are not significantly 
different from those with outlier firms included.
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Table 7.2 External Comparison Factors and Executive Pay Changes (Dependent variable: HPD pay changes and REST pay changes)
HPD PAY REST PAY
Variable Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e Variable
Model
3a-Rest
Model
3b-Rest
Model
3c-Rest
Model
3d-Rest
Model
3e-Rest
ChlnSales 0.154*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.169*** ChlnSales 0.087 0.115* 0.099* 0.082 0.083
(3.16) (3.95) (3.93) (3.89) (3.76) (1.57) (1.65) (1.66) (1.43)
ChRYRota 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** ChRYRota 0* 0* 0* 0* 0
(3.15) (3.24) (3.24) (3.27) (3.3) (1.67) (1.65) (1.73) (1.93) (164)
ChlnAdj_mv 0.125*** 0.102** 0.102** 0.103** 0.108** ChlnAdj_mv 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.193*** 0.181***
(2.67) (2.38) (2.38) (2.41) (2.48) (2.88) (3.12) (3) (3.32) (2.85)
Re_HPDa_1 -0.245*** Re_RESTa_1 -0.110**
(-10.12) (-2.23)
OverHPDa_1 -0.237*** -0.134 OverRESTa_1 -0.04 -0.129
(-5.84) (-1.19) (-0.48) (-1.55)
UnderHPDa_1 -0.251*** -0.218** UnderRESTa_1 -0.215*** -0.042**
(-5.53) (-1.97) (-3.64) (-2.04)
OverHPDa2_1 -0.089 -0.209*** OverRESTa2_1 0.013 0.001
(-1.09) (-8.25) (0.29) (0.01)
UnderHPDa2_1 -0.028 -0.149*** UnderRESTa2_1 0.017 -0.076
(-0.42) (-5.68) (0.27) (-1.24)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
_cons 0.168*** 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.152*** 0.17*** _cons 0.128*** 0.124*** 0.08* 0.109*** 0.012**
(7.53) (7.72) (5.88) (4.59) (7.67) (4.75) (4.50) (1-77) (2.75) (2.53)
N 878 878 878 878 878 N 858 851 851 851 851
Equation F 9.37 25.28 22.97 17.95 23.33 Equation F 6.08 6.20 6.55 5.94 4.03
F-ratio 0 0 0 0 0 F-ratio 0 0 0 0 0.0002
R 2 0.059 0.193 0.193 0.193 0.182 R 2 0.034 0.066 0.067 0.071 0.046
■ MacKinnon & White (1985) hc3 heteroskedasticity-corrected and robust standard error t-statistics in parentheses
■ Significance levels: * for p^0. 10; ** for p^0. 05; *** for psSO. 01
■ Coefficient 0 m eans <0.001
■ Ns are different due to som e missing values in the newly introduced variable(s)
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As shown in Table 7.2, the explanatory power of the models with respect to pay 
changes is greatly improved by the inclusion of the pay anomaly variable(s). Model 
3b includes pay anomalies experienced by HPD in the previous year (R eH PD al),
which increases t h e ^ 2 from 0.059 in Model 3a to 0.193. This change in R2 is 
significant (F (1, 871) = 102.4, p < 0.0001). The pay anomaly variable has a 
significant and negative impact on changes in HPD pay, which is consistent with the 
prediction of Hypothesis 7a and the findings of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) 
that external comparison does play an important role in determining executive pay 
adjustments. Moreover, the significant results justify the attempt to further test 
whether the adjustments in HPD pay are different with respect to whether a HPD is 
underpaid or overpaid in the previous year compared to the market level.
Model 3c is designed to serve this purpose, splitting the pay anomaly variable into 
two variables: one for overpaid HPDs (OverHPDal), equal to pay anomalies if 
anomalies are greater than 0, otherwise 0; and the other for underpaid HPDs 
(UnderHPDa_l), coded as pay anomalies if pay anomalies are less than 0 and 0 
otherwise. The estimated coefficients of the two variables are both significant and 
negative as anticipated by Hypothesis 7a. Hence prior period pay anomalies have a 
significant impact upon subsequent pay awards to both underpaid HPDs and overpaid 
HPDs. However, the difference between the magnitude of the two coefficients of 
UnderHPDa l (Cu = -0.251) and OverHPDa l (Co = -0.237) is not significant (F = 
0.03, p = 0.853). Moreover, splitting the pay anomaly variable into two does not 
improve the overall explanatory power of the model. Thus these results support 
Hypothesis 7a, but not Hypothesis 7b.
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To further investigate this issue, Model 3d follows Ezzamel and Watson by adding the 
square terms of the original pay anomaly variables, OverHPDasq_l and 
UnderHPDasq_l, to Model 3d. However, contrary to the finding in Ezzamel and 
Watson (1998; 2002), the addition of the squared terms does not lead to an increase in 
the explanatory power of the model. For the four variables, only the linear term 
UnderHPDa 1 has a negative and significant coefficient at 5%, which is different 
from the findings of Ezzamel and Watson (1998) who reported that only the square 
term of underpaid anomaly is significant. However, the lack of statistical significance 
for the other three variables might be because of the high correlations between the pay 
anomaly variables and their squared terms in Model 3d estimates (Ezzamel and 
Watson 2002): Pearson correlation coefficient (r) equals to 0.91 and 0.92 respectively; 
and the VIFs for these four variables are between 7.47 and 10.10, high enough to 
cause bias in the estimates (Studenmund 2006). Therefore, Model 3e uses only the 
two square-termed pay anomaly variables and the results show that again both terms 
significantly impact HPD pay changes and the coefficient for OverHPDsq_l (b= - 
0.209, t=-8.25) is larger than UnderHPDasq_l (b= -0.149, t=-5.68), but the difference
is not significant either (F=2.47, p=0.12). The R 2 (=0.182) shows that using the 
square terms does not improve the overall explanatory power of Model 3d.
These findings suggest that there is no significant difference in the extent of 
adjustments made to overpaid HPDs compared with underpaid HPDs. Thus, 
Hypothesis 7b is not supported in terms of HPD pay. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Ezzamel and Watson (1998) in their models when HPD pay was proxied 
by total cash compensation, but is not consistent with their findings when their HPD 
pay was proxied by HPD salary only or the findings of Ezzamel and Watson (2002)
241
CHAPTER 7 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES - PAY CHANGE MODELS
who found that pay adjustment to underpaid executives and that to overpaid ones are 
asymmetric.
Therefore, as suggested by these results, the external pay comparison factor also plays 
an important role in the HPD pay adjustment process in Chinese listed firms, but the 
asymmetric adjustments that were observed in the UK context by Ezzamel and 
Watson (1998; 2002) are absent in my sample.
As can be seen in Table 7.2, the results for other variables are quite consistent across 
the models and are similar to what has been discussed in Model 2a in the previous 
section. It should be borne in mind that the benchmark HPD pay model in this thesis 
uses return on total assets as the performance measurements, different from 
shareholders’ return used in Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), due to data 
unavailability. To what extent this may account for the discrepant results between my 
results and theirs remains unresolved.
7.3.1.2 External Comparison Factors and REST Pay Changes
Table 7.2 also reports the results of the models investigating the effects of external 
benchmarking over the REST pay changes. Model 3a-Rest (the same as Model 2a- 
Rest) is also used for benchmarking purpose. Model 3b-Rest, Model 3c-Rest, 3d-Rest 
and 3e-Rest are the counterparts of Model 3c, 3d and 3e, using the changes in REST 
pay as the dependent variable.
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The results of Model 3b-Rest show that prior pay anomaly is negatively related to 
REST pay changes at the 5% level and its inclusion brings significant improvement in 
the explanatory power of the model, R 2 increasing from 0.034 to 0.066 (F = 23.1, p < 
0.001). Model 3c-Rest, which splits the prior pay anomaly into underpaid anomaly 
(UnderRESTal) and overpaid anomaly (OverRESTal), has a similar explanatory 
power upon subsequent REST pay adjustment ( R 2 =0.067) to Model 3b-Rest. Both 
variables have negative coefficients, but only the one for UnderRESTa_l is 
significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the rest of management only 
experienced subsequent pay adjustment when they were underpaid in the previous 
year, but there seems to be no significant effect for those who were paid over the 
market level. However, the Wald test shows that the differences between the 
coefficient for UnderRESTa_l is not significantly different from that for 
OverRESTa l (F (1, 843) = 1.93, p= 0.165). Therefore, in the case of REST pay, 
again Hypothesis 7a is supported, but Hypothesis 7b is not, despite suggestive 
evidence.
Model 3d-Rest explains 7.1% of the variance in REST pay changes. For the four pay 
anomaly variables, only the coefficient of the underpaid term is robustly significant at 
the 5% level, while the remaining three coefficients are not significant. The Wald test 
(F=0.09, p=0.91) shows that these two square terms have no significant contribution 
to the overall explanatory power of the model. In Model 3e-Rest the two linear terms 
were dropped. The results show that neither of the coefficients for pay anomaly 
squared terms is significant and that the R 2 of Model 3e-Rest is smaller than those of 
Model 3c-Rest and Model 3d-Rest. These results show that there are no ‘bidding-up’ 
adjustments in executive pay in terms of the rest of management team. Thus, the
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results of Model 3d-Rest, 3e-Rest further support Hypothesis 7a, but not Hypothesis 
7b.
As can be seen from Table 7.2, in all the REST pay change models, 
ChlnAdjusved mv and year2002 have a positive impact upon REST pay changes, 
which are robustly significant at the 1% level across the models; while the effects of 
ChRYRota are weakly significant at 10% in most of the Models and ChlnSales only 
show weak significance in Model 3b-Rest and Model 3c-Rest but not in Models 3d- 
Rest and 3e-Rest. In Model 3e-rest, the coefficients for ChlnSales and ChRYRota are 
both non-significant. These results indicate that REST pay changes are not that 
closely related to the changes in firm sales and the rank of return on total assets, but 
are closely related to changes in the market value of the firm. As REST pay is under­
explored in the literature, I cannot compare my results with other studies. Ezzamel 
and Watson (2002) looked at the determination of other directors’ remuneration, and 
found no significant relations between other directors’ remuneration and firm sales or 
relative return.
7.3.2 THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL COMPARISON FACTORS
Table 7.3 reports the results of the models to test Hypotheses 8 and 9 concerning the 
internal comparison effects on the executive pay adjustment. Hypothesis 8 assumes 
that the board of directors will adjust pay awards to all the management members and 
therefore their pay changes will be related to each other. Hypothesis 9 proposes that 
the ‘bidding up’ of executive pay is most apparent in firms where the other
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management members are relatively generously paid with respect to the external 
comparison level of pay.
7.3.2.1 Internal Comparison Factors and HPD Pay Changes
As mentioned earlier, the results of the specification tests (Linktest and Ramsey Reset 
test) for these three models suggest that Model 3e is a better fit than Models 3c and
383d . Also, in order to maintain consistency with Ezzamel and Watson (2002), Model 
3e, with the squared terms, is used as a basic model for Models 3f-3i, which will test 
the interrelationship between HPD pay changes and REST pay changes.
Model 3f adds the pay anomalies of the rest of the management team (Re_RESTa_l), 
the residuals of Model la-Rest, to Model 3e to test whether the prior pay anomalies of 
the rest of management affect subsequent pay adjustments in HPD pay. The results 
show that the REST pay anomaly variable has a positive association with HPD pay 
changes at the 5% level and the inclusion of this variable brings a significant increase
in the of the model, from 0.182 to 0.208 (F (1, 846) = 28.9, p < 0.001). The
IQ
results of other factors remain similar to Model 3e . The Linktest (p= 0.227) and 
Ramsey Reset test (p=0.348) suggest that Model 3f has no specification errors.
38 The Linktest (p<0.002) and the Ramsey Reset test (p=0.002) of Model 3c both show that there are 
specification errors in the model; and the same applies to Model 3d (the Linktest (p=0.010) and 
Ramsey Reset test (p=0.002); while Model 3e passes both tests (Linktest (p= 0.170), and Ramsey Reset 
test (p=0.098).
39 I also retest Model 3e by replacing Re restpay l with two variables, o v errestl for the rest of 
management teams that are overpaid and underrest l for those underpaid. Both variables have a 
positive association with HPD pay changes, but only the coefficient for overrest l is significant at 
10%.
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Model 3g introduces the actual change in the rest of management pay into the model 
(ChlnRESTpay), which significantly increases the overall explanatory power of the
model (F (1, 836) =138.3, p<0.001): the R 2 improved from 0.208 in Model 3f to 
0.409. The results show that both Re_RESTa_l and ChlnRESTpay are positively 
related to HPD pay changes at the 1% level, suggesting that the board of directors, 
when adjusting HPD pay, not only takes into account the situation of the pay status of 
the rest of management related to the market level, but also tries to keep the changes 
in HPD pay in the same direction as that of REST pay, though not definitely at the 
same rate. From the coefficient for ChlnRESTpay (0.425), the increase of HPDpay is 
nearly equal to the square root of the increase of RESTpay. These findings are 
consistent with Ezzamel and Watson (2002) and support Hypotheses 8. The results 
related to most of the other variables remain unaffected, except that the coefficients 
for ChlnAdjusted_mv and year2002 both become non-significant.
Model 3h further tests Hypothesis 8 by using a new variable, the change in the other 
board members pay at time t relative to the estimated external comparison pay level at 
time t-1 (REST_RESTpret = LnRESTpayt -  LnREST*payt-i), which is supposed to 
be statistically equivalent to the aggregate of the two new variables introduced by 
Model 3f and 3g (see Ezzamel and Watson (2002)). The results show that Model 3h is
less powerful in explaining HPD pay changes: R 2 of Model 3h is 0.325 compared to 
0.409 in Model 3g, which is different from the findings of Ezzamel and Watson (2002) 
who reported that the two models have equivalent explanatory power over CEO pay 
changes. A Wald test (F=94.39, p<0.0001) shows that the coefficient for 
R e R E S T a l  (0.080) is significantly different from that for ChlnRESTpay (0.425), 
which indicates that the extent to which the two variables affect HPD pay changes are
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different. This might answer the question why combining the two variables into one 
reduces the overall explanatory power of the model. Also, the size of the estimated 
coefficient for REST-RESTpre is not significantly different from the mean of the 
coefficients on the two variables included in Model 3g, which was also noted by 
Ezzamel and Watson (2002).
Table 7.3 Internal Comparison Factors and HPD Pay Changes
Variables Model 3e Model 3f Model 3g Model 3h Model 3i
ChlnSales 0.169*** 0.151*** 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.132***
(3.76) (3.26) (3.06) (3.95) (3.09)
ChRYRota 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.3) (3.37) (3.05) (2.93) (3.15)
ChlnAdjusted_mv 0.108** 0.098** 0.012 0.061 0.068
(2.48) (2.32) (0.26) (1.24) (1.35)
OverHPDasq_1 -0.209*** -0.225*** -0.205*** -0.319*** -0.31***
(-8.25) (-8.04) (-6.86) (-8.32) (-4.1)
UnderHPDasq_1 -0.149*** -0.178*** -0.154*** -0.213*** -0.2***
(-5.68)
Re_RESTa_1
ChlnRESTpay
REST-RESTpre 
OverHPDasq_l *OverREST a_l 
UnderHPDasq_l*OverRESTa_l
(-6.33)
0.051**
(2.21)
(-5.81)
0.08**
(2.21)
0.425***
(11.89)
(-9.18)
0.237***
(11.55)
(-7.17)
0.232***
(10.76)
-0.007
(-0.12)
-0.358**
(-2.55)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
_cons 0.17*** 0.163*** 0.101*** -0.35*** -0.332***
(7.67) (7.38) (5.15) (-7.88) (-6.94)
N 878 856 844 845 845
Equation F 23.33 20.65 37.29 31.22 23.13
R 2 0.182 0.208 0.409 0.325 0.326
■ MacKinnon & White (1985) hc3 heteroskedasticity-corrected and robust standard 
parentheses
error t-statistics in
■ Significance levels: * for p^O. 10; ** for p^O. 05; *** for p
■ Coefficient 0 means <0.001
ooV/
■ Ns are different across models due to some missing values in the newly introduced variables
Model 3i is designed to test Hypothesis 9 which states that in instances where the rest 
of the management team are generously overpaid relative to their external market pay 
level, there will be a greater element of bidding-up in HPD pay adjustment to prior
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period pay anomalies. It adds two interaction terms with the HPD pay anomalies, 
OverHPDasq_l and UnderHPDasq_l, for the case where the rest management pay are 
paid more than the comparison level of pay, OverRESTa_l, which are signified as 
OverHPDasq_l*OverRESTa_l and UnderHPDasq_l*OverRESTa_l in Table 7.3. 
The results show that both OverHPDasq_l and UnderHPDasq_l have a negative and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level. The coefficient for the overpaid interaction 
term is not significant, while the coefficient on the underpaid interaction term is 
negative and significant at the 5% level, which indicates that those underpaid HPDs in 
firms where the rest of management are relatively overpaid receive stronger pay 
adjustment towards the market level in the subsequent year, while those overpaid 
HPDs do not appear to have received a subsequent pay decrease or increase. This 
finding is consistent with the results of Ezzamel and Watson (2002) that there is a 
greater ‘bidding-up’ in HPD pay in firms where REST management are relatively 
overpaid. Therefore, Hypothesis 9 is supported.
7.3.2.2 Internal Comparison Factors and REST Pay Changes
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) explored the relationship between CEO pay 
changes and the relative pay for the other board members by examining the 
relationship between the effects of the relative pay for CEO on the pay changes of 
other board members. This thesis aims to extend their work by exploring the 
relationship between REST pay changes and the relative pay for HPDs. The results 
are reported in Table 7.4. As above, Model 3f-Rest to 3i-Rest are the counterpart 
models of Model 3f to 3i but using REST pay changes as the dependent variable. 
However, for the REST pay change models, Model 3c-Rest is used as the basic model
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for further analyses because the square terms of REST pay anomalies are not 
significant in the case of REST pay changes.
Model 3f-Rest adds to Model 3c-Rest the pay anomaly of HPD pay (ReHPDal ) ,  
which has a negative but non-significant association with REST pay changes and does 
not improve the overall explanatory power of Model 3c-Rest, with R 2 =0.066. Model 
3g-Rest is Model 3f-Rest plus the log of actual change of HPD pay, which 
significantly increases the R 2 to 0.275 (F (1, 841) =132.2, pO.OOl). Both HPD pay 
anomalies (Re HPDa l) and HPD pay change have a positive and significant impact 
on REST pay changes at the 1% level, indicating that the board of directors, when 
adjusting REST pay, not only takes into account the situation of the pay status of 
HPDs related to the market level, but also tries to keep the adjustment of REST pay in 
line with the adjustment of HPD pay. And again, as found in the HPD pay change 
models in the previous section, the coefficient for the actual change of HPD pay is 
greater than that for the HPD pay anomaly variable and the difference is significant at 
1% as indicated by a Wald test (F(l, 841 )=36.17, pO.OOl). This suggests that when 
adjusting the REST pay, the board refers more to the actual adjustment of HPD pay to 
keep peace inside the board. These results support Hypothesis 8.
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Table 7.4 Internal Comparison Factors and REST Pay Changes
Variables Model3c-Rest
Model
3f-Rest
Model
32-Rest
Model
3h-Rest
Model
3i-Rest
ChlnSales -0.061 0.099 0.017 0.062 0.011
(-0.79) (1.63) (0.3) (0.93) (0.24)
ChRYRota 0.125*** 0* 0 0 0
(3.4) (1.72) (0.32) (1.06) (1.29)
ChlnAdjusted_mv -0.061 0.182*** 0.036** 0.175*** 0.184***
(-0.79) (2.97) (2.1) (2.67) (3.48)
O verR E ST al 0.125*** -0.037 -0.073 -0.103 0.002
(3-4) (-0.41) (-0.61) (-0.58) (0.02)
UnderRESTa_l -0.061 -0.201*** -0.304*** -0.47*** -0.465***
(-0.79)
R e H P D a l
ChlnHPDpay
HPD-HPDapre
OverRESTa*OverHPDa_l
UnderRESTa*OverHPDa_l
(-2.6)
-0.014
(-0.3)
(-3.57)
0.167***
(3.22)
0.563***
(11.5)
(-5.92)
0.298***
(5.97)
(-6.81)
0.349***
(8.12)
-0.318***
(-3.43)
-0.762
(-0.59)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
_cons 0.08* 0.082* -0.022 -0.015 0.006
(1.77) (1.81) (-0.42) (-0.22) (0.13)
N 851 851 851 851 851
Equation F 6.55 6.58 21.58 11.05 13.68
R 2 0.067 0.066 0.275 0.174 0.215
■ MacKinnon & White (1985) HC3 heteroskedasticity-corrected and robust standard 
parentheses
■ Significance levels: * for p<0.10; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01
■ Coefficient 0 means <0.001
error t-statistics in
Model 3h-Rest further tests Hypotheses 8 by using a new variable, the change in HPD 
pay to time t relative to the estimated external comparison pay level at time t-1 
(HPD_HPDpre= LnHPDpay -  LnHPD*payt-i), which is supposed to be statistically 
equivalent to the aggregate of the two new variables introduced by Model 3f-Rest and 
3g-Rest (see Ezzamel and Watson (2002)). REST-RESTpre also has a positive and 
highly significant impact as the two separate variables. However, as with Model 3h to 
3g, I found that Model 3h-Rest, compared to Model 3g-Rest, has less power in
explaining REST pay changes: the R 2 of Model 3h-Rest is only 0.174 compared to 
0.275 in Model 3g-Rest. The reduction of the explanatory power of the model might
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lie in the different extent in which the two variables impact the HPD pay changes: as 
can be seen from Table 7.4, the size of coefficient (0.167) for R e H P D a l  is much 
smaller than for ChlnHPDpay (0.563) and the difference is significant (F( 2, 841) = 
67.3, pO.OOl).
Model 3i-Rest adds two interaction terms with the REST pay anomalies, 
OverRESTa l and UnderRESTal ,  and for the case where HPDs are paid more than 
the comparison level, OverHPDa l. These variables are called OverRESTa l* 
OverHPDa l and UnderRESTa l* OverHPDa l in Table 7.4. The results show that 
only the coefficient on the overpaid interaction term is negative and significant at the 
1% level. These results indicate that those firms where HPDs are relatively overpaid 
are more likely to adjust overpaid REST pay downwards in the subsequent year, while 
whether the HPDs are overpaid or underpaid does not appear to have a significant 
impact on the pay adjustment for those underpaid REST managements. This result is 
interesting. It might suggest that the rest of management fail to bargain their pay 
terms favorably compared to powerful HPDs who can manage to overpay themselves. 
Therefore, in the case of REST pay. Hypothesis 9 is not supported either.
7.4 Extension of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002)
Section 7.3 has presented the results of the models duplicating the work of Ezzamel 
and Watson (1998; 2002) to test internal and external comparison effects. As 
mentioned earlier, the thesis also intends to extend their work by investigating how 
the inclusion of the governance variables impacts upon the results or their models. I
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wish to revisit the question of how exactly to define pay anomalies on which the 
framework of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) rests.
It is evident from the discussions of the results of HPD pay models in Chapter 6 that 
the explanatory power of Model 1 c, which includes corporate governance variables 
and other control variables, is higher than that of the traditional agency model, Model 
la. It would be interesting to explore the extent to which the use of a different 
external benchmark pay model provides different results for the effects of external 
and internal comparison factors on subsequent pay adjustments. The better the 
estimated power of the external benchmark pay model is, the less noisy the pay 
anomalies will be as they are defined as the residuals of the model. To undertake this 
task, I proxied HPD pay anomalies as the residuals of Model lc and reran the tests of 
the models already discussed in Section 7.3. The results are reported in Table 7.5.
7.4.1 EXTERNAL COMPARISON FACTORS AND AN EXTENSION TO HPD 
PAY CHANGES
As reported in Section 7.2, Model 2c, which includes other control variables, has less 
explanatory power over HPD pay changes than Model 2b; therefore, the models for 
testing the effects of internal and external comparison factors over HPD pay 
adjustments will be based on Model 2b.
252
Table 7.5 Extension of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) Models—HPD Pay Changes
External comparison factors_______________________ Internal comparison factors
Model 3a Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e Model 3f Model 3g Model 3h Model 3i Model 31* Model 3h-0 Model 3h-U
ChlnSales 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.126*** 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.125*** 0.089** 0.171***
(3.19) (3.87) (3.79) (3.7) (3.72) (3.71) (3.78) (3.61) (4.67) (2.31) (3-45)
ChRYRota 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** Q * * * 0.001*** 0.001*** Q * * * 0.001** 0**
(2.75) (3.19) (3.22) (3.22) (3.18) (2.93) (3.23) (3.07) (3.3) (2.15) (1.99)
ChlnAdj-Mv 0.126** 0.117** 0.118** 0.118** 0.102** 0.016 0.061 0.052 0.036 -0.017 0.052
(2.35) (2.48) (2.48) (2.48) (2.31) (0.33) (1.2) (1.05) (0.88) (-0.26) (0.68)
lnBoardsiz~1 -0.031 -0.036 -0.041 -0.046 -0.057 -0.006 -0.009 -0.028 0.016 -0.081 0.12
Size_super_1
(-0.45) (-0.56) (-0.64) (-0.72) (-0.88) (-0.09) (-0.14) (-0.45) (0.28) (-0.96) (1-34)
-0.013 -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.014 -0.013 -0.018* -0.014 -0.013 0.004 -0.032**
Proind_1
(-1.13) (-1.4) (-1.55) (-1.64) (-1.25) (-1.31) (-1.87) (-1.39) (-131) (0.29) (-2.44)
-0.024 0.02 0.037 0.052 0.022 -0.081 -0.003 -0.018 -0.04 0.154 -0.295
(-0.13) (0.12) (0.22) (0.31) (0.13) (-0.54) (-0.02) (-0.11) (-0.29) (0.69) (-133)
Duality1_1 -0.13** -0.12** -0.12** -0.121** -0.114** -0.084* -0.101** -0.098** -0.082** -0.11* -0.083
(-2.33) (-2.38) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.27) (-1.89) (-2.17) (-2.14) (-2.05) (-1.68) (-1.41)
State_share_1 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.002 0.001
(-0.6) (-0.33) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.2) (-0.24) (-0.22) (-0.14) (-0.3) (-0-72) (0.49)
Legal_share_1 -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-0.36) (-0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.18) (0.28) (0.24) (0.31) (0.36) (0.07) (0.26)
Private_share _1 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001
(0.32) (0.41) (0.47) (0.52) (0.78) (0.37) (0.55) (0.8) (0.54) (0.01) (0.64)
RYforeign_1 -0.001** 0 0 0 0 0 -0.001* 0 0 -0.001 0
(-2.14) (-1.31) (-1.38) (-1.47) (-1.37) (-1.36) (-174) (-1.51) (-1.46) (-1.28) (-0.64)
RYDirector_share_1 0** Q * * * 0** 0** 0** 0** 0** 0** 0** Q * * * 0
(-2.35) (-2.7) (-2.58) (-2.49) (-2.26) (-2.13) (-2.47) (-2.23) (-2.26) (-2.73) (-0.25)
Herfindahl_10_1 0.181 0.12 0.097 0.087 0.122 0.045 0.017 0.043 0.051 0.191 -0.132
Overpaid_1
Underpaid_1
(1.06) (0.72)
-0.189***
(-3.91)
-0.402***
(-8.12)
(0.59)
-0.103
(-0.77)
-0.18*
(-1.69)
(0.53) (0.74) (0.3) (0.11) (0.28) (0.38) (0.84) (-0.67)
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External comparison factors_______________________ Internal comparison factorsvati«uies -
Model 3a Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e Model 3f Model 3g Model 3h Model 3i Model 3i' Model 3h-0 Model 3h-U
Overpaidsq_1 -0.127 -0.244*** -0.255*** -0.297*** -0.426*** -0.44*** -0.488*** -0.338*** -0.49***
(-1.11) (-6.29) (-5.74) (-7.56) (-10.92) (-6.64) (-3.65) (-8.53) (-2.79)
Underpaidsq_1 -0.165*** -0.277*** -0.282*** -0.269*** -0.344*** -0.333*** -0.279*** -0.529*** -0.295***
(-2.65) (-8.33) (-9.7) (-8.3) (-10.71) (-10.65) (-12.45) (-4.13) (-10.08)
re_RESTpay_1 0.026 0.142***
(0.98) (5.85)
ChlnRESTpay 0.438***
(12.51)
ChREST_REST pre 0.281*** 0.267*** 0.369*** 0.388*** 0.333***
(13.38) (12.41) (16.34) (9.3) (9.47)
Overpaidsq *OREST_1 0.035
(0.56)
Underpaidsq *OREST_1 -0.284***
(-2.68)
Overpaidsq *DRESTO 0.155
UnderpaidsqDRESTO
(1.12)
-0.249***
(-3.15)
DRESTO -0.294***
(-8.4)
year2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
_cons 0.548*** 0.413** 0.448** 0.48*** 0.462** 0.324* 0.408** 0.402** 0.433*** 0.34 0.223
(2.8) (2.31) (2.52) (2.71) (2.58) (1.93) (2.43) (2.35) (2.72) (1.36) (0.97)
N 844 821 821 821 804 797 809 795 798 389 406
F 3.96 12.52 12.1 11.84 12.54 21.69 20.61 28.34 21.97 11.98 13.93
R 2 0.068 0.240 0.248 0.244 0.271 0.472 0.412 0.408 0.447 0.448 0.441
■ MacKinnon & White (1985) HC3 heteroskedasticity-corrected and robust standard error t-statistics in parentheses
■ Significance levels: * for p^O. 10; ** for p^0.05; *** for p^O.Ol
■ Coefficient 0 means <0.001
" Ns are different across models due to some missing values in the newly introduced variables___________________
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The models developed here are similar to those discussed previously except that these 
new models include the corporate governance variables and the external and internal 
benchmark pay models are Model lc and Model lc-Rest, rather than Model la and 
la-Rest respectively. The following discussion will focus on whether this difference 
in definition of the ‘market rate’ affects the results relating to the effects of internal 
and external comparison factors on HPD pay changes.
As can be seen in Table 7.5, Model 3c adds to Model 2b the prior HPD pay anomalies 
of overpaid HPDs and underpaid HPDs, which I name Overpaid l and Underpaid l 
in order to distinguish Model 3 c used here from that used in the previous section. 
These two variables are both negative and significant at the 1% level, with a sizeable
and significant increase in R 2 from 0.068 in Model 2b to 0.240 (and the F-ratio of the 
model improves from 3.96 in Model 2b to 12.5). This result is similar to that of its 
counterpart model in the previous section; Hypothesis 7a is therefore supported. What 
is different is that there is a significant difference between the two coefficients of pay 
anomalies (Wald test: F (1, 803) =6.58, p=0.01). The one for underpaid HPDs (cfu =- 
0.402) is greater in magnitude than that for overpaid HPDs (cf0 =-0.189), indicating 
that there is an asymmetric pay adjustment related to prior pay anomalies for 
underpaid HPDs compared to overpaid HPDs. The extent of adjustment is greater for 
underpaid HPDs. Therefore, with the extension model, the finding is consistent with 
Ezzamel and Watson (2002) and Hypothesis 7b is therefore supported.
These findings are further supported by the results of Model 3d in which only the 
coefficients for underpaid anomalies and its squared term are significant at the 10% 
and 1% level respectively. The coefficients for overpaid terms are not significant. Due
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to the multicolinearity between the four pay anomaly variables, the statistical 
significance is lower and also the allocation of coefficients might be biased. However, 
the coefficients for underpaid HPDs seem to be greater, though not by much, 
compared to their counterparts for overpaid HPDs. When the linear forms of pay 
anomalies are dropped, see Model 2f, both the squared terms are significant, and the 
magnitude of the coefficient for Underpaidsq_l is slightly greater than that for 
Overpaidsq_l, although the difference is not significant (F(l,803) =0.34, p=0.559).
It is worth noting that in all these models, the results for the other variables are stable. 
ChlnSales and ChRYRota has a positive association with HPD pay changes at 1%, 
ChalnAdjusted_mv also have a positive impact, but at 5%, while Dualityl l and 
RYtotdirshare_l have a negative association with HPD pay changes at the 5% level. 
Other variables do not have significant impacts. The model specification tests 
(Linktest and Ovtest) show that Model 3d and Model 3e are better fitted than Model 
3c, indicating that there is a nonlinear effect of the pay anomalies over HPD pay 
changes.
7.4.2 INTERNAL COMPARISON FACTORS AND AN EXTENSION TO HPD 
PAY CHANGES
The extended version of Model 3f to Model 3h-U, as reported in Table 7.5, are also 
rerun, to examine how the different definition of pay anomalies affects the previous 
findings about the relationship between HPD pay changes and the relative pay of the 
rest of management.
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Model 3f adds the REST pay anomalies (ReRESTpayl) ,  the residuals of Model lc- 
Rest in Chapter 6, to Model 3e to test whether the prior pay anomalies of the rest of 
management affect the subsequent pay adjustment of HPD pay. The result shows that 
the pay anomaly variable has no significant association with HPD pay changes,
although the inclusion of this variable does bring a significant increase in the R 2 of 
the model, from 0.244 to 0.271 (F (1,784) =30.62, pO.OOl), which is different to the 
original Model 3f in Section 7.3.2 where the pay anomaly variable has significant 
impact at 5%40. However, in Model 3g, both the REST pay anomaly and actual 
change of REST pay are positively related to HPD pay changes at the 1% level. The
R 2 is significantly improved from 0.271 in Model 3f to 0.472 in Model 3g (F (1, 777) 
= 156.4, pO.OOl). The size of coefficient (0.142) for Re_RESTpay_l is much smaller 
than that ChlnRESTpay (0.438) and the difference is significant (Wald test: F (1,777) 
=54.21, pO.OOl). The results of Model 3h are also not substantially different from 
their counterpart models in Section 7.3.2 which do not take into account governance 
variables: HPD pay changes is positively related to the difference between REST pay 
and previous REST pay market level. Therefore, Hypothesis 8 is consistently 
supported.
Model 3i is designed to test whether the status of the rest of management being 
underpaid or overpaid compared to the market level affects the pay adjustment of 
HPDs related to their market level. Again, the result shows that only the underpaid 
interaction term is negative and significant at 1%, which indicates that the ‘bidding- 
up’ is more severe when the rest of management is overpaid. I also produced a model
401 also retested Model 3 f by splitting Re_restpay_l into two variables, Overrest l for the rest of 
management teams that are overpaid and underrestl for those underpaid. With the results for other 
variables remaining similar, the coefficient for overrest l is positive and significant at 10%, while the 
one for Underrest l is negative but not significant.
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with a dummy variable (DRESTO), coded 1 when the rest of management is overpaid, 
and 0 otherwise, and two interaction terms between each of the HPD pay anomalies 
and this dummy variable, reported as Model 3i’ in Table 7.5. The results show that the 
dummy variable has a negative and a significant impact at the 1% level. For the two 
interaction terms, only the one for underpaid HPDs has a significant and negative 
impact at 1%, the one for overpaid HPDs has a positive but non significant impact. 
These results indicate that when the rest of management are overpaid, those underpaid 
HPDs experience a greater pay increase in the subsequent year; however, those 
overpaid do not seem to experience a significant pay decrease down to the market rate. 
Therefore, there is a greater bidding-up in HPD pay in those firms whose 
managements other than HPDs are overpaid compared to the market rate. In this case, 
Hypothesis 9 is supported.
I also tested Hypothesis 9 in an alternative way. I separately estimated Model 3h for 
the two sub-samples: firms with relatively under and overpaid rest of management, 
and the results are reported as Model 3h-0 and 3h-U. The estimates included are less 
restrictive than the estimates in Model 3i and 3i’, since the coefficients on all the 
variables were allowed to vary across the two sub-samples (Ezzamel and Watson 
2002). These estimates show the differences in the slope coefficients relating to the 
HPDs’ pay anomalies. The results show that in the both samples, both HPD pay 
anomalies have a significant and negative impact, which is different from Ezzamel 
and Watson (2002) who found that in the sample of underpaid boards, the coefficient 
for the overpaid CEO anomaly is not significant. However, I also found that in the 
overpaid sample, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient for Underpaidsq_l is 
larger than that for Overpaidsq_l, and vice versa in the underpaid sample. These
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estimates indicate that HPDs with relatively overpaid managements experience a 
significant element of bidding-up in their pay which is related to their prior period 
payment anomalies whilst CEOs with relatively underpaid management experience a 
significant element of ‘bidding down’. However, these differences in the size of 
coefficient are not significant, as shown by Wald tests41.
7.4.3 EXTENSION OF EZZAMEL &WATSON (2002)-REST PAY CHANGES
Similarly, I reran the extension models for REST pay changes, to see whether using 
different comparison pay level models changes the results. In the case of REST pay 
changes, I used Model 2a-Rest, chosen to be the basic model for further analyses, 
because the inclusion of the governance variables and other variables in Model 2b- 
Rest and Model 2c-Rest does not contribute much explanatory power to the rest pay 
change models. The rest pay anomalies here are proxied as the residuals of Model lc- 
Rest (traditional agency model plus governance variables and other control variables). 
The results are reported in Table 7.6.
41 For overpaid sample: F (1, 370) = 1.84, p = 0.176; for the underpaid sample: F( 1, 390) = 1.49, p = 
0.223. Also, When robust regressions are run, which are better capable of dealing with outliers, the 
difference in the overpaid sub-sample is significant (F=6.42, p=0.0117), while the one in the underpaid 
sample is not. This indicates that pay for overpaid managements is related to greater bidding up of 
HPD pay adjustment. However, this relationship is not robust to heteroskedasticity correction.
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Table 7.6 Extension of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) Models—REST Pay
Changes
External Comparison Factors
Variables
internal Comparison Factors
hies Model
3b-Rest
Model
3c-Rest
Model
3d-Rest
Model 36- 
Rest
Model 3f- 
Rest
Model
3g-Rest
Model
3h-Rest
Model
3i-Rest
Sales 0.063 0.062 0.062 0.064 ChlnSales 0.062 -0.03 0.003 -0.013
(1.32) (1.28) (1.26) (129) (1.28) (-0.77) (0.08) (-0.33)
Rota 0* 0* 0* 0* ChRYRota 0* 0 0 0
(1.73) (1.75) (1.73) (1.68) (1.74) (0.07) (0.58) (0.55)
idj-mv 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.177*** 0.177*** ChlnAdj-mv 0.182*** 0.122* 0.14* 0.168**
(2.81) (2.77) (2.67) (2.79) (2.73) (1.78) (1.88) (2.34)
■STpay_1 -0.232*** OverREST_1 -0.203*** -0.302*** -0.437*** 0.245***
(-7.76) (-2.74) (-4.51) (-7.43) (-2.87)
*EST_1 -0.185*** 0.173 UnderREST_1 -0.283*** -0.332*** -0.414*** 0.475***
(-3.09) (0.88) (-4.76) (-6.48) (-7.75) (-8.45)
•REST_1 -0.273*** -0.421*** re_HPDpay_1 0.024 0.258***
(-4-71) (-2.74) (0.58) (6.44)
JESTsq_1 -0.296 -0.213*** ChlnHPDpay 0.606***
(-1.64) (-3.94) (13.48)
■RESTsq_1 0.077 -0.186*** HPD_HPDpre 0.403*** 0.437***
(0.75) (-4.45) (11.19) (12.04)
OREST*OHPD__1 -0.253***
(-2.94)
UREST*OHPD__1 1.075***
(3-4)
)01 Yes Yes Yes Yes year2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.137*** 0.113*** 0.058 0.136*** _cons 0.115*** 0.034 0.083** 0.063*
(5.05) (3.08) (1.24) (4.47) (3.08) (0.97) (2.37) (1.73)
802 802 802 802 N 802 802 802 79842
ion F 15.34 12.94 10.89 10.35 Equation F 11.31 31.31 25.49 24.37
0.122 0.122 0.125 0.117 R 2 0.121 0.364 0.289 0.295
MacKinnon & White (1985) HC3 heteroskedasticity-corrected and robust standard error t-statistics in parentheses
Significance levels: * for p^O. 10 ; ** for  p ^ 0 . 05; *** for p^O .O l
Coefficient 0 means <0.001
Comparing the results in Table 7.6 with those in Table 7.2 and Table 7.4 that 
replicated the original Ezzamel and Watson models, I found that there is no 
substantial difference in the results of Model 3b-Rest: the REST pay anomaly variable 
has a significant and negative impact. In terms of Model 3c-Rest, the results for the
42 These results are after deleting two outliers (firms with both high leverage and high residuals). With 
outliers included, both variables have no robust significant results. W hen the first outlier was deleted, 
only the UrestOHPD l has a positive and significant coefficient at 1%. Due to the high sensitivity of 
the results to some particular firms, I ran a robust regression with the sam e variables, and the results are 
quite similar to those with two outliers excluded.
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two REST pay anomaly variables are different. In the extended model, both overpaid 
and underpaid REST pay anomalies have negative and significant coefficients; but 
there is no significant difference between the two coefficients (Wald test: F (3,791) 
=0.74, p=0.39), which does not support the ‘bidding up’ hypothesis. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 7a is supported, while Hypothesis 7b is not. The results of both versions 
of Model 3d-Rest are quite similar: only the linear term of underpaid anomaly 
variable has a significant coefficient; however, due to the high multicolinearity of the 
four variables, no safe conclusion can be drawn. When the two linear terms are 
dropped in Model 3e-Rest, both squared terms are significant at the 1% level, and 
again there is no significant difference between the two coefficients. Therefore, when 
the extended models are used and in terms of REST pay changes, it can only be 
concluded that the external comparison factor does play a significant role in the 
subsequent pay adjustments. There is no consistent evidence that there is an 
asymmetric adjustment between underpaid management and overpaid management. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 7a is supported while Hypothesis 7b is not supported in case of 
REST pay change models when the governance effects are included in proxying pay 
comparison rate.
In terms of the effects of the internal comparison factors, the results of the extended 
version are quite similar to those of the replicated version. For instance, in Model 3f- 
Rest, the coefficient for HPD pay anomaly variable is not significant by itself in both 
versions. But when the actual changes of HPD pay are also included, as in the Model 
3g-Rest, both the coefficient for HPD pay anomalies (re_HPDpay) and that for the 
actually changes in HPD pay (ChlnHPDpay) variable become significant at 1%, and 
the magnitude of the former (0.258) is much smaller than that of the latter (0.606).
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Also, as shown in Model 3h-Rest in Table 7.6 and in Table 7.4, the actual changes of 
HPD pay related to the estimate market level in the previous period have a 
consistently positive and significant impact on REST pay changes. These results seem 
to suggest consistently that in China’s case, although REST pay is adjusted to be in 
line with the anticipated changes in the market rates for the HPDs, more efforts are 
made to keep the adjustment of REST pay in line with the actual changes of HPDs 
rather than HPDs’ previous pay anomalies compared to the market rate. These results 
support Hypothesis 8.
However, in terms of Model 3i-Rest, the results of the two versions are different. In 
the replicated version in Table 7.4, only the overpaid interaction has a negative and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level, which supports Hypothesis 9. However, in the 
extended model, the underpaid interaction is also significant at the 1% level and with 
a positive sign. These findings are counter to Ezzamel and Watson (2002) and do not 
support Hypothesis 9.
It is worth noting that although both overpaid and underpaid REST pay anomalies are 
significant in the models in Table 7.6; it is not until Model 3i-Rest that the difference 
in their coefficient magnitudes is statistically significant (Wald test: F (=3.76, 
p=0.056). Another interesting finding is that the overall explanatory power of the 
extended models are consistently stronger than their counterpart models replicating 
the work by Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002). This may be due to the less noisy 
proxy of executive pay anomalies estimated by those models that include corporate 
governance variables and other control variables and thus have better explanatory 
power than those traditional agency models used by Ezzamel and Watson.
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7.5 Discussion and conclusion
Chapter 6 presented and discussed the results for the pay level estimate models. The 
results showed that corporate governance variables have significant explanatory 
power over the pay level of HPDs and the rest of management. This chapter reports 
the results of the pay changes models.
In contrast to the pay level models, the first difference models do not show much 
support for the significant impact of governance variables. Duality, foreign ownership 
and director ownership all negatively impact on the change in HPD pay; but the 
impacts disappear in the case of REST pay changes, although in one of the models, 
board size shows a weak negative effect on REST pay changes. Without taking 
account of the effects comparison factors, the pay first difference models can only 
explain between 3% and 7% of executive pay changes.
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) introduced the external and internal comparison 
factors into CEO pay change models and their models significantly increase the 
overall explanatory power. The thesis retested their models in the Chinese context. 
The results show that the previous pay anomalies from the market level have 
significant explanatory power over subsequent HPD and REST pay adjustments, 
which supports Hypothesis 7a. However, except for the HPD extended model, this 
thesis does not find that the adjustment for underpaid executives is greater than those 
for overpaid ones; therefore, Hypothesis 7b is not consistently supported. But in both 
HPD and REST pay changes, the explanatory power of the cash compensation models 
was significantly improved by the addition of the pay anomaly variables. These
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results show that market factors that have been reported to affect the decisions of 
listed companies in terms of executive pay adjustments in the West also seem to 
function in transitional economies like China.
Concerning the internal comparison factors, the results of this thesis also show 
support for Ezzamel and Watson (2002) in that the board of directors, when adjusting 
HPD pay, not only take into account the situation of the pay status of RESTpay 
related to the market level, but also try to keep the percentage adjustment of HPD pay 
in line with that of REST pay. These findings support Hypothesis 8, that executive 
pay is adjusted according to the internal comparison pay level, and are consistent with 
Ezzamel and Watson (2002). However, in contrast to what were found in Ezzamel 
and Watson (2002), the explanatory power of pay changes of related to external 
market level is not as strong as its two separate elements: the actual percentage 
changes of other management members and their prior pay anomalies. In both HPD 
and REST cases, the percentage changes of their within-firm peers seem to affect the 
pay adjustments decision to a greater extent. Actually, in some models, which only 
include the pay anomalies experienced by the peer in previous period as the internal 
comparison factor, the pay anomaly variable of within firm peers itself does not have 
a significant effect over executive pay changes.
Hypothesis 9 assumes that in instances where the rest of management is overpaid 
relative to their peers in the market, there is a greater element of bidding-up in respect 
of the HPD pay, which is supported by the empirical results of the HPD pay change 
models. This finding is consistent with Ezzamel and Watson (2002). However, in the
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case of the rest of management, this thesis does not find similar greater ‘bidding-up’ 
adjustment to REST pay in firm where HPDs are relatively overpaid
Also, although firm performance is not a focused variable in the thesis, the results of 
these first difference models show that there is a robust positive association between 
the changes of HPD pay and the changes in firm size and performance, which 
supports agency theory. The finding is different from Firth et al (2006) who only 
found very weak pay-performance relation in some of their pay change models. 
However, in terms of REST pay changes, excepting the adjusted market value, the 
relation between REST pay changes and changes in firm size and return on total 
assets are rather weak, which suggests that the determination of pay changes is 
different between HPDs and the rest of management.
To sum up, this chapter runs several regression models on HPD pay changes and 
REST pay changes. There are some common factors that explain the pay adjustments 
of executive pay in Chinese listed firms: the changes in market values of the firm, the 
pay anomalies related to the external pay market level (both of themselves or their 
within-firm peers) and the pay percentage changes of their within-firm peers. It is 
quite clear from the results that in the Chinese context, social comparisons are very 
important in the pay dynamic process. However, there are some differences in the pay 
adjustment of HPD pay and that of REST pay. Generally speaking, while firm size, 
firm performance, and corporate governance are all important in explaining the pay 
awards of HPDs, they do not seem to impact REST pay as much. Also, the 
explanatory powers of those HPD pay changes are much better than their counterparts 
for REST pay. In terms of the effects of comparison factors, the extended models
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appear to have consistently higher overall explanatory power than those models that 
simply duplicated the work of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), which might be 
because of the additional explanatory power of the corporate governance variables 
and other control variables included.
The next chapter will discuss the results presented in this chapter, together with those 
in Chapter 5 and 6, at a general level and will link these empirical results to research 
hypotheses, previous literature and the interview findings.
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CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION AND 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
8.1 Introduction
Chapter 7 presented the results of executive pay change models, thus completing the 
empirical analyses as planned in Chapter 4. This chapter summarizes the results of 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 and seeks to interpret these results by linking them to the research 
hypotheses, the previous literature reviewed in Chapter 3, and the specific 
institutional background in China introduced in Chapter 2. The relevant results of the 
interviews are used in this chapter to supplement and help explain the empirical 
results.
Generally, the results show that the focal variables of this thesis - board characteristics, 
ownership structure and market comparison factors - all impact significantly on 
executive remuneration, although support for the research hypotheses is mixed. The 
hypotheses were developed from the previous literature which was mainly conducted 
in the West, and were based on agency theory. The mixed supports suggested that the 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms on executive pay in China differ from 
those in the Western economies, which may be due to the special institutional factors 
in China. This chapter provides a detailed discussion of these issues.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises in a tabular form the main 
findings related to the research hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the results concerning
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the impact of board characteristics on executive remuneration. Section 4 examines the 
results relating to ownership structure. Section 5 covers the findings concerning 
market comparison effects. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
8.2 Hypotheses and findings
As explained in Chapter 3, nine groups of hypotheses were developed relating to 
board characteristics, ownership structure and market comparison factors. This 
section summarises these hypotheses and the empirical results related to them in 
Table 8.1.
As indicated in Table 8.1, my empirical results support the hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between executive remuneration and board size (Hypothesis la), CEO- 
Chairman duality (Hypothesis 3a), external comparison (Hypothesis 7a) and internal 
comparison factors (Hypothesis 8). They also show support for Hypotheses 2b, 
concerning executive pay-performance sensitivity and the proportion of independent 
directors, and Hypotheses 6b on the relation between managerial ownership and 
executive pay-performance sensitivity. Hypothesis 7b and Hypothesis 9 relating to the 
‘bidding-up’ adjustment of executive pay was not consistently supported. Hypotheses 
lb, 2a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a, and 6a are not supported; In fact, the results show contrary 
evidence for Hypothesis 2a, 5a and 6a. These findings are discussed in detail below.
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Table 8.1 Summary of Hypotheses (Hs) and Findings
Hs Variables Predictedsign
Empirical Results
Dependent Independent HPD REST
la Executive pay
Board size
9 Supported Supported
lb
Executive pay-
performance
sensitivity
9 Not supported Not supported
2a Executive pay Proportion of
independent
directors
- + Contrary evidence Contrary evidence
2b
Executive pay-
performance
sensitivity
+ Supported Not supported
3a Executive pay CEO-
chairman
duality
+ + Supported Not supported
3b
Executive pay-
performance
sensitivity
- Not supported Not supported
4a Executive pay
State
ownership
? Not supported Not supported
4b
Executive pay-
performance
sensitivity
? Not supported Not supported
5a Executive pay
Institutional
ownership
- Contrary evidence Not supported
5b
Executive pay-
performance
sensitivity
+ Not supported Partly supported
6a Executive pay
Managerial
ownership
- Contrary evidence Contrary evidence
6b
Executive pay-
performance
sensitivity
+ + Supported Not supported
7a Executive pay changes
External pay 
anomalies -
Replicated:
Supported
Extended:
Supported
Replicated:
Supported
Extended:
Supported
7b
The adjustment of executive pay 
over previous pay anomalies are 
stronger for underpaid executives 
than for overpaid executives
Cu<Co<0
Replicated:
Not
supported
Extended:
Supported
Replicated:
Not
Supported
Extended:
Not
supported
8 Executive pay changes
Internal pay 
comparison
+
Replicated:
Supported
Extended:
Supported
Replicated:
Supported
Extended:
Supported
9
‘Bidding-up’ HPD pay adjustment 
will be most apparent in firms 
where the rest of management is 
relatively overpaid
Cui< 0 
Cq^ O
Replicated:
Supported
Extended:
Supported
Replicated:
Not
supported
Extended:
Not
supported
Note
1) For the predicted signs, ‘+’ stands for that ‘there is a positive relation between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable; means ‘negative’, while ‘?’ means that there is a relation, but the sign is not decisive
2) The results are divided into three categories: ‘Supported’ means that the result is consistent with the prediction 
at the at least 10% level; ‘Not supported’ means that there is no significant result; and ‘Contrary evidence’ 
means that ‘the relation is significant, but the sign of the relation is contrary to what is predicted’.
8.3 Board characteristics and executive remuneration
As discussed in Chapter 3, the board of directors plays a crucial role in the internal 
governance of a corporation (Ezzamel 2005; Jensen 1993). From the principal-agent
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perspective, an expert board ratifies and monitors top management through its power 
to “hire, fire and compensate” top managers (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), and 
improves the governance and performance of the firm. This thesis examines the 
relationship between executive remuneration and board characteristics, proxied by 
board size, composition and leadership structure.
8.3.1. BOARD SIZE AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
According to agency theory, an effective board of directors can monitor executives’ 
entrenchment behaviour and design more appropriate remuneration packages. 
Consequently, board control should be able to explain a significant part of executive 
pay (Boyd 1994). High remuneration levels and low sensitivity of pay-performance 
have been offered as evidence of ineffective board control. However, the empirical 
evidence concerning the relationship between board effectiveness and board size has 
been mixed. Dalton et al. (1999) argue, from the perspective of resources dependency 
theory, that larger boards have more resources and man-power and hence should 
control and monitor executives more effectively and lead to a more sensitive link 
between executive pay and firm performance. Rui et al. (2003) supports this argument 
by providing evidence of a negative relationship between board size and executive 
remuneration in China. However, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue 
that large boards are less effective compared to small boards, due to ineffective group 
behaviours and/or communications, which is supported by Yermack (1996) and Cole 
et al. (1999). Yermack (1996) reported a negative relationship between board size and 
executive pay-performance, while Cole et al. (1999) observed a positive relationship 
between CEO remuneration and board size.
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Given the unclear direction in the literature of a relationship between board size and 
executive remuneration and firm performance suggested by the literature, this thesis 
hypothesized that board size has a significant impact on executive remuneration 
(Hypothesis la) and executive pay-performance sensitivity (Hypothesis lb), but left 
the sign of the impact to be decided by empirical analysis. The empirical results 
showed that there is no significant impact of board size on executive pay-performance 
sensitivity, i.e. Hypothesis lb is not supported, which is inconsistent with Yermack 
(1996), who argued that larger boards lead to weaker CEO pay-performance linkage.
My empirical results also showed that there is an inverse U-shaped association 
between HPD pay and board size, suggesting that executive pay initially increases 
with board size, but after the board reaches a certain critical size, executive pay starts 
to decrease as board size increases further. These findings were consistent for both 
HPD pay and REST pay. This finding is not predicted by agency theory but does 
support the argument of Dalton et al. (1999) that the effect of board size is complex 
and is moderated by other factors such as board independence, board roles and firm 
size. The results presented in this thesis may also go some way to reconciling the 
conflicting findings in the literature, since it is possible to observe either a positive, 
negative or no relationship between board size and effective monitoring, depending 
on which part of the inverted U the researcher samples most heavily.
In Chinese listed firms, below a certain critical board size, an increase of board size 
brings less effective executive monitoring, which supports the findings in Cole et al. 
(1999) and Jensen (1993). As shown in Chapter 5, currently, there are typically 
around 9 members on the board of directors in Chinese listed firms; therefore, it is
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more likely that an increase in board size might lead to higher executive pay, i.e., the 
first part of inverted U-shaped association between board size and executive pay. This 
argument is supported by the empirical results presented in Chapter 6 which show that, 
when those observation with board size larger than 15 are deleted, there is a positive 
linear relation between board size and executive pay. If the increase in board size in 
recent years is due to the appointment of independent directors as required by 
regulations, this might suggest that the newly appointed independent directors have 
not improved the monitoring of executive remuneration. The ineffectiveness in 
monitoring might be due to the lack of independence or inability of the independent 
directors (Cha 2001), or because of ineffective group behaviours with more members 
on the board (Jensen 1993). However, when board size further increases, executive 
pay starts to decrease, which is consistent with the findings in Rui et al. (2003). This 
might be because the more resources the larger board has, the more it compensates for 
the downside effect of being oversized and thus, a much larger board can exercise 
more monitoring, as suggested in resources dependent theory (Dalton et al. 1999).
The first difference models in Chapter 7 did not return significant results concerning 
the impact of board size on executive pay change, which might be due to the lack of 
variation in board size over the years. Also, the empirical results showed that board 
size seems to have no significant impact on the pay-performance relationship in my 
sample, which is not consistent with Yermack (1996), who argued that larger boards 
lead to weaker CEO pay-performance linkage, and does not support Hypothesis lb.
My interpretation of the pay level results related to board size can be taken as an 
attempt to understand how boards work in China. The inconsistent results in the
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literature and in this thesis indicate that the relation between board size and executive 
remuneration is complex. Further research is needed in order to better understand the 
relationship between board size, board effectiveness and executive pay.
8.3.2 BOARD COMPOSITION AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
As indicated in Chapter 3, previous literature (Core et al. 1999; Dahya et al. 2002b; 
Fama and Jensen 1983) and a series of governance reports (Cadbury 1992; Greenbury 
1995) suggest that employing non-executives on the board is a good governance 
mechanism that can help reduce agency cost. Hypotheses 2a and 2b aim to test 
whether independent directors have monitoring effects on executive remuneration in 
China. If independent directors are effective in monitoring management, boards with 
a higher proportion of independent directors will pay lower executive remuneration 
(Hypothesis 2a) and the firm will exhibit stronger executive pay-performance 
sensitivity (Hypothesis 2a). In the pay level model, I found that both HPD pay and 
REST pay are positively related to the proportion of independent directors. This 
finding runs counter to Hypothesis 2a. Also, I found no significant impact of the 
proportion of independent directors on HPD and REST pay changes. The findings 
seem to suggest that in China’s context, independent directors are inefficient in 
monitoring top management, which supports the findings of previous studies (Peng
2004). Peng (2004) found that only affiliated outside directors have a positive impact 
on sales growth (but not on return of equity), while non-associated directors (i.e., 
independent directors) have no influence on firm performance.
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However, I found that higher proportions of independent directors are related to 
stronger HPD pay-performance sensitivity, which is consistent with Mehran (1995) 
and Rupp and Smith (2002), who also found a positive link between outside director’s 
effectiveness and pay-performance sensitivity. This relationship, however, does not 
hold in the case of REST pay-performance sensitivity.
My results are different from those of similar studies, in particular the work of Lin et 
al. (2005) and Rui et al. (2003). Rui et al. (2003), found no relationship between CEO 
pay and the proportion of non-paid directors (the proxy for non-executive directors) of 
the board. Meanwhile, Lin et al. (2005) found a significantly negative relationship in 
their individual fixed effects models but not in their firm fixed effects models. 
However, because I used independent directors as a category distinct from non­
executive or non-paid directors, my results are not exactly comparable with these two 
previous studies. These results suggest that the relation between board composition 
and executive pay in China requires further investigation.
The above discussion shows that the results related to the monitoring of executive pay 
by independent directors are conflicting. Hiring more independent directors has 
increased executive pay, but also results in tying HPD pay more strongly to firm 
performance. In China, CEOs and other senior executives usually have seats on the 
board and make up about two thirds of the board, as reported in Chapter 5. These 
findings are supported by my interviews. All the firms interviewed had 3 independent 
directors, as the minimum number required, except for one that had 5 (board size=l 1), 
which was regarded by the interviewee himself as unusually many for Chinese firms. 
Although Core et al. (1999) and Boyd (1994) argued that insider directors are not
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pawns of CEOs, reporting a negative relationship between CEO remuneration and the 
percentage of inside directors on the board, they admitted that this argument makes 
sense only when that the insiders do not side with or become intimidated by CEOs. In 
reality, however it is rare that the insider directors can really keep at arm’s length 
from the CEOs. This is especially so in China. As one interviewee said, “Most insider 
directors are promoted by the chairman or the CEO, and therefore are likely to be 
more responsive to the chairman or the CEO’s desires than to protecting shareholders 
to avoid animosity and retribution from the CEO.” This is quite similar to the 
argument made by Jensen (1993). In this case, the monitoring effectiveness of the 
board depends largely on the independent non-executive directors.
However, as suggested by previous literature and also by the interviews, independent 
directors lack genuine independence and have not been performing their jobs well 
(Cha 2001). Given this, the results of this thesis related to the impact of independent 
directors can be interpreted as follows: due to the lack of independence of the so- 
called independent directors, these directors fail to govern executive pay levels; 
however, they do manage to link executive pay more strongly to firm performance, in 
order to justify high executive pay to the public.
Equally, given the fact that most executives in China are underpaid (SRIC 2003), as 
discussed in Chapter 2, it could be argued that the appointment of independent 
directors helps to bring executive pay up to a more reasonable level and make it more 
appropriate, by linking pay to performance. If this is the case, this thesis provides 
evidence of the positive role played by independent directors, which is in contrast to
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previous literature (Cha 2001; Peng 2004; Rui et al 2003) that criticises the 
ineffectiveness of independent directors in China.
Both possibilities find some support from the interview results. Almost all the 
independent directors interviewed stated that the insider directors, especially the 
Chairman and the CEO, can over-rule them on board decisions. Two interviewees 
explicitly said that the fate of independent directors currently depends on the quality 
of the management team of the firm they served, due to the lack of legal protection of 
and support for independent directors’ rights. According to them, as a conscientious 
independent director, if you were hired by a company where the governance system is 
weak and the management team is entrenched, you have two choices: either to quit 
(thus avoiding the responsibilities for possible fraud or scandals) or to stick to your 
guns, which will result in offending the management and the independent directors 
getting sacked in the end. However, even in this case, all the independent directors 
interviewed said that they insisted that executive pay should be linked to firm 
performance and that the management normally agrees because it would be hard to 
say no and to explain to the public. Also, three independent directors stated that not 
all management are bad and that they were happy with the behaviour of their current 
management teams. They said these management teams work hard to improve firm 
performance, and in that case, the independent directors were happy with the fact that 
they were paid at a very high rate.
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8.3.3 CEO-CHAIRMAN DUALITY AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
Hypothesis 3 a states that executive remuneration is positively related to CEO- 
Chairman duality. Some studies, such as Dahya et al. (2002b), Ryan and Wiggins 
(2001), Conyon (1997b) and Main and Johnson (1993), found no significant effects of 
CEO-chairman duality on CEO pay or quality of board oversight. Rui et al (2003) 
even found a negative relationship between CEO-chairman duality and CEO pay. 
However, the majority of research examining the impact of duality on firm 
performance or CEO remuneration find evidence of a positive relationship between 
CEO-chairman duality and CEO remuneration, such as Brickley et al. (1997), Cole et 
al. (1999), Cyert et al. (2002) and Sridharan (1996). My empirical results also show a 
positive relationship between CEO and chairman duality and HPD remuneration. The 
first difference models showed that the HPD pay change is negatively related to CEO- 
Chairman duality. Duality has no significant impact over REST pay, REST pay 
changes or executive (HPD and REST) pay-performance sensitivity. These results 
suggest that in firms with CEO-chairman duality, top managers are paid more 
compared to those in firms without duality. There is no tendency for firms with 
duality to link pay to performance. Hypothesis 3b is not supported, but Hypothesis 3a 
is. These results are different from those in Rui et al. (2003), who found a negative 
relationship between the two, but their finding was not robust across their models.
My results are consistent with agency theory and the majority of the literature on this 
issue. As argued by Jensen (1993), Chairman-CEO duality gives the CEO too much 
power over the decision-making process, and scope to pursue personal interests at the 
expense of shareholders’ interests. This is especially true in China, where the problem
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of insider control in listed companies is prevalent (Cha 2001; Clarke 2003). When the 
CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board, internal control systems are 
more likely to fail, because the board cannot effectively perform its key control 
functions (Jensen 1993), which in turn leads to more likelihood of incurring executive 
entrenchment by overpaying themselves and not linking their pay to firm performance.
8.4 Ownership structure and executive remuneration
This thesis also examines how ownership structure may affect monitoring and impact 
remuneration. Although many studies have examined the monitoring effect of 
ownership structure and show quite consistent results concerning the negative 
relationship between external institutional ownership and executive remuneration 
(Holdemess 2003b), these findings provide little insight into the effect of ownership 
structure in China. Chinese listed firms are diverse in terms of types of owners and 
listed locations, as discussed in Chapter 2. This thesis examines the impact of the 
proportion of shares held by different types of owners on executive remuneration, 
including state ownership, institutional ownership and managerial ownership.
8.4.1 STATE OWNERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
State ownership has been the most important and dominant ownership type in Chinese 
listed firms, as shown in the descriptive results in Chapter 2: on average, the state 
controls about 48% of the shares. However, there is sparse evidence to support the 
argument that the state plays a positive role in either improving the monitoring of 
management or enhancing firm performance, as mentioned in Chapter 3. In terms of
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executive pay, on the one hand, state ownership has been reported as contributing to 
higher executive pay and less pay-performance sensitivity (Berkman et al. 2002; Lin 
et al 2005) due to inefficient monitoring and more acute agency problems (Chen 
2001; Xu and Wang 1999; Zou and Xiao 2005). However, on the other hand, state 
controlled companies experience pressure to keep executive pay in line with 
government civil service salaries at similar positions in the hierarchy (Zou and Xiao
2005), and to ensure that executive pay does not significantly deviate from the pay of 
other employees, in order to avoid social instability. Therefore, state ownership might 
be expected to lead to lower executive pay and stronger pay-performance sensitivity 
(as a way of justifying executive pay) (Firth et al. 2006).
Based on the previous literature, this thesis argues that state ownership impacts 
executive pay and pay-performance sensitivity, but leaves the direction of the impacts 
indeterminate. The empirical results in this thesis show that state ownership has no 
significant impact on executive pay and on executive pay-performance sensitivity and 
therefore neither Hypothesis 4a nor Hypothesis 4b is supported. The results are robust 
to different proxies of state ownership and are consistent in the cases of HPD pay and 
REST pay. These results are consistent with Firth et al. (2006) in terms of the non­
significant relation between CEO pay level and state ownership, but are inconsistent 
in that Firth et al. (2006) reported a stronger likelihood of using incentive pay 
schemes in firms controlled by SOEs. However, they only reported a significant 
relationship when firm performance was measured by operating income, not when 
firm performance was measured by share returns.
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Although this issue might need more investigation, the non-significant results in this 
thesis are quite consistent with the results of the majority of previous literature on 
related topics that report on the inefficiency of state ownership (Chen 2001; Gul and 
Zhao 2000; Hovey et al. 2003). Gul and Zhao (2000) and Hovey et al. (2003) 
interpreted their non-significant results by arguing that state ownership did not 
explain much of the variations in firm performance. The non-significant relationship 
between state ownership and executive remuneration and pay-performance sensitivity 
reported in this thesis might also be because of the lack of controlling effects of state 
ownership on executive pay. But equally, this may be due to the offsetting impact of 
different effects of state ownership as I mentioned in the earlier part of this paragraph.
Both of the effects of state ownership were mentioned by the interviewees. Most of 
the interviewees mentioned the ineffectiveness of monitoring by the State as the 
dominant shareholders. Two interviewees stressed that they have to try to keep their 
executive pay levels reasonable to avoid offending government officials at a similar 
hierarchical level. One interviewee said that the firm he worked for had to be careful 
not to pay their management members more than those in the parent company which 
is a state-own company.
8.4.2. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature has shown consistent evidence of an active 
role in monitoring played by institutional investors. Institutional investors are 
expected to be more active in monitoring than individual shareholders because they 
have a legal fiduciary obligation to guard their customers’ interests: it is more difficult
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for them to “vote with their feet” due to their large holdings, and they are more 
eligible and capable of monitoring top management (David et al 1998; Gomez-Mejia 
and Wiseman 1997; Kochhar and David 1996), such as monitoring managment 
remuneration policy (Black 1992). In China’s case, institutional ownership, also 
called legal person ownership, are not allowed to trade freely in the second market, 
which in turn forces institutional investors to pay more attention to the long-term 
performance of the firms in which they invest.
Based on this argument, this thesis proposes that having higher proportions of legal 
person ownership is related to lower executive remuneration (Hypothesis 5a) and 
stronger executive pay-performance sensitivity (Hypothesis 5b). The thesis tests these 
two hypotheses by proxying legal person ownership through the use of state- 
controlled legal person ownership, foreign ownership, and private legal person 
ownership, both individually and collectively. It is found there is a positive 
relationship between HPD pay and state-controlled legal person ownership, foreign 
ownership, and private legal person ownership, while in the case of REST pay, only 
foreign ownership has a positive impact. Also, all the institutional ownership 
variables do not seem to have a significant impact on executive pay performance 
except that foreign ownership has a significant impact on REST pay-performance 
sensitivity. Hypothesis 5a is therefore not supported. Hypothesis 5b is not supported 
in the case of HPD pay, but is partly supported in the case of REST pay: higher 
institutional ownership leads to stronger REST pay-performance sensitivity, but not to 
a stronger HPD pay-performance sensitivity.
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The finding of a positive relationship between executive pay and legal person 
ownership is consistent with Firth et al. (2006), but is inconsistent with most previous 
literature, such as Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995), Bertrand & Mullainathan (2000) 
and Firth et al. (1999), who found that companies with large external/institutional 
shareholders pay their CEOs less than those with no significant external owners, and 
is also inconsistent with those in Mehran (1995), David et al. (1998) and Hartzell and 
Starks (2003). Mehran (1995) found that firms with larger percentages of their shares 
held by outside blockholders used less equity-based remuneration and suggested that 
monitoring by outside blockholders may be a substitute for incentive pay for 
executives.
David et al. (1998) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) reported that institutional investors 
have a negative impact on CEO pay and a positive impact on fostering long-term 
incentives. However, David et al. (1998) also argued that the monitoring effect 
depends on the nature of institutional investors’ relationships with firms, such as 
whether they were “pressure-resistant” or “pressure-sensitive”.
Given the quite consistent results in the literature on China of a positive effect of 
institutional ownership on firm performance, caution should be exercised in 
interpreting my results. Instead of management entrenchment, it might just be that 
those firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to employ more 
competent directors and therefore pay them more. Unfortunately, the data does not 
allow me to further explore this issue. However, this interpretation of my results are 
consistent with the argument made by Chhibber & Majumdar (1999) and Hovey 
(2003), that institutional investors, especially foreign investors, have an incentive to
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more closely monitor the management of the firms they invest in, and encourage them 
to hire highly qualified executives (Firth et al. 2006). However, in this case, it remains 
hard to explain why there is no stronger pay-performance link in those firms with 
higher proportions of foreign ownership or private legal ownership.
8.4.3 MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND CEO REMUNERATION
According to agency theory, agency cost declines as management’s ownership of 
stock rises (Jensen and Meckling 1976). As managers’ stakes rise, they bear a larger 
proportion of agency cost and are, therefore, less likely to squander corporate wealth 
by overpaying themselves. Hence, Hypothesis 6a presumes that executive cash 
remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of managerial ownership. Also 
managers are more likely to pay themselves according to firm performance, which 
gives rise to Hypothesis 6b that predicts a positive relation between managerial 
ownership and executive pay-performance sensitivity. My empirical results support 
Hypothesis 6b. However, the results also show a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and executive remuneration, which does not support 
Hypothesis 6a.
These results are consistent with Jensen & Murphy (1990b), Holdemess and Sheehan 
(1988), Hadlock & Lumer (1997) and Holdemess et al. (1999), but are inconsistent 
with Mehran(1995). Holdemess and Sheehan (1988) investig ated the relationship 
between managerial shares and managerial remuneration and found that top 
executives with higher ownership received higher cash remuneration compared to 
those in firms of similar size but whose shares were more diffusely held. Mehran
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(1995), on the contrary, reported a negative relationship between executive cash 
remuneration and managerial ownership and a negative relationship between the 
percentage of executives’ equity-based remuneration and their shareholdings. He 
argued that cash remuneration in large firms may become less important for managers 
holding significant equity stakes in the firm since the majority of their income would 
come from their equity stakes.
Mehran’s explanations provide a useful insight that helps the interpretation of my 
results. As discussed in Chapter 2, in China only a few firms have awarded 
management teams share ownership, and even when they do that, the amount is tiny, 
less than 0.01% of total shares (Lin et al. 2005) and thus may not motivate managers 
in terms of monetary income. Therefore, cash remuneration is still the most important 
part of their pay. Also, given that higher managerial ownership seems to lead to a 
stronger pay-performance link, instead of taking the higher pay level as evidence of 
management entrenchment, this thesis instead cautiously provides an alternative 
explanation: firms could be using managerial ownership as a more intrinsic 
motivation to attract and retain higher qualified managers, who are expected to be 
paid more.
The conflicting results indicated by the previous research and this study suggest that 
the agency relationship between owners and executives is very complex (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein 1995). As argued by Hambrick & Finkelstein (1995), CEO 
remuneration in management-controlled firms and in owner-managed and externally 
controlled firms is influenced by different determinants. No previous study has
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explored this issue in China (Lin et al. 2005), so further studies are required to better 
understand the function of managerial ownership in China.
8.5 Market comparisons and executive remuneration
Another determinant of executive pay that this thesis focuses on is market comparison 
factors. Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), with a sample of UK firms, found that 
market pay comparisons factors, both internal and external, are important in 
explaining both CEO and other directors’ pay dynamics. This thesis retested the 
Ezzamel and Watson models using a sample drawn from Chinese listed firms. I first 
replicated their models by using the traditional agency model to estimate the market 
going rate for executive pay (henceforth, called replicated models). I then retested the 
same models but adding the governance variables and other control variables to the 
market going estimate model (henceforth, called extended models). I found similar 
results to those found in Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002): market comparison 
factors have a significant influence on executive pay dynamics in China.
8.5.1 EXTERNAL MARKET COMPARISONS AND EXECUTIVE PAY
Hypotheses 7a and 7b were concerned with the extent to which the board of directors 
attempts to reduce any pay anomalies relative to what the market was paying for 
similar positions. Based on the results in Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), 
Hypothesis 7a predicted that external pay comparisons have a significant impact upon 
executive remuneration adjustment. My results suggest that pay anomalies in the prior 
period are important in explaining the cash pay awards to both HPDs and the REST of
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management. This finding supports Hypothesis 7a and is consistent with Ezzamel and 
Watson (1998; 2002) and previous research (Agrawal and Walkling 1994; Fama 
1980).
Based on Hypothesis 7a, Hypothesis 7b further predicted that the strength of the 
relationship between the time t+1 changes in executive cash pay and their time t pay 
anomalies is significantly greater for executives who were underpaid than for 
executives who were overpaid relative to the external comparative pay level. My 
results in the extended model of HPD pay changes show support for the prediction of 
asymmetric adjustment, which leads to the “bidding up” of executive pay, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 7b. However, I did not observed these asymmetric adjustments 
in the results of the replicated models of HPD pay changes models, the replicated 
models of REST pay changes and the extended REST pay changes models. This 
variation of results between models was also found in Ezzamel and Watson (1998), 
where they reported asymmetric adjustments in the salary models, but not in the total 
cash payment models. Therefore, my empirical results only show mixed support for 
Hypothesis 7b that there is a ‘bidding-up’ effect in executive pay adjustment and thus 
partially support the argument of Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman’s (1997) that the notion 
of “going rate” in the market is firmly abused among remuneration practitioners.
According to O'Reilly et al (1988), this “bidding-up” might be because executives 
tend to compare themselves to those who are slightly better qualified or more expert; 
and also that from the perspective of agency theory, an agent, especially when he has 
power over the board, will try to negotiate his pay up when underpaid but will try to 
avoid pay reduction when he/she is overpaid. The finding about the important impact
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of external market level does not conflict with agency theory. On the contrary, agency 
theory also suggests that market forces offer an upper boundary for executive 
compensation, as argued by Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman’s (1997). Smith and 
Szymanski (1995) argue that the market going rate can be regarded as the effect of the 
participation constraint in a principal agent model, which must be paid by a firm in 
order to retain their executives from being bid away by another firm. Also, as argued 
by Ezzamel and Watson (1998), the substantial costs related to executive recruitment 
provide a financial incentive for firms to keep their executives by offering competitive 
remuneration. Furthermore, market competition restrains the entrenchment of 
managers who are concerned about their reputation and long-term career and helps 
keep levels of compensation in line with the market rate (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 
1997).
The interviews also support the impact of external market comparison factors. To the 
question “ What internal or external reference points or comparisons do they use and 
why?” almost all of the interviewees replied that they take into account the market 
pay levels when making executive remuneration decisions. For example, one 
interviewee, who was an independent director and a remuneration committee member 
of the firm he served, said, “We try to keep our pay level of executives in line with, or 
maybe a bit higher than, the market pay level, especially the market pay level in 
similar sized firms and/or in the same industry. Otherwise, they will jump to another 
company if they are offered a better remuneration package.” Another interviewee, an 
executive director and also the board secretary, said “We refer to related remuneration 
regulations, the practices of other companies when designing our pay system...We 
normally survey the remuneration packages in all listed companies before we design
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ours. The survey focuses on: the listed companies in the same industry and the listed 
companies around this geographical area. We should make our remuneration 
competitive in the industry but we also have to take into account the acceptability of 
pay levels to society”.
8.5.2 INTERNAL COMPARISONS AND EXECUTIVE PAY
Hypothesis 8 was concerned with the impact of internal comparisons upon executive 
pay. It states that executive pay adjustment is positively related to the pay adjustment 
of their peers within the firm. It was motivated by the previous studies by O'Reilly et 
al. (1988) and Ezzamel & Watson (2002), both of which found that comparability in 
pay awards to all members of the board is essential when setting executive pay. From 
the initial analysis in Chapter 5, I have observed that HPD pay and REST pay 
increased at a similar rate every year. After controlling for other factors, there is still a 
significant and positive relationship between HPD pay and REST pay, and between 
HPD pay changes and REST pay changes. Hypothesis 8 is therefore supported.
My results are consistent with those of O'Reilly et al. (1988) and Ezzamel & Watson 
(2002). O'Reilly et al. (1988) observed that board members refer to their own pay 
when setting executives’ pay and their empirical results showed that CEO pay rose as 
the average salary of outside directors increased. Ezzamel & Watson (2002) 
investigated the determinants of, and the relations between, the cash pay awards of 
CEOs and other board members for a sample of large UK companies over the period 
of 1992-1995. They found that internal (i.e. within-board) pay comparisons were 
important in explaining both CEO and other directors’ pay awards. Social comparison
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theory, signalling theory and equity theory were used by these two studies to explain 
their results. Ezzamel & Watson (2002) argued that comparability in pay awards to all 
members of the board is essential for the firm to observe justice and fairness in pay 
and to maintain team cohesion and equality. Given that the Chinese government 
gives priority to social stability (Zou and Xiao 2005) and that the ideology of society 
is collective development and equity among people, it is not difficult to explain why I 
found similar results in China. Retaining the comparability and equality among 
management members in pay adjustment is essential for Chinese listed companies.
Finally, this thesis also investigated the relationship between CEO pay changes and 
the extent to which the other board members appear to be under or overpaid relative 
to their market pay level. As stated in Hypothesis 9, this thesis predicted that 
‘Bidding-up’ of Highest Paid Directors’ pay was most likely to occur when the rest of 
management are relatively overpaid compared to the external comparison pay level, 
which was supported by the empirical results. The results are consistent with Ezzamel 
& Watson (2002) and suggest that executive pay adjustment is affected by :1) their 
own pay levels compared to external market pay level; 2) the percentage changes in 
pay of their peers within the firm; and 3) the pay level of their peers compared to 
external pay level. These results are further supported by the interview findings. Most 
interviewees recognised the importance of retaining internal comparability. For 
example, one interviewee said, “although the people are getting familiar with the 
difference in pay levels, our culture is to average everything, particularly formed in 
the time of ‘Da Guo Fan’ [i.e., life-long employment and averaged income]. So the 
company normally adjusts executives’ pay in the same direction, though the extent 
might be different.”
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It is worth stressing that although the empirical results of this thesis have shown that 
HPD pay, REST pay and their dynamics are closely related to each other, the 
empirical analysis cannot detect the causal relationship between the two. That is, I do 
not yet know whose pay determines whose. However, my interview findings tend to 
suggest that it is more likely that REST pay is adjusted according to HPD pay rather 
than vice versa. From the interviews’ insider insights, the practice is that the board 
decides the pay packages of the Chairman and/or the CEO, and then decides the pay 
for other senior managers based on their pay packages or according to the suggestions 
by the Chairman and/or the CEO. For example, one interviewee stated clearly: “Well, 
in my firm, the executive remuneration solution is designed for the CEO. The vice 
directors are to assist him in his job and therefore they are evaluated by two factors: 
an index related to CEO, and the individual performance. For example, if the base is 
‘1’ for the CEO, each of the others is given an index between 0.6 and 0.8, depending 
on his/her responsibility. And at the year end, the pay of other senior managers is 
determined by the CEO’s pay multiplied by their index after being adjusted to reflect 
their individual performance.” Also, in Chinese business, especially in state owned 
companies, the CEO or Chairman is appointed by the government or the parent 
company (stated-owned as well), while the other senior managers are appointed and 
compensated by the CEO or the Chairman. Therefore, this thesis argues that it is more 
the case that HPD pay determines REST pay, rather than the other way round.
8.6 Conclusion
In summary, the empirical results of the data analyses in this thesis have shown mixed 
supports for agency theory and the research Hypotheses. Hypotheses la, 3a, 2b, 6b, 7a,
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and 8 are supported, while Hypotheses lb, 2a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b and 6a are not. 
Hypothesis 7b and Hypothesis 9 are partially supported. Hypothesis 9 is supported in 
terms of HPD pay, but not in the case of REST pay. Hypothesis 7b is supported by the 
results of extended HPD pay change models, but not by those of the replicated HPD 
pay change models and the REST pay change models.
This thesis provides results supporting the idea that corporate governance and market 
comparisons have a significant impact on executive pay. However, due to the special 
institutional factors in China, the empirical results concerning the governance 
variables are not exactly as predicted by the hypotheses or as found in the Western 
literature. In particular, I did not find supportive results for the monitoring effects of 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership and independent directors. Instead, 
higher institutional ownership, higher managerial ownership and/or higher 
proportions of independent directors seem to lead to higher executive pay. These 
results could be interpreted as evidence of management entrenchment or the failure of 
corporate governance, in accordance with Western literature. Moreover, taking into 
the special institutional environment in China, this thesis provides an alternative 
interpretation that the higher quality of the executives may lead to higher executive 
pay. At the very least, having a stronger pay-performance linkage related to higher 
managerial ownership and higher proportion of independent directors is a good sign. 
The conclusion is not definitive. China, a transitionally planned economy, is in a 
process of transformation with emerging elements of a market economy. Given that 
the Chinese governance systems are relatively weak, the performance of the firm and 
the behaviour of the management team greatly depend on the moral standard and the 
quality of executives.
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In terms of market comparison factors, this thesis provides relatively consistent 
support to the literature, particularly the findings of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 
2002). Both my empirical results and business insiders’ insights suggest that when 
deciding pay for executives, the board takes into account the following: the market 
pay levels, especially those firms of a similar size and in the same industry; the 
necessity to maintain within-firm comparability; and the relative pay position of their 
peers compared to the market. Although China used to be a socialist economy, it has 
been changing into a market economy. Executives in Chinese listed companies are 
now employed on contract and renew basis. Therefore, it is also necessary for a 
Chinese listed company to pay their executives at least the market rate in order to 
keep them. Within-firm equity is also important to executives.
In terms of theory, in transitional economies like China in this case, agency theory 
cannot provide full guidelines for corporate governance reform. Additional 
perspectives are required in order to understand the complexity of corporate 
governance issues in China. The results of this thesis have shown support for previous 
studies that draw on social comparison theory and equity theory. Whether there are 
some other theories that might have significant implications requires more research 
work.
The next chapter reviews the main arguments in previous chapters, discusses the 
contributions and limitations of the thesis and ends with a conclusion.
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CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Introduction
Chapter 8 discussed the main results of this thesis at a general level, focusing on the 
findings concerning the focal variables in this thesis, and related the findings to the 
research hypotheses, previous literature and institutional settings in China. By now, 
the main parts of this thesis have been covered. This chapter summarizes the main 
themes of the thesis and draws the conclusions.
The main objective of this thesis has been to investigate the determinants of executive 
remuneration in listed companies in China. Executive remuneration has been a 
controversial topic in both practice and academic research (Barkema and Gomez- 
Mejia 1998). Most of the literature on this topic area focuses on testing for the relation 
between executive remuneration and firm performance from the perspective of agency 
theory, and most studies have been conducted in the USA or the UK. This thesis 
relates executive remuneration to board characteristics, ownership structure and 
market comparison factors, in addition to those factors widely recognized in the 
literature, such as firm performance, firm size, risk and other firm characteristics. The 
empirical analyses were carried out in the context of the world’s largest transitional 
economy, China, with a panel data set of 417 Chinese listed firms over 2001 to 2003. 
In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with 10 directors (both executive 
directors and independent directors) to gain insiders’ insights into corporate 
governance and executive remuneration in China and to help understand the empirical 
quantitative results.
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The results show that board characteristics, ownership structure and market 
comparison factors all have significant explanatory power over executive 
remuneration in Chinese listed companies. Being one of the few studies on corporate 
governance and executive remuneration in China, this thesis makes significant 
contributions to the literature and has important implications for the international 
investors, business practitioners and policy makers. This final chapter recaps the 
research objectives and hypotheses of this thesis, summarizes the main findings, 
discusses the main contributions, implications and limitations, and investigates the 
possibilities for future research.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the research objectives, 
hypotheses and methods. Section 3 recapitulates the main findings. Section 4 
illustrates the contributions and implications of the thesis. Section 5 identifies the 
limitations of the thesis and suggests some avenues for future research. Section 6 
concludes the chapter.
9.2 Research background, objectives, hypotheses, and methods
This thesis is motivated by the conflicting results in the existing literature and the lack 
of studies on executive remuneration in China. Most research on the determinants of 
executive remuneration is conducted in Western economies, mostly the USA and UK, 
drawing predominantly on agency theory. China has recently been reforming its 
corporate governance system, influenced in part by Western reform experiences. This 
process raises an interesting and far-reaching question: do the traditional governance 
models used in the West function well in China?
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As outlined in Chapter 1, the main objectives of this study are two-folded: to
investigate the impact of board characteristics and ownership structure on HPD 
remuneration in Chinese listed firms; and to test and extend the models developed by 
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), exploring how the concept of internal and external 
‘market rate’, as identified in the developed economies in the West, works in a 
transitional economy like China.
The following hypotheses were developed based on the literature review, agency 
theory and the specific institutional settings of China, which relate executive pay or 
pay changes to board characteristics, different ownership structures, internal and 
external pay comparison factors.
Hypothesis la: Executive remuneration is related to the size of the board of directors. 
Hypothesis lb: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is related to the size of the 
board of directors.
Hypothesis 2a: Executive remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of 
independent directors.
Hypothesis 2b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of independent directors.
Hypothesis 3a: Executive remuneration is positively related to CEO-Chairman 
duality.
Hypothesis 3b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is negatively related to CEO- 
Chairman duality.
Hypothesis 4a: Executive remuneration is related to the proportion of state ownership. 
Hypothesis 4b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is related to the proportion of 
state ownership
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Hypothesis 5a: Executive remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of 
legal person ownership.
Hypothesis 5b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of legal person ownership.
Hypothesis 6a: Executive cash remuneration is negatively related to the proportion of 
managerial ownership.
Hypothesis 6b: Executive pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to the 
proportion of managerial ownership.
Hypothesis 7a: External market pay level has a significant effect over executive pay 
adjustment, i.e. pay anomalies have a negative impact on subsequent-period pay 
changes
Hypothesis 7b: The strength of the relationship between the time t+1 changes in 
executive cash pay and their time t pay anomalies will be significantly greater for 
executives who were underpaid than for executives who were overpaid relative to the 
comparative pay measure.
Hypothesis 8: Internal pay level has a significant effect over executive pay: executive 
pay adjustment is positive related to the pay adjustment of their peers within the firm.
Hypothesis 9: ‘Bidding-up’ of highest paid directors’ pay will be most apparent in 
the firms where the rest of management is relatively overpaid compared to the 
external comparison pay level.
To test these hypotheses, several multiple regression models were run with a panel 
data set consisting of 417 Chinese listed firms over 3 years’ periods. Models were run 
separately on Highest Paid Director (HPD) pay and the rest of management (REST) 
pay, and were run with various techniques to check for their robustness.
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9.3 Summary of discussion and findings
This thesis focuses on several key research questions: how is executive remuneration 
in China determined? Are recently-introduced Western corporate governance 
mechanisms affecting the setting of executive pay? Do market factors matter in 
shaping executive pay? Studying corporate governance and executive remuneration in 
China is very important. As discussed in Chapter 1, China has introduced a series of 
economic reforms and one of the key goals is to establish a sound corporate 
governance system to facilitate the sustainable development of Chinese enterprises. 
Management incentive is always a central issue in corporate governance and the lack 
of effective managerial incentive has been well acknowledged as a key obstacle to the 
further improvement of the Chinese economy and as a key cause for managerial 
corruption in China (Wu 2002). Therefore, this study is a timely piece of work and 
has important implications for the Chinese government and business practitioners, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter. From the academic point of view, the findings 
of this study contribute empirical evidence for the relationship between executive 
remuneration and corporate governance, and market comparison factors, drawn from 
a transitional economy.
Chapter 8 offered a detailed discussion of the main findings. Generally speaking, the 
focused variables in this thesis all have significant impact on executive remuneration, 
as briefly recapped as follows. First, this thesis unearths some interesting findings on 
the relationship between board characteristics and executive remuneration. 
Hypothesis la  predicts that board size has significant impact on executive pay, 
without specifying the direction of the impact, which is supported by the empirical
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results. I found an inverse U-shaped association between executive pay and board size 
with my sample, which suggests that executive pay initially increases with board size, 
but peaks at a certain size, and then decreases as board size further increases. This 
finding is not consistent with the previous literature. It is not predicted by agency 
theory but does support the argument that the effect of board size is complex and is 
moderated by other factors such as board independence, board roles and firm size 
(Dalton et al. 1999). Further research is needed in order to better understand the 
relationship between board size, board effectiveness and executive pay. I also found 
that executive pay is positively related to the proportion of independent directors 
which runs counter to the prediction of agency theory and Hypothesis 2a. It seems 
that in China’s context, this result could be taken to suggest that independent directors 
are inefficient in monitoring top management, which supports previous studies (Peng 
2004). However, given the typically low pay levels of Chinese executives reported, 
the interpretation should be cautious. Alternative explanations of the result can be that 
more independent directors help companies bit for better quality executives who 
deserve higher pay, or that more independent directors are more likely to bring 
executive pay up to market level. Consistent with agency theory, I found a positive 
relationship between CEO and chairman duality and HPD remuneration (though not 
REST remuneration), suggesting that HPDs in firms with CEO-chairman duality are 
paid more compared to those without duality, which supports Hypothesis 3 a.
In terms of executive pay-performance sensitivity, this thesis found that only the 
proportion of independent directors has a positive impact on HPD per-performance 
sensitivity and therefore supports Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis lb and 3b are not
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supported, because board size and board leadership structure do not have a significant 
impact on executive pay-performance sensitivity.
In terms of ownership structure, I found no significant result for state ownership 
which is consistent with the literature (Chen 2001; Gul and Zhao 2000), therefore 
Hypothesis 4a is not supported. This might be due to the off-setting impacts of state 
ownership on executive remuneration: on the one hand, the state might be under the 
pressure to keep the executive pay controlled in order to maintain the balance between 
government appointed business executives and government bureaucrats; on the other 
hand, the inefficient and ineffective supervision due to the lack of real shareholders 
might provide a chance for executives to overpay themselves.
I also found positive and significant relations between HPD pay and the proportion of 
domestic legal person ownership, foreign ownership and managerial ownership, 
which is inconsistent with agency theory and is counter to Hypothesis 5a and 6a. 
While the impact of managerial ownership is complex in the Western literature, the 
monitoring effect of institutional ownership is quite consistent. Given the quite 
consistent results in the literature of a positive effect of Chinese institutional 
ownership on firm performance (Chen 2001; Gul and Zhao 2000), these results may 
be understood as evidence that firms with higher institutional ownership or 
managerial ownership are more likely to employ more competent directors whose pay 
will naturally be higher (Firth et al. 2006), rather than as indicative of management 
entrenchment or non-performance of institutional monitoring.
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Only managerial ownership and foreign ownership have a significant impact on 
executive pay-performance sensitivity. HPD pay-performance sensitivity is positively 
related to managerial ownership, while REST pay-performance sensitivity is 
positively related to foreign ownership, therefore Hypothesis 5b and 6b both receive 
some empirical support. These results suggest that firms with higher managerial 
ownership and foreign ownership are more likely to link their executive pay to firm 
performance. State ownership has no significant impact on executive pay- 
performance sensitivity and thus Hypothesis 4a is not supported.
These results were based on OLS pooled cross-sectional analyses. Once I controlled 
for both observed firm characteristics and unobserved firm specific effects by running 
the fixed effect models with the same panel data, I can no longer conclude that there 
are significant relationships between institutional ownership and executive pay. The 
firm effects are significant, which suggests that firm heterogeity is important in 
shaping executive pay. This finding is similar to that in Himmelberg et al (1999), 
who found significant results with OLS cross-sectional analyses, which disappeared 
when they ran, fixed effects models. The changes in the results from OLS models and 
fixed effect models might be due to the lack of variation in the data of most ownership 
variables (Firth et al 1999; Himmelberg et al 1999; Zhou 2001).
In addition to board characteristics and ownership structure, this thesis also built on 
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) and explored whether the internal and external 
market going rate also affect the dynamics of executive remuneration in China. I first 
defined and ran the models as in Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002), using traditional 
agency executive pay model to estimate the comparison pay level and pay anomalies
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(called replicated models), and then I modified the definition of what constitutes a pay 
anomaly by using the estimating pay models which take into account governance 
variables and control variables (called extended models).
As presented in Chapter 7 and further discussed in Chapter 8, the two versions of 
models produced generally consistent results. Previous pay anomalies from the 
external market level have significant explanatory power over both subsequent HPD 
pay adjustments and REST pay adjustment; therefore, Hypothesis 7a is supported. 
The concept of “market going rate” also functions in China, a traditionally planned 
economy. Chinese listed firms adjust their executive pay in a way to be in line with 
the market, as do their Western counterparts. However, in terms of Hypothesis 7b, 
which captures the ‘bidding-up’ phenomenon in executive pay adjustment found in 
the UK firms by Ezzamel and Watson (2002), this thesis did not find consistent 
support. Only the results of the extended HPD pay change models suggest that there is 
an asymmetric adjustments to previous pay anomalies between overpaid HPDs and 
underpaid HPDs. Other models, both the replicated HPD and REST pay change 
models and the extended REST pay change models, do not show support for 
Hypothesis 7b.
Therefore, concerning the effects of external market comparison factors, the results in 
this thesis consistently suggest that there is a significant impact of external 
comparison factors on executive pay; i.e., firms are trying to bring their executive pay 
towards the external market pay level. However, the results concerning whether there 
is a difference between the degree of the impact of pay anomalies on the pay 
adjustment process for overpaid executives and that for the underpaid executives, are
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sensitive to how the pay anomalies are estimated in the first place and require further 
investigation.
Hypotheses 8 and 9 dealt with the effects of internal comparison factors. This thesis 
provides results that support the idea that internal comparison factors have a 
significant impact on executive pay. These effects were initially identified in the 
executive pay level models, in Chapter 6, which found that HPD pay and REST pay 
have significant explanatory power over each other. This idea was further explored in 
the pay dynamics models in Chapter 7, in which the results of pay dynamics models 
show that the changes in HPD pay can be explained by the changes in REST pay and 
REST pay anomalies, and vice versa. The insiders’ insights suggest that it is more 
likely that REST pay is determined by HPD pay, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
Hypothesis 9 proposes that the ‘bidding up’ adjustments for HPD pay are more 
apparent in firms where the rest of management are relatively overpaid, which is 
supported by the results of the HPD pay change models. However, in the case of 
REST pay, such effects can not be observed.
Generally speaking, the results of this thesis are quite consistent with the findings in 
Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002): the market comparison factors, both internal and 
external, that have been shaping executive pay adjustments in listed companies in the 
West seem to also function in transitional economies like China. These findings are 
not conflicting with agency theory, as discussed in Chapter 8. In addition, the findings 
seem to support the application of social comparison theory and equity theory in 
China’s executive remuneration settings, though these are not the guiding theories in 
this thesis.
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Moreover, both the pay level models and the pay dynamics models yield robust 
results concerning the positive association of the change in pay and the change in firm 
size and accounting performance, which supports agency theory and is consistent with 
previous literature (Groves et al. 1994, 1995; Mengistae and Xu 2004). Also, other 
observable firm characteristics, such as firm diversification, risk, capital structure, 
location and industries, all have significant effects on executive pay. Although these 
factors are not the focus of this study, the findings provide useful insights into the 
determination of executive remuneration.
In summary, the empirical results of the data analyses show mixed support for agency 
theory and Hypotheses. Hypotheses la, 3a, 2b, 6b, 7a, and 8 are supported, while 
Hypotheses lb, 2a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b and 6a are not. Hypotheses 7b and 9 receive 
mixed support. Hypothesis 7b is supported by the results of extended HPD pay 
change models, but not by those of the replicated HPD and REST pay change models 
and the extended REST pay change models. Hypothesis 9 is supported by HPD pay 
change models, but not REST pay change models. From theoretical perspective, in 
transitional economies, China in this case, agency theory can probably not provide 
full guidelines for corporate governance reform. Additional perspectives are required 
in order to understand the complication of the corporate governance issues in China. 
The results have shown support for social comparison theory and equity theory. 
Whether there are some other theories that might have significant implications 
requires more research work.
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9.4 Contributions and implications
This study is intended as a contribution to the literature on corporate governance and 
executive remuneration, as well as providing help to policy makers and practitioners 
of corporate control in a transitional economy such as China.
9.4.1 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
Empirically, this thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, the 
thesis provides empirical evidence on the relationship between executive 
remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of directors 
and ownership structure, which is a significant departure from the majority of 
previous literature on executive remuneration, that usually examines the relationship 
between executive remuneration and firm performance (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 
1998; Cony on and Peck 1998). The results show that corporate governance has a 
significant role to play in shaping executive remuneration in Chinese listed firms. 
However, due to the specific institutional environment in which the Chinese firms are 
operating, the roles that the governance mechanisms play might deviate from what 
they have been expected to fulfil in the West.
Secondly, this thesis is among the first pieces of work to explore the extent to which 
Western corporate governance models work in China, a planned economy transiting 
towards a market economy. Particularly, this thesis is the first study to explore how 
the concept of the internal and external ‘market going rate’, both internal and external 
market pay comparisons, impact the pay dynamics of executive pay in China. It
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provides empirical support for the findings of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) and 
therefore suggests that the market comparison factors that work in the West equally 
function in China.
Thirdly, this thesis examines determinants of executive pay both in terms of the 
highest paid directors and the rest of management members. The pay dynamics for 
management members other than CEOs or HPDs has been largely unexplored and 
thus this thesis is one of the few exceptions in the literature to shed lights on this area, 
which will hopefully provide helpful insights for business practitioners and academics 
interested in the between-firm and within-firm comparison pay levels.
Fourthly, this thesis offers precious insiders’ insights from interviews conducted with 
10 current directors of Chinese listed companies, which is rare in the literature on 
corporate governance and executive remuneration. These insiders’ insights have not 
only helped understand and interpret the results of quantitative analyses, but also 
provided guidance in clarifying some direction and causation of the empirical results 
that the quantitative analysis itself can not clarify, such as the relationship between 
HPD pay and REST pay.
Finally, the results of this thesis yield robust results of a significant and positive 
association between HPD pay and firm accounting performance, but not market based 
performance. Although the association is not the focus of this study, this finding is 
interesting and suggests that how firm performance is measured is important in this 
kind of research. The results of other control variables also provide useful insights 
into the determination of executive remuneration in China.
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Theoretically, my results have offered mixed support for traditional agency theory. It 
suggests that although agency theory can provide a helpful guide in studying 
corporate governance in China, by itself it is not sufficient to explain executive 
remuneration. Also, a straightforward application of traditional Western governance 
models, though endorsed by CSRC in policy making, might not be very fruitful as 
Chinese firms are characterized by significant institutional differences compared to 
Western firms, such as the existence of dominating state ownership and the lack of 
legal protections of shareholders’ rights (Cha 2001), as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Although traditional agency governance models might work well, their operation 
depends on a series of institutional back-up settings, which China might not yet have.
In addition, alternative theories are needed in order to better understand corporate 
governance issues in a transitional economy like China, see also Peng (2004) and Tian 
and Lau (2001). By retesting the models of Ezzamel and Watson (1998; 2002) in 
China’s context, this thesis shows supportive evidence for the application of social 
comparison theory and equity theory in explaining executive remuneration in China.
The need to consider theoretical perspectives on executive remuneration other than 
agency theory has been recognized by other authors, for example, Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia (1998) have suggested that researchers on executive remuneration 
should broaden the theoretical base of research by ways such as combining agency 
theory with other theories. Also, Conyon and Murphy (2000) suggested that a variety 
of economic, political, and cultural factors can help explain the difference in 
executive remuneration schemes, such as income tax, attitude towards risk. This area 
requires further research.
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9.4.2 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings in this thesis have valuable implications for regulators, listed companies 
and their international investors in China.
Security regulators all over the world have recognized the importance of corporate 
governance in enhancing firms’ investment values (Bai et al. 2006) and monitoring 
managerial behaviours. They have proposed various best practice codes to improve a 
firm’s overall governance standard. Chinese regulators in recent years have also 
introduced a series of corporate governance reforms, generally borrowed from 
Western countries. This thesis has shed light on the relative importance of various 
corporate governance practices in determining executive remuneration. It provides 
useful information for Chinese regulatory authorities to design best practice codes 
tailored to the Chinese institutional background and to the current level of their 
corporate governance mechanisms, especially in terms of managerial incentive issues.
The results provided in the thesis suggest that a straightforward application of 
traditional Western governance models, though endorsed by CSRC in policy making, 
might not be very fruitful. Chinese firms are characterized by significant institutional 
differences compared to Western firms, such as substantial government intervention 
into business management, weak legal protection to shareholders’ right, naive 
individual investors, and lack of effective management incentives and constraints 
(Cha 2001; Tam 2002). Therefore, before embracing Western governance models, 
Chinese policy makers should carefully consider the institutions - the legal, social and 
economic infrastructure - that are needed to make the models function as expected
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(Clarke 2003). More specifically, this thesis does not observe an effective monitoring 
effect from Chinese independent directors and institutional shareholders. These results 
might disappoint those who expect to maximize shareholder value and solve the 
agency problem by relying on more appointments of independent directors and the 
activism of institutional shareholders. Based on the findings of this study and also 
drawing on previous literature, a number of implications for policy makers are 
discussed below.
First, further ownership reform is needed. As shown in my sample, the majority of 
shares of Chinese listed firms are in the hands of the state or state controlled legal 
persons and these shares are not tradable. The highly concentrated ownership 
structure, especially state ownership, have been seen to cause problems such as the 
lack of liquidity of the secondary market, inefficient stock markets and the absence of 
effective shareholder monitoring. This thesis joins other authors (Chen 2001; Lin 
2004; Tenev and Zhang 2002) in suggesting that the Chinese government should 
gradually float the un-tradable shares owned by the state, by ways like selling them to 
existing non-government shareholders, transferring them to financial institutional 
shareholders or transforming them into preferred non-voting shares (Lin 2004).
Second, the importance of the independence of the board of directors should be 
highlighted. Board independence is not easily achieved by simply hiring more 
independent directors, though this might be a step in the right direction. More 
attention should be paid to how these directors are appointed and also how they could 
be induced to act in the shareholders’ interests, especially those of the minority 
shareholders. It might be worth attempting to establish an efficient labour market of
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independent directors in China. With such a market, listed companies can have a 
bigger pool to select and appoint independent directors rather than appointing from 
those known and recommended by the top management. Also, with such a market, 
independent directors are more likely to maintain their reputations and have a forum 
to seek support if needed.
Third, executive remuneration structure should be reformed. Current remuneration 
structures for top managers are too simple and unlikely to provide enough incentives 
to curb opportunistic behaviour. As argued by Monks (2001) and also Jensen and 
Murphy (1990a), it not how much but how CEOs are paid that matters. Although this 
thesis suggests a positive linkage between executive pay and accounting-based 
performance in China (not in terms of market-based performance), the linkage is too 
simple -  generally only in the form of a cash bonus. To induce directors and top 
executives to act in the best interest of owners, a performance-related, market-based 
and long-term oriented executive compensation scheme needs to be designed and 
implemented. For example, multi-year bonus plans, in which not the level but the 
sustainable rise of profits should be the base for performance measurement. Or 
alternatively, a personal “bonus-accounf ’ without floors and caps can be used to sum 
up positive and negative bonuses and pay out the positive bonuses only partly at the 
end of the year (Gebistorf 2002). Such a bonus-account will help entice managers not 
to maximize short-term profits at a cost of a long-term rise of shareholder value.
Fourth, more transparent financial information disclosure should be encouraged, or 
even legally required. The importance of information disclosure has been highlighted
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by some Western rules, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)43. Improved financial 
transparency will help investors in fulfilling their monitoring and oversight roles, 
which is even more important in China where insider transactions are prevalent (Lin 
2004). This thesis agrees with Firth et al (2006) in advocating greater disclosure of 
CEO and top management remuneration in China, especially those implicit incomes 
or benefits.
Last but not least, there have been some recommendations concerning stock options 
(Firth et al. 2006; Wu 2002). In western countries, managerial ownership works quite 
well. As stated by Wu (2002), more than 50% of American companies use long-term 
incentive plans, which is thought to be one of the main factors that contribute to the 
competitive advantage of American enterprises for the last 20 years. Though there is 
no generally optimal managerial ownership level and it is not possible to predict a 
priori whether or not the profits gained through higher incentives will outweigh the 
costs of managerial ownership (Himmelberg et al 1999), a general conclusion that 
can be drawn from the empirical studies is that managerial stock options improve the 
chances of aligning the interests of managers with those of the shareholders. 
Therefore, many researchers and practitioners, such as Wu (2002) and Zhi (2003), 
advocate the introduction of managerial ownership and stock options into China’s 
listed companies.
However, improving the structure of compensation packages is just a good start. 
There are some conditions that need establishing first to make managerial ownership
43 also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act o f  2002, is a 
United States federal law passed in response to a number of major corporate and accounting scandals, 
e.g., Enron, Tyco International, and WorldCom, in order to rebuild public trust in accounting and 
reporting practices. It provides a framework of information disclosure requirements on auditor firms, 
offices, CPAs, services, fees, compliance/enforcement actions and other critical issues.
310
CHAPTER 9 SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS
an effective incentive, as suggested by Wu (2002) and Zhi (2003), both in terms of 
incentive and restraint. External environments that might affect the function of 
managerial ownership mainly include the legal environment and the market 
environment. The legal environment, such as Corporate Law and Security Law etc., 
will affect decisions taken and their effectiveness in terms of choosing incentive 
mechanisms. The market environment such as the labour market, the product market, 
and the stock market are all essential to the functioning of managerial ownership. All 
these mechanisms can affect managerial incentives and firm performance. For 
example, the labour market can motivate managers to maintain their human capital by 
avoiding opportunistic behaviour.
As Monks (2001:222) stated, “Executive compensation unrelated to performance is 
just one symptom of a corporate governance system that fails to ensure management 
accountability”. Mechanisms within the framework of corporate governance are not 
isolated. Instead, they often work together and mutually strengthen each other. 
Changes of ownership structure, reforms of boards of directors and strengthening of 
the function of supervisory boards are all necessary elements for the effectiveness of 
managerial incentives.
Boards of directors are only one component of a larger governance ‘package’ 
consisting of internal and external mechanisms. At present, external Chinese 
governance mechanisms are relatively weak (Peng 2004). For example, state 
ownership still dominates the stock market, controlling about 49% of the shares in my 
sample, with little evidence of favourable governance effects. Chinese financial 
institutions, most of which are state-owned, account for a very small percentage of
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both market capitalization and number of shares. In the long run, financial 
institutional investors such as investment and pension funds, which have not had 
much monitoring impact in emerging economies, may accumulate more shares, 
demand board representations, and become more active and effective monitors (Peng 
2004).
Overall, the economic and legal environment should be improved in order to 
effectively deal with the problem of incentive and restraints. Only in these conditions 
can managerial ownership incentive be expected to work. It has been suggested that 
any fundamental improvement in China’s corporate governance will require a broad 
program that encompasses not only privatization but also laws and their effective 
implementation to provide better protection for investors.
9.5 Limitations and future research
One of the unavoidable limitations of this thesis is that I was only able to proxy 
executive pay using the cash components. Stock options (though still rare), benefits or 
other forms of payment that were not disclosed in the annual reports were not 
included. Again, due to the lack of data, my analysis does not control for HPD 
individual characteristics. Future research may be able to rectify these limitations 
once the data becomes available.
Moreover, the thesis focused on the impact of different types of ownership on HPD 
pay. Future research can examine whether different types of shareholders, especially
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different groups of institutional investors, have a significant impact on corporate 
governance, particularly executive remuneration, in China.
Furthermore, the sample was drawn from A-share listed companies only and the 
results may not be generalized to Chinese firms listed in HongKong, New York or 
other overseas stock exchanges. Future research is needed to address diversity of the 
forms of Chinese companies in terms of the international stock market in which they 
are registered.
Also, this thesis has found some results that depart from the majority findings in 
Western literature. These departures in results might be attributed to the different 
institutional settings of the transitional economy of China from Western countries. 
However, are these results common to transitional economies, or are they just special 
to China? This is another interesting issue for future research to consider.
Finally, while a number of clear results have been obtained from this study, it is also 
recognized that the mixed results relating to certain variables require further research. 
For example, future research could further investigate the issue of why market based 
performance and accounting performance yield different results. Alternative 
specifications of performance would also be worth exploring. Further research is 
required to systematically examine what drives the finding that executives in firms 
with higher institutional ownership are paid more.
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9.6 Summary and conclusion
The vast majority of studies dealing with determinants of executive pay use data 
drawn from Anglo-Saxon economies. We know precious little about executive pay 
dynamics and their determinants in contexts other than those of advanced capitalist 
countries.
With a sample of 417 Chinese listed firms, this thesis has examined the determinants 
of executive pay in the transitional economy of China, focusing on the impact of 
board characteristics, ownership structure, and internal and external market 
comparison factors. The evidence here has shown mixed support for agency theory, 
and this mixed support may be due to the transitional environment in which Chinese 
listed firms are operating. The development of corporate governance in the West has 
offered useful insights in terms of what might be considered the code of best practice. 
However, it is not advisable that China should copy these models wholesale. It should 
be realized by the Chinese regulators that different countries are likely to achieve high 
standards of corporate governance through the application of different mixture of 
shareholder activism, self-regulation, external regulation, statute law and law 
enforcement (Chambers 2005). The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the 
governance of executive pay in China will continue to be an important policy and 
research issue for the foreseeable future.
To recap, this thesis has been organized as follows: Chapter 1 raised the research 
questions, introduced the research background, motivations and the main objectives of 
this study, and discussed the significance of this study. Chapter 2 first introduced the
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development and current position of corporate governance and executive 
remuneration in China, which provides the institutional background for this thesis. 
Chapter 3 reviewed agency theory and the empirical literature on executive 
remuneration, based on which, and China’s specific background, research hypotheses 
were developed. Chapter 4 defined the research methods used in this thesis; Chapters 
5, 6 and 7 applied the methods to analyze the data, tested the research hypotheses, and 
presented and discussed the results. Chapter 8 linked the empirical results to research 
hypotheses, previous literature and Chinese institutional background, and provided an 
inter-chapter discussion. Chapter 9 provided a summary of the thesis, recapped the 
main results of this study, discussed its contributions, implications and limitations, 
and explored opportunities for future studies.
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Appendix 1 
Outline of the Interview
--on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Firms
Interviewee:
Company Name:
Position and years in the firm and that position:
Time and Place:
Questions (Qs)
1. Does your company have a remuneration committee? (If yes —» Q2, if no—» Q5 )
2. About memberships of remuneration committee:
> How many members are there in your remuneration committee?
> How many are non-executive directors?
> Where are they from?
3. Who select them? Who appoint them? (Who determines the remuneration 
committee, why it is these people and not others)
4. Does the remuneration committee use consultants to decide executive 
remuneration?
Turn to Q 9
5. Who determines the CEO and other top managers’ remuneration committee? 
And who selects those people who determine the remuneration?
6. How are they selected? Why is it these people and not others?
7. Are they formally known as the people who set the remuneration levels, do they 
engage consultants to help them decide on the remuneration levels? How doe the 
committee determine remuneration for the CEO and other top managers?
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8. What factors do you think are taken into account when setting executive 
remuneration?
Reminders:
> Directors’ characteristics (Age, Experience, Education, Tenure, the year with 
the company, Professional qualifications, etc.)
> Company characteristics (Size, Profit, industry, competition, etc.)
9. What internal or external reference points or comparisons do they use and why? 
Industry/ Whole market pay level/ similar firm?)
10. When do they use benchmark? Are they really using them (for moving up or 
down)?
11. What dynamics do you take if they find directors underpaid or overpaid? (Do you 
adjust one-off in the following year or over the following years?)?
12. Do you have a special fund for executive compensation?
13. Does it disclose in your financial reports?
14. Why the special compensation fund isn’t made public in the financial Statements?
15. How much is the special fund for compensation that is not disclosed in the 
accounts compared to the figures published in the accounts?
16. How special compensation fund is determined (company characteristics/external 
characteristics?)
> Do you use external benchmark in deciding this special compensation fund?
> How do you know if they are all confidential?
> Where does this special fund appear?
> Do you have this fund even when the company is making losses?
17. Do you use stock option for executive compensation in your company?
18. How do you think of stock options as a compensation method, in China 
specifically? Why?
